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Executive summary
The ‘Warning on Crime’ (WOC) project (www.warningoncrime.eu) has been carried out with the financial support of 
the European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), in the framework of the 
Programme Prevention of and Fight against Crime (ISEC). The research is a comparative study on criminal infiltration 
and corruption in public procurement, involving all Member States (MSs) except Belgium, Cyprus, and Greece.
The aim is to compare the vulnerability of public procurement across 25 MSs, as well as legislation and measures 
adopted to prevent and reduce it, with a view to clarifying what makes public procurement a ground for fruitful 
cooperation among white-collar criminals, unfaithful public officers, and members of criminal organisations. 
Specific attention is paid to major and cross-border public works. The report is divided into four chapters. 
Chapter 1 reflects on the available legal framework on countering illegality in public procurement; 
chapter 2 presents the assessment of vulnerability of public procurement; chapter 3 describes the preventive 
measures put in place in MSs; and chapter 4 analyses the control measures envisaged in the post-tender phase.
The Legal framework
Countering illegality in public procurement through law provisions involves different legal rules and soft-law tools. 
The legislative framework focuses on four areas: criminal organisations, bribery, public procurement law, and 
integrity pacts.
All the countries studied criminalise criminal organisations in conformity with Council Framework Decision 
2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime, and in most of them the offence could 
represent a tool to punish groups – provided they meet the requirements established by law – that run criminal 
activities, including corruption, related with public procurement. In addition, the Italian legal system specifically 
envisages the offence of mafia-type association, which explicitly mentions public procurement. The Austrian 
legislation includes an offence of criminal association, which can also encompass corruption. However, case law is 
very limited across MSs.
The legal framework on bribery and trading in influence has been subjected to a process of evolution and 
approximation across MSs, and although loopholes and contradictions remain, the overall response results much 
more comprehensive than a few years ago.
New directives on public procurement focus the attention on prevention, transparency, and accountability as 
means to reduce illegality in public procurement. The research shows that the transposition of rules on the 
grounds for exclusion and subcontracting varies significantly across countries. This is partly connected with the 
idea that public procurement is a nationwide market which needs to face local threats in terms of illegality, and 
also take into account a more technical consideration on the degree of discretion the legislator intends to leave to 
the contracting authority.
Soft-law instruments are gaining more relevance in countering illegality in public procurement. Integrity pacts – a 
tool developed by Transparency International (TI), consisting of an agreement signed by the contracting authority, 
bidders, and an independent monitor, which commit themselves to refraining from any form of corruption and 
collusion – are about to be tested in 11 countries on 17 projects co-financed by the EU structural funds and the 
Cohesion Fund. Italy has a longstanding experience of legality pacts signed over the years, which commit the 
parties to adopting specific actions to implement legal rules countering corruption and organised crime and to 
enhancing integrity and transparency in the public procurement cycle. In the major public work studied, the Turin-
Lyon high-speed railway line, a soft-law instrument (reglement des contracts) has been used to provide common 
rules for this public work, regardless of the nationality of the bidders involved. In particular, it extends Italian 
anti-mafia controls to all bidders involved in works execution. However, as for most soft-law instruments, it is 
debatable whether it could have a binding value before an administrative court in the case of complaints.
8The vulnerability of the public procurement lifecycle
The public procurement lifecycle is vulnerable to crime. Some business sectors turn out to be more exposed 
thereto: construction and healthcare are highly vulnerable. Transportation, energy, waste disposal, and IT and 
telecommunication are all medium/high-risk sectors, with differences across countries. For those countries that 
still have a mining industry, this sector is considered highly vulnerable. Public procurement related to the defence 
sector lacks transparency. Social services and education is emerging as a new sector where public procurement 
is becoming increasingly vulnerable. The vulnerability of several of the countries under investigation is closely 
intertwined with the exposure to corruption and illegality of local governments and state-owned enterprises.
The whole procurement cycle (pre-tender, tender, and post-tender phases) is vulnerable. In the pre-tender phase, 
however, the planning stage – the one preceding the beginning of the procedure – is considered highly vulnerable 
in almost half of the countries, and features some problems concerning the adoption of countermeasures. All of 
this is due to manipulation of needs and of funding allocation, as well as to the risk of disclosure of information.
The lack of clarity of tender specifications and the submission of a low bid price accompanied by extensive 
possibilities of expanding the contract in the post-award phase are often observed in most countries.
The tender phase is highly regulated. The selection procedure, however, features a high/medium risk in 60% of the 
countries due to non-objective or inadequate weighting of selection criteria and manipulation of the evaluation 
board. The misuse, too, of judicial actions by bidders appears to be a concrete risk in most countries.
Overall the post-tender phase turns out to be the most risky. The contracting authority seems to forget the 
contract after it is signed, and in most countries there is no authority to monitor contract execution.
Low-quality material, inflated work volume and costs, and delays in works execution are all widespread problems, 
particularly – but not exclusively – in relation to public works. 
The prevention system in public procurement
Due to the various risks affecting the public procurement lifecycle, the prevention system is rather complex and 
constantly evolving. It includes prevention bodies and tools.
Beside the role played by the court of audits in monitoring the use of public funds, there is a wide range of bodies 
in MSs,  focused on prevention of corruption and organised crime, and whose action concerns public procurement. 
Some MSs have specific bodies in place whose task is to counter crime and illegality in public procurement, albeit 
with differences across countries.
As far as prevention tools are concerned, the Netherlands and Italy boast specific measures aimed at monitoring 
companies and their owners and legal representatives. In Italy, these checks are carried out in the framework of 
the anti-mafia legislation.
Red flags are emerging from among the various tools used to monitor misconduct in public procurement. Red 
flags are warning signals on potential issues to be addressed, such as corruption, misconduct, and frauds. 
Although these indicators are considered useful predictors for the risk of corruption, only eight countries use 
some types of red flags with national specificities.
Debarment measures are used in 14 MSs. White lists work as a pre-selection condition to choose companies that 
will take part in the bidding process, while black lists entail a procedure that excludes companies and individuals. 
In all countries but Romania, these tools are managed by public authorities. In spite of the general recognition of 
the usefulness of these tools as an incentive to comply with law provisions and as a reputational sanction, their 
use is not yet widespread due to practical difficulties in managing them (risk of manipulation and difficulties in 
defining clear criteria and rules for the appeal).
Databases are a crucial tool to share information for law enforcement purposes. With the exception of Italy and 
the Netherlands, the use of databases to monitor companies is not yet so common. Owing to the lack of common 
rules at EU level and to national public procurement markets with limited access for foreign bidders, the set-up of 
a common information-sharing mechanism on companies is not high on the agenda.
Control measure in the post-award phase
Control measures that are common in all MSs in the post-tender phase can be divided into two groups:
OO internal monitoring, usually performed by the contracting authority; 
OO external monitoring, carried out by independent and external institutions (such as courts of auditors, finance 
or tax agencies, labour inspectorates, etc.), which generally focus their attention on economic and financial 
aspects, transparency of accounts, compliance with labour laws, etc.
9Besides, only Italy boast control systems focused on abusive practices that can be observed during public contract 
execution. In particular, Italy is the only MS with special law enforcement units responsible for carrying out 
monitoring and investigative activities in relation to major public works. All other MSs do not make any distinction 
– among control and/or monitoring bodies – based on the type of public works.
Two thirds of MSs feature law enforcement bodies specialised in detecting corruption in various economic 
sectors, including public procurement. Half of these countries also feature a specialised prosecutor’s office in 
charge of prosecuting corruption.
Along with these bodies, one third of the countries have special law enforcement units in place, which have 
been specifically established to investigate serious organised crime and/or economic and financial crimes. 




The 2-year ‘Warning on Crime’ (WOC) project started in March 2014, and includes the following 
activities:
OO three background analyses on: a) EU legislative framework on bribery, organised crime, and public 
procurement; (b) modus operandi of organised crime infiltration in the legitimate economy and in 
particular in public procurement; and (c) studies on the public discourse about organised crime 
infiltration in public works;
OO a case study on the Turin-Lyon high-speed railway line major work. This activity was aimed at 
outlining the measures that have been implemented with a view to countering crime in public 
procurement;
OO a comparative study on vulnerability of public procurement across 25 Member States (MSs), as 
well as on legislation and measures adopted to prevent and counter it.
The project idea emerged from the known presence of organised crime infiltration in public 
procurement in Italy and the current globalisation of crime, as well as from the construction of the 
Turin-Lyon high-speed railway line, which has been an object of interest for criminal groups. This idea 
led the research group of the Law Department of the University of Turin and Professor Fabio Armao 
as advisor to decide to focus on the vulnerability of public procurement to criminal infiltration and 
corruption. Correlations between corruption and organised crime, although having been recognised 
recently by some academics and EU institutions (Buscaglia and van Dijk, 2005; Gounev and Ruggiero, 
2014; Europol, 2009) are still little explored due to the lack of awareness of relationships between 
them, as well as due to disciplinary segmentation of scholars and policy-makers, and difficulties in 
defining organised crime.
The project tried to further investigate the legal framework, the vulnerability of public procurement, 
and the existence of a prevention and control system, having in mind both phenomena.
This report presents the results of the comparative study involving all MSs, except Belgium, Cyprus, 
and Greece, with specific references to major public works.
The report is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 reflects on the available legal framework on 
countering illegality in public procurement; chapter 2 presents the assessment of vulnerability of 
public procurement; chapter 3 describes the preventive system put in place in MSs; and chapter 4 
analyses the control measures envisaged in the post-tender phase. The main findings summarise the 
main results, and suggest some recommendations. Annex 1 contains the questionnaire and Annex 2 
the methodological remarks as well as the answers to questions 9, 12, 13, and 14. Annex 3 contains 
the executive summary of this report translated into 13 languages in order to promote dissemination 
in EU MSs and neighbouring countries.
The project website (www.warningoncrime.eu) contains this report as well as all background studies. 
It furthermore presents country profiles of the MSs analysed.
The website also includes a repository of publications and main case law across the countries.
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The legal framework
This chapter analyses the legal framework of MSs from a specific point of view. Public procurement 
is of crucial importance for the internal market of the EU and MSs. As reported by the EU Anti-
Corruption Report (EC, 2014), one fifth of EU GDP is spent yearly by European contracting entities 
on goods, works, and services. A 2013 study (Wesink and De Wet, 2013) aimed at estimating the 
cost of corruption in public procurement in eight MSs (France, Italy, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, and Spain) for five major sectors (i.e. road and rail, water and waste, urban/utility 
construction, training, and research and development) ranged from €1.4 billion up to €2.2 billion.
These figures make crystal clear why public procurement is an attractive sector for criminals 
involved in different criminal practices. Public procurement is a field of valuable and successful 
cooperation among white-collar criminals, unfaithful public officers, and members of criminal 
organisations. For this reason, the choice was to widen the analysis, including the offence related to 
participation in a criminal organisation and those related to corruptive practices. This also means, on 
the other hand, that the analysis will be narrowed on how these offences can be applied to criminal 
activities in public procurement.
Moreover, a specific focus will be on the first evidence from the transposition by MSs of the articles 
of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (Text with EEA relevance) aimed at 
preventing criminal activities in this area. 
Finally, soft-law instruments consisting of integrity pacts will be analysed.
1. Criminal organisations and public procurement: any space for 
sanctioning the involvement of organised crime in public procurement?
The first two questions of the questionnaire deal with the provisions in national legislation on the 
offences relating to participation in a criminal organisation.
As previously outlined1, Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the 
fight against organised crime maintained the dual approach of the so-called ‘civil law’ and ‘common 
law’ models, giving MSs the possibility to choose whether to punish participation in a criminal 
organisation and/or conspiracy to commit criminal offences. According to the researchers, all 
MSs - with the exception of Denmark and Sweden - have transposed Article 2 of the framework 
decision under scrutiny. This means that all MSs have in their legal system a self-standing provision 
that punishes organised crime. Taking into account the recent development in the legislation of 
the United Kingdom, which in July 2015 introduced the ‘offence of participation in activities of an 
organised criminal group’, the dual approach has today the sole effect of providing an ‘EU umbrella’ to 
those countries that have chosen to punish both behaviours (Bulgaria, Croatia, Ireland, and Malta in 
addition to the United Kingdom).
As pointed out by a recent report on the transposition of Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA (Di 
Nicola et al., 2015), the level of compliance with EU legislation is very high: all key elements have 
been transposed and only few discrepancies remain.
Looking at this offence from the point of view of safeguarding public procurement, the more 
interesting aspect is related to the predicate offences.
The aforementioned framework decision was not certainly drafted focusing on the possible 
connections between criminal organisations and crime in public procurement. EU policy-makers had 
traditional organised crime in mind, i.e. criminal organisations involved in serious crimes related to 
the illegal economy (such as drug and human trafficking, extortion, money laundering, etc.), to be 
punished with rather harsh penalties. Therefore, the definition of criminal organisation provided for 
1 See Ferraris, EU legislative framework on organised crime, corruption and public procurement, Working Paper, p. 2, available at: 
http:/ www.warningoncrime.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ws1_EU_legislative_framework.pdf.
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in the framework decision refers to a group established ‘with a view to committing offences which 
are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a 
more serious penalty’ (Article 1, paragraph 1).
However, several countries have adopted an approach going beyond the scope of the framework 
decision. Nine MSs (Czech Republic, Germany2, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands3, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
and Spain) do consider any offences without relevant restrictions; six MSs (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia) have reduced the punishment threshold to three years; four MSs 
(Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Malta) have adopted the EU threshold, and three MSs (France, 
Hungary, and Slovakia) have increased punishment to five years; finally, in a new legal provision, the 
United Kingdom has set out ‘imprisonment for a term of 7 years or more’.
Moreover, beside the general limit, three countries (Austria, Czech Republic, and Finland) mention, 
in the same article, some offences that imply the criminalisation of participation in a criminal 
organisation, regardless of the penalty. These offences do not include bribery.
For those countries that criminalise also conspiracy to commit criminal offences, it is worth recalling 
that no predicate offences are required. There are thus no restrictions in place.
Figure 1 .  Predicate offence limit
Table 1 .  Predicate offence limit – wording and reference
Country Threshold Text of legal rules in English Reference
Austria Three years Commitment of one or more crimes [...], other 
considerable acts of violence against life and 
limb, not only petty damages to property, 
thefts, or frauds or misdemeanours under 
sections 165, 177(b), 223 to 239, 304 or 307, 
or under sections 104 or 105 of the Aliens Act. 
According to Article 17 of the Criminal Code, 
‘crimes are intentional acts that are punishable 
by lifelong or with more than three years’ 
imprisonment’. 
Articles 278 and 17 of 
the Criminal Code
Bulgaria Three years The commission of criminal offences 
punishable with more than three years’ 
imprisonment
Article 93 of the 
Criminal Code
Croatia Three years Whoever conspires with another to commit 
a criminal offence for which a punishment of 
imprisonment exceeding three years may be 
imposed.
Article 328 of the 
Criminal Code
Czech Republic No restrictions Commission of intentional criminal activities Article 129 of the 
Criminal Code
Denmark -- -- --
2 Germany limits the application ‘if the commission of offences is of merely minor significance for the objectives or activities or 
to the extent that the objectives [or] activities of the organisation relate to offences under sections 84 to 87’ (Art. 129, par. 3 
of the Criminal Code).
3 The Netherlands limits the application of the approach to serious crimes.
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Country Threshold Text of legal rules in English Reference
Estonia Three years Commission of second-degree criminal 
offences for which the maximum term of 
imprisonment of at least three years is 
prescribed.
Article 255, paragraph 
1 of the Criminal Code
Finland Four years Committing one or more offences for which 
the maximum statutory punishment is 
imprisonment for at least four years.
Chapter 17, Article 
1(a), paragraph 1 of 
the Criminal Code
France Five years One or more felonies, or one or more 
misdemeanours punished with at least five 
years’ imprisonment
Article 450(1), 
paragraph 1 of the 
Criminal Code
Germany No restrictions Commission of offences Article 129, paragraph 
1 of the Criminal Code
Hungary Five years Article 459 of the 
Criminal Code
Ireland Four years Commission or facilitation of serious offence. 
Serious offence is defined by section 70 as ‘an 
offence for which a person may be punsihed by 
imprisonment for a term of four years or more’.
Articles 71(a) and 70 
of the Criminal Justice 
Act of 2006
Italy No restrictions Committing offences Article 416, paragraph 
1 of the Criminal Code
Latvia No restrictions Article 21 of the 
Criminal Code
Lithuania Three years Article 25 of the 
Criminal Code
Luxembourg Four years Committing offences which are punishable by 
deprivation of liberty or a detention order of 
a maximum of at least four years or a more 
serious penalty.
Article 324(bis) of the 
Criminal Code
Malta Four years Criminal offences liable to punishment of 
imprisonment for a term of four years or more
Article 83(a), 
paragraph 1 of the 
Criminal Code
Netherlands No restrictions Commission of serious offences Article 140, paragraph 
1 of the Criminal Code
Poland No restrictions Commission of offences Article 258, paragraph 
1 of the Criminal Code
Portugal No restrictions Commission of one or more crimes Article 299, paragraph 
1 of the Criminal Code
Romania No restrictions Committing one or more crimes Article 367, paragraph 
6 of the Criminal Code
Slovakia Five years Article 11 of the 
Criminal Code
Slovenia Three years Committing criminal offences for which a 
punishment of imprisonment of more than 
three years is envisaged.
Article 294, paragraph 
1 of the Criminal Code
Spain No restrictions Commission of felonies Article 570(bis), 
paragraph 1 of the 
Criminal Code
Sweden -- -- --
United Kingdom Seven years An offence in England and Wales punishable on 
conviction on indictment with imprisonment for 
a term of 7 years or more
Article 45, paragraph 
4 of the Serious Crime 
Act of 2015 
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However, in spite of the offences that have been introduced with a view to transposing the 
framework decision, the legal system of several countries envisages other offences related to 
organised crime in general, which could be applied to crimes in public procurement.
Italy is the only country whose legal system envisages an offence that specifically mentions public 
procurement. It is Article 416(bis) of the Criminal Code, which defines the mafia-type association 
as that whose members ‘take advantage of the intimidating power of the association and of the 
resulting conditions of submission and silence in order to commit criminal offences, to manage or in 
any way control, either directly or indirectly, economic activities, concessions, authorisations, public 
procurements and services, or to obtain unlawful profits or advantages for themselves or for any 
other persons […]’.4
The Austrian legislation, on the other hand, includes an offence of criminal association which can also 
encompass corruption. Article 278(a) of the Criminal Code punishes participation in an association 
consisting of a ‘considerable number of persons, intended to last a longer period of time and similar 
to an enterprise […] if the association […] (2) aims at profits on a high scale or at considerable 
influence on politics or economy, and (3) undertakes to corrupt, or intimidate, others, or to avoid 
prosecution measures’.5 However, no cases have been brought to court for corruption related with 
public procurement.
Broader offences can be found also in France and Luxembourg.
Article 132(71) of the French Criminal Code envisages the concept of organised gang (bande 
organisée) as ‘any group formed or association established with a view to preparing one or more 
criminal offences, marked by one or more material actions’.6 The commission of a crime within an 
organised gang is an aggravating circumstance for a number of crimes, but none of them is related 
with public procurement.
The Luxembourgian legislation criminalises gangs (association de malfaiteurs). Article 3227 punishes 
the formation of any association with the goal of attacking persons or property. 
4 Art. 416(bis) of the Italian Criminal code states: ‘L’associazione è di tipo mafioso quando coloro che ne fanno parte si avvalgono 
della forza di intimidazione del vincolo associativo e della condizione di assoggettamento e di omertà che ne deriva per 
commettere delitti, per acquisire in modo diretto o indiretto la gestione o comunque il controllo di attività economiche, di 
concessioni, di autorizzazioni, appalti e servizi pubblici o per realizzare profitti o vantaggi ingiusti per sé o per altri, ovvero 
al fine di impedire od ostacolare il libero esercizio del voto o di procurare voti a sé o ad altri in occasione di consultazioni 
elettorali.’
5 Art. 278(a) of the Austrian Criminal Code states: ‘(1) Wer eine kriminelle Vereinigung gründet oder sich an einer solchen als 
Mitglied beteiligt, ist mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren zu bestrafen. (2) Eine kriminelle Vereinigung ist ein auf längere 
Zeit angelegter Zusammenschluss von mehr als zwei Personen, der darauf ausgerichtet ist, dass von einem oder mehreren 
Mitgliedern der Vereinigung ein oder mehrere Verbrechen, andere erhebliche Gewalttaten gegen Leib und Leben, nicht nur 
geringfügige Sachbeschädigungen, Diebstähle oder Betrügereien, Vergehen nach den §§ 104a, 165, 177b, 233 bis 239, 241a 
bis 241c, 241e, 241f, 304 oder 307, in § 278d Abs. 1 genannte andere Vergehen oder Vergehen nach den §§ 114 Abs. 1 oder 
116 des Fremdenpolizeigesetzes ausgeführt werden. (3) Als Mitglied beteiligt sich an einer kriminellen Vereinigung, wer im 
Rahmen ihrer kriminellen Ausrichtung eine strafbare Handlung begeht oder sich an ihren Aktivitäten durch die Bereitstellung 
von Informationen oder Vermögenswerten oder auf andere Weise in dem Wissen beteiligt, dass er dadurch die Vereinigung 
oder deren strafbare Handlungen fördert. (4) Hat die Vereinigung zu keiner strafbaren Handlung der geplanten Art geführt, 
so ist kein Mitglied zu bestrafen, wenn sich die Vereinigung freiwillig auflöst oder sich sonst aus ihrem Verhalten ergibt, dass 
sie ihr Vorhaben freiwillig aufgegeben hat. Ferner ist wegen krimineller Vereinigung nicht zu bestrafen, wer freiwillig von der 
Vereinigung zurücktritt, bevor eine Tat der geplanten Art ausgeführt oder versucht worden ist; wer an der Vereinigung führend 
teilgenommen hat, jedoch nur dann, wenn er freiwillig durch Mitteilung an die Behörde (§ 151 Abs. 3) oder auf andere Art 
bewirkt, dass die aus der Vereinigung entstandene Gefahr beseitigt wird.’
6 Art. 132(17) of the French Criminal Code states: ‘Toute association formée dans le but d’attenter aux personnes ou aux 
propriétés est un crime ou un délit, qui existe par le seul fait de l’organisation de la bande.’
7 Art. 322 of the Luxembourgian Criminal Code states: ‘Toute association formée dans le but d’attenter aux personnes ou aux 
propriétés est un crime ou un délit, qui existe par le seul fait de l’organisation de la bande.’
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The sanction changes according to the seriousness of the offence - felony or misdemeanours (crimes 
or delits) - and the role covered within the gang (Articles 3238 and 3249).
Finally, Article 570(ter)10 of the Spanish Criminal Code punishes the participation in criminal groups 
(grupos criminales). These groups aim to commit offences and the penalty varies according to the 
seriousness of felonies. Moreover, as to misdemeanours (delitos leves), participation in criminal 
groups is a crime only in the case of reiterated commission of misdemeanours.
In conclusion, in those countries (Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, and Spain) where the offence of participation in a criminal organisation is not limited to 
certain predicate offences11, the offence could potentially apply to situations in which a group that 
meets the requirements established by law runs criminal activities related with public procurement. 
The same can be observed in relation to those countries (United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Croatia, Ireland, 
and Malta) that opt for the criminalisation of conspiracy to commit crimes. However, this would require 
a shift in the approach of investigators and public prosecutors towards the application of this type of 
offence in cases other than traditional criminal organisations involved in illegal activities. For all other 
countries, the offence of participation in a criminal organisation could provide a tool to punish illegal 
behaviours related with public procurement only if the provisions that sanction such behaviours set 
out a punishment above the threshold. As a matter of fact, considering the leniency generally featured 
by white-collar crimes/crimes of the powerful (Ruggiero, 2015), this is unlikely to occur.
In France and Luxembourg, the offences of bande organisée and association de malfaiteurs could cover 
groups that commit crimes related with public procurement.
2. Bribery and trading in influence in relation to public procurement
Corruption is a complex phenomenon. The degree of complexity is so significant that scholars, 
international organisations, and NGOs involved in fighting corruption do not share the same 
definition of corruption.
It is worth noticing that the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the most universal tool, 
does not define corruption, mainly because the parties could not agree on a common definition.  
8 Art. 323 of the Luxembourgian Criminal Code states: ‘Si l’association a eu pour but la perpétration de crimes emportant la 
réclusion supérieure à dix ans, les provocateurs de cette association, les chefs de cette bande et ceux qui y auront exercé un 
commandement quelconque, seront punis de la réclusion de cinq à dix ans. Ils seront punis d’un emprisonnement de deux 
à cinq ans, si l’association a été formée pour commettre d’autres crimes, et d’un emprisonnement de six mois à trois ans, si 
l’association a été formée pour commettre des délit.’
9 Art. 324 of the Luxembourgian Criminal Code states: ‘Tous autres individus faisant partie de l’association, et ceux qui auront 
sciemment et volontairement fourni à la bande ou à ses divisions des armes, munitions, instruments de crimes, logements, 
retraite ou lieu de réunion, seront punis: Dans le premier cas prévu par l’article précédent, d’un emprisonnement de six mois à 
cinq ans ; Dans le second cas, d’un emprisonnement de deux mois à trois ans; Et dans le troisième, d’un emprisonnement d’un 
mois à deux ans.’
10 Art. 570(ter) of the Spanish Criminal Code states: ‘1. Quienes constituyeren, financiaren o integraren un grupo criminal serán 
castigados: a) Si la finalidad del grupo es cometer delitos de los mencionados en el apartado 3 del artículo anterior, con la pena 
de dos a cuatro años de prisión si se trata de uno o más delitos graves y con la de uno a tres años de prisión si se trata de 
delitos menos graves. 
b) Con la pena de seis meses a dos años de prisión si la finalidad del grupo es cometer cualquier otro delito grave. 
c) Con la pena de tres meses a un año de prisión cuando se trate de cometer uno o varios delitos menos graves no incluidos 
en el apartado a) o de la perpetración reiterada de delitos leves. A los efectos de este Código se entiende por grupo criminal 
la unión de más de dos personas que, sin reunir alguna o algunas de las características de la organización criminal definida en 
el artículo anterior, tenga por finalidad o por objeto la perpetración concertada de delitos. 2. Las penas previstas en el número 
anterior se impondrán en su mitad superior cuando el grupo: 
a) esté formado por un elevado número de personas. 
b) disponga de armas o instrumentos peligrosos. 
c) disponga de medios tecnológicos avanzados de comunicación o transporte que por sus características resulten 
especialmente aptos para facilitar la ejecución de los delitos o la impunidad de los culpables. 
Si concurrieran dos o más de dichas circunstancias se impondrán las penas superiores en grado.’
11 See notes Nos 2 and 3 on Germany and the Netherlands.
16
In its report on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Transparency International (TI) – definitely 
the most influent NGO working on corruption – defines corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for 
private gain’. However, TI also promotes and circulates another broader definition – ‘the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain’12 – decoupling corruption from the presence of a public official.
As Holmes (2015, p.3) clearly pointed out, ‘even TI’s first – narrow – definition is subject to diverse 
interpretation’. Does the abuse of public office refer to economic or also to social improprieties? Is 
a gift an economic impropriety? What about the meaning of ‘public’ in decades featuring increasing 
privatisation of public services? Should geography matter when defining corruption? (See Holmes, 
2015, p. 1–17 for a short and useful overview of these issues.) Scholars have not come out with any 
final solution (see Mikkelsen, 2013 and the references cited there).
A common view today is that corruption represents a problem because it distorts markets and 
competition, hampers the growth of legitimate business, and overall undermines the rule of law. 
Moreover, any benefits it may bring do not last for a long time13. Bearing in mind the main topic 
of this study, we will focus our attention on some specific offences that criminalise corruption 
related with behaviours of public officials, emphasising any specific aspects connected with public 
procurement. We will not address issues that are only indirectly connected with public procurement, 
such as funding of political parties or the accountability and integrity of elected officials. There is no 
doubt that legal rules on integrity of elected officials have a role in corruptive practices in the public 
administration. However, we would risk enlarging too much the focus, thus making the comparison 
too broad for the scope of our analysis.
For this reason, the focus will be on the offences of active and passive bribery of public officials 
and trading in influence. The choice of these offences is due to the fact that they refer to situations 
that often occur in the case of illegality in public procurement. The Council of Europe (CoE) Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption is the chosen term of reference. As previously explained 14, the CoE 
is currently carrying out significant efforts in tackling corruption among its MSs. These efforts 
are based mainly on the monitoring mechanism named ‘Group of States against Corruption’ 
(GRECO), which is stimulating changes in legal rules, as well as reforms in general. Several States 
either have enacted major legal reforms also in order to comply with the convention and GRECO 
recommendations (this is the case of Estonia in 2006, Lithuania in 2011, and Italy, Romania, and 
Austria in 2012) or have been adjusting their legal framework over the years through specific 
amendments (e.g. Croatia), guidelines (this is what happened in several States in relation to the 
acceptability of gifts), or interpretative acts (such as those of the Ministry of Justice of Poland on 
trading in influence).
Through its evaluation round, GRECO moreover pays attention to the actual enforcement of amended 
provisions, and this gives a further contribution to the approximation of law provisions in practice.
All the countries under scrutiny, except Germany15, have signed and ratified the CoE convention. More 
than 50%, mostly among the newest MSs, did it in 2002 when the convention entered into force. 
Figure 2 .  Entry into force of the CoE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
12 See http:/ www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption.
13 Contra: for the functionalist theory, see Leys (1965); for the argument that the cost of countering corruption should not exceed 
the costs of corruption itself, see Klitgaard (1991); for the argument that citizens support a corrupted government if ‘things 
get done’ more than a clean but ineffective government, see Manzetti and Wilson (2007).
14 See Ferraris, EU legislative framework on organised crime, corruption and public procurement, Working Paper, p. 10, available at: 
http:/ www.warningoncrime.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ws1_EU_legislative_framework.pdf.
15 Germany signed the convention in January 1999, but never ratified it.
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All the countries have also implemented Article 3 of the Convention on the fight against corruption 
involving officials of the European communities or officials of Member States of the European 
Union. Taking into account the relevance of EU funds in major public procurement, this is a promising 
starting point.
Today, all the countries criminalise active and passive bribery and, in general terms, all of them have 
increased penalties. Nevertheless some differences remain. 
Two of the Nordic countries (Denmark and Sweden), Ireland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia do not 
differentiate by law between passive and active bribery committed to perform an act of duty (or a 
lawful act) and an act in breach of duty (or an unlawful act). 
The decision on whether and how to increase the penalty is left entirely to the court through a 
judgment. The legal systems of all other countries envisage two separate offences, with a significant 
higher penalty in the case of breach of duty.
Romania does not punish as bribery the acts that fall outside the responsibility of a public official. It 
must therefore be proved that the act falls within the competence of the official. Romania’s concern 
is to maintain the difference between a bribe-taker and a fraudster; it is however the only country 
featuring the formula ‘act [falling] within a public official’s responsibility’ or ‘act contrary to such 
responsibility’.
For the focus of this report, it is worth mentioning that the Latvian legislation punishes active bribery 
of an employee of a local or state institution who is not a state official, only if the performed act is 
unlawful. There is no offence in the case of an omission or of a lawful act. In addition, the sanction is 
much lower compared to the same offence committed by a state official.
Bulgaria does not criminalise active bribery when the advantage is intended for a third party, 
whereas it does for passive bribery.
In all countries, the definition of bribe includes any advantages, either material (money, goods) or 
non-material (such as supports for promotion, sexual favours, etc.). 
Gifts are not mentioned in the offences of some of the countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia), however a valuable gift would be considered inappropriate. 
In the Czech Republic, this rule is better specified for state employees: according to the Act on State 
Service, accepting gifts or other benefits worth more than CZK 300 (about €11) is prohibited.
In general, only customary or low-value gifts are considered acceptable and excluded from the scope 
of the offences. Some countries do have more specific rules. For instance, in Slovenia the Integrity 
and Prevention of Corruption Act16 details which gifts can be accepted and their maximum value. It 
also introduces the obligation for each administration to prepare a list of gifts. The Commission for 
the Prevention of Corruption can scrutinise the gifts received by public officials.
In 2010, the Finnish Ministry of Finance enacted the guidelines on hospitality, benefits, and gifts that 
cannot be considered as acceptable. Some years before, in 2001, it had adopted the guidelines on 
travel expenses when covered by a third party. 
In Spain, there is no national provision but some Autonomous Communities have set limitations, in 
general €50, on the gifts officials can accept. If the value is higher, a body is responsible for determining 
whether the officer can keep the gift or should donate it to public institutions, NGOs, food banks, etc.
Furthermore, several countries (e.g. Slovenia, some municipalities in Italy) have specific rules for 
members of parliament (MEPs) or elected officials, such as the obligation to donate any gifts received 
to the administration that financially support their stay in special premises (this applies, for instance, 
to any gift in the case of official visits by foreign delegations).
Eleven (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, 
Portugal, and Romania) out of 25 countries distinguish between petty and grand corruption. 
Obviously, everywhere judges are supposed to assess the amount of money involved when deciding 
the sanction. The aforementioned countries, however, have this distinction specified in a law 
provision.
16 The text is available in English at: https:/ www.kpk-rs.si/upload/datoteke/ZintPK-ENG.pdf.
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Figure 3 .  Countries that distinguish between petty and grand corruption by law
Petty and grand corruption are not differentiated according to the same criteria across all EU MSs. 
In four countries, the law states that in the case of ‘considerable/major benefit’, ‘considerable 
loss’ (Finland and Germany) or ‘on a large scale basis’ (Estonia) or in the case of ‘affair of greater 
importance’ (Bulgaria, only for passive bribery), the sanction will be increased.
The other countries have specific ceilings that modify the sanction. It is worth underlining that 
the ceilings are defined with respect to monthly wages. This means that the higher the wage, the 
higher the ceiling for a more severe sanction. Among these countries, Romania has a specialised 
prosecution office. The National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) has exclusive investigative and 
prosecuting powers in the case of a bribe above €10.000 or damage greater than €200.000.
The Czech Republic explicitly distinguishes between petty and grand corruption in the Criminal Code, 
on the basis not only of the amount but also of the perpetrator. Corruption is always considered 
grand if a public office holder is involved.
A specific case is that of Ireland where, according to the level of seriousness of corruption in office, 
an offence is classified either as a summary offence or as an indictable offence, with consequences in 
terms of sanctions and procedure.
Table 2 .  Ceilings for petty and grand corruption
Austria Three ceilings: more than €50,000; more than €3,000; less than €3,000
Czech Republic Two ceilings in monetary terms: substantial benefit defined by law of at least CZK 500,000 
(about €20,000); major benefit defined by law of at least CZK 5,000,000 (about €200,000) 
only for passive bribery
One ceiling based on the subject involved: the corruption is grand if a public office holder is 
involved.
Latvia On a large scale, at least 50 times the minimum monthly wage
Lithuania Above 250 times the minimum subsistence level
Poland Benefit of considerable value, more than 200 times the lowest monthly salary
Romania Amount greater than €10,000 or damages for more than €200,000
Despite there are differences, the overview shows the existence of a common ground in 
criminalising bribery, together with a trend in increasing penalties. However, this better 
approximation of criminal legislation has no immediate effects on common actions against 
corruption. Many other offences cover misbehaviour in public procurement procedures and, as 
underlined by several researchers, public prosecutors still favour easier-to-prove offences.
In addition, not all the countries include, in their legal system, the offence of trading in influence.
Fifteen countries (Austria17, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) do have the offence in their legal 
framework, but in many of them it has been introduced recently and it is thus too early to assess its 
effectiveness. 
17  Austria does criminalise the ‘feeding process’ of corruption, i.e. granting of lawful favours and privileges as a preparation for 
corruption (Art. 306 of the Criminal Code).
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All other countries formulate at least one reservation on the CoE articles that introduce the offence 
of trading in influence. However, the picture is quite complex.
Some countries (Denmark, Finland, Ireland18, and Sweden) do not have in their national legislation 
any offence that criminalises trading in influence. Some countries (France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, and United Kingdom) have many offences that address, not always clearly and 
even with overlaps, some aspects of trading in influence.
Figure 4 .  Countries that have implemented trading in influence according to CoE standards
From the perspective of illegality in public procurement, trading in influence is interesting because it 
addresses those who claim to be able to influence public officials. Considering that collusive practices 
carried out by ‘white-collar professionals above all suspicion’ or by middlemen are one of the 
methods used by criminal organisations to infiltrate public procurement19, trading in influence seems 
to describe a situation that can lead to further crimes. 
This kind of influence has to be improper, it means that it is outside a legitimate lobbying activity. 
Certainly, the increasing relevance and power of lobbying, in particular in some countries, make it 
more difficult to criminalise these behaviours and to distinguish them from lawful conducts. 
This could lead to an increase in legal uncertainty. 
3. New EU legislation on public procurement: the directions taken by MSs
3.1 New directives
Public procurement in the EU is harmonised through a common legislative framework, which has 
been recently renovated with three new directives (see Caranta and Dragos, 2014 and Williams, 
2014 for a brief overview of the changes). These are:
OO Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (Text with EEA relevance)20; 
OO Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and 
repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (Text with EEA relevance)21; 
OO Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the 
award of concession contracts (Text with EEA relevance)22; concession contracts were marginally 
touched by the previous EU regulation.
Beyond the traditional goals of guaranteeing fair competition, transparency, and non-discrimination, 
these directives aim at achieving simplification, efficiency, and flexibilisation of the regime. In 
addition, they envisage several rules designed to prevent, or at least reduce, the risks of illegality and 
corruption in public procurement.
18  The draft Criminal Justice Corruption Bill published in June 2012 includes offences outlawing trading in influence. However, 
the legislation has not been adopted yet.
19  See Ferraris, V. and Mazza, C., The infiltration of criminal groups into public works: strategies and methods, Working Paper, p. 14, 
available at: http:/ www.warningoncrime.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ws_1_the_infiltration_of_criminal.pdf.
20  Avaiable at: http:/eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32014L0024.
21  Avaiable at: http:/eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32014L0025.
22  Avaiable at: http:/eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.094.01.0001.01.ENG.
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The issue of illegality in public procurement was firstly addressed in 2011 when the European 
Commission issued ‘The Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy. 
Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market’.23 This document dedicates one section 
titled ‘Ensuring sound procedures’ to the issue of conflict of interest, favouritism, and corruption. 
The guiding principle is that more effective mechanisms to prevent unsound business practices 
can not only ensure fair competition and efficiency of public spending, but also strengthen the fight 
against economic crime. The European Commission underlines that in the directives of 2004 this 
area was mainly left to the responsibility of MSs, whose level of safeguards varies greatly.
The green paper identifies the integrity and fairness of the process as desirable objectives. 
These objectives could be reached through the use of measures that increase the level of 
transparency and accountability, such as a higher level of scrutiny of public officials’ personal and 
business situation, a more transparent procedure that enables to scrutinise decisions, clearer rules 
on reporting documents, and protection of whistle blowers.
Finally, the exclusion of bidders guilty of professional misconduct and serious crimes – already 
envisaged in Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts 
and public service contracts – requires some clarification on the scope, interpretation, transposition, 
and practical application.
However, since more procedural guarantees against unsound business practices at EU level entail 
additional administrative burdens for procurers, they have to be weighted against a possible negative 
impact on simplification and fair competition.
For this reason, the green paper suggests the possibility to adopt a self-cleaning procedure that 
allows economic operators to tackle a situation that may lead to their exclusion, or to allow bidders in 
an advantageous situation to participate if they disclose the privileged information they possess.
The new directive on public procurement (2014/24/EU) takes notice of the suggestions contained in 
the green paper, proposing: some measures directly aimed at preventing illegality in the procedure; 
some others aimed at governing the procedure in order to enhance transparency and reduce 
opportunities for illegal behaviours; and finally some rules on the governance, i.e. monitoring of the 
application of the directive in MSs. Most of these measures address the role of contracting entities; 
others are targeted at bidders (see Di Cristina, 2014).
In comparison with the previous directives, greater attention is certainly paid to the integrity of the 
procedure and the need to counter corruptive or collusive conduct, through measures addressing the 
above-mentioned aspects. The measures are summarised in the following table.
Table 3 .  Measures aimed at ensuring sound procedures
Purpose Measures
Preventing illegality in the procedure Conflict of interest; grounds for exclusion
Enhancing transparency and reducing 
opportunities for illegal behaviours
Publication of information; aggregation of demand; subcontracting
Strengthening governance Monitoring reports
Grounds for exclusion and conflict of interest are the core measures aimed at preventing illegality in 
the procedure.
The directive maintains the distinction between mandatory and discretionary ground for exclusion, 
clearly stating the possibility for MSs to implement all the grounds for exclusion as mandatory. 
Exclusion rules can be applied at any time during a public procurement procedure.
23  COM (2011) 15 final, available at: http:/eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0015:FIN:EN:PDF.
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The grounds for mandatory exclusion (Article 57, paragraphs 1–3) are:
OO convictions for several offences according to a final judgment.24 The list of offences is longer than 
in 2004, and the references to how these offences are described in EU documents will require 
some MSs to redefine them to apply the directive;
OO violation of obligations to pay taxes and social contributions. In comparison to 2004, in the 
case of a judicial or administrative decision having final and binding effect, the exclusion shall 
be mandatory. This new mandatory ground for exclusion points to the relevance given to the 
payment of taxes and social contributions in terms of reliability of bidders and how this behaviour 
is a red flag to identify areas prone to illegality. However, if the economic operator fulfils its 
obligations, it cannot be excluded. In the case of minor violations, MSs can derogate from the 
mandatory rule of exclusion.
In addition to the mandatory ones, new discretionary grounds for exclusion have been added or 
modified. They can be classified into two categories: those based on doubts regarding the bidders’ 
reliability, capability, or suitability; and those aimed at avoiding distortion of competition.
The former includes: 1) violation of environmental, social, or labour law; 2) bankruptcy, insolvency, or 
winding-up proceedings; 3) grave professional misconduct; 4) deficiencies in the performance of a 
public contract; 5) misrepresentation in the course of proceedings.
The latter includes: 1) non-remediable conflicts of interest; 2) plausible indication of agreements 
among competitors; 3) prior involvement of economic operators in the preparation of the 
procurement procedure, that results in a non-remediable distortion of competition; 4) the exercise 
of undue influence on the decision-making process in order to obtain confidential information or to 
provide misleading information. This ground for exclusion will often result in crimes (bribes, extortion, 
and blackmail), but this is not necessary to exclude bidders.
In order to avoid excessive rigidity, the new directive allows economic operators to avoid exclusion by 
taking responsibility, and to rehabilitate themselves by proving that: a) they have paid or undertaken 
to pay compensation in respect of any damage caused by the criminal offence or misconduct; b) they 
have clarified the facts and circumstances in a comprehensive manner by actively collaborating with 
investigating authorities; and c) they have taken concrete technical, organisational, and personnel-
related measures suitable to prevent further criminal offences or misconduct. MSs have a wide 
margin of discretion in the implementation of such self-cleaning measures although this certainly 
represents a step further towards a more harmonised practice (for more details on grounds for 
exclusion and self-cleaning measures, see Priess, 2014). However, an effective implementation of 
such measures certainly requires an efficient public administration.
According to the new directive, ‘conflict of interest’ includes any situation in which officers involved in 
the procedure25 ‘have, directly or indirectly, a financial, economic or other personal interest which might 
be perceived to compromise their impartiality and independence in the context of the procurement 
procedure’ (Article 24, paragraph 2). It is the responsibility of MSs to enact appropriate measures to 
effectively prevent, identify, and remedy conflicts of interest arising in the procurement procedure.
24  These offences are: 1) participation in a criminal organisation, as defined in Art. 2 of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/
JHA; 2) corruption, as defined in Art. 3 of the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European 
Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union and Art. 2(1) of Council Framework Decision 2003/568/
JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector, as well as corruption as defined in the national law of the 
contracting authority or the economic operator; 3) fraud within the scope of Art. 1 of the Convention on the protection of the 
European Communities’ financial interests; 4) terrorist offences or offences linked to terrorist activities, as defined in Arts. 1 
and 3, respectively, of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, or inciting, aiding 
and abetting, or attempting to commit an offence, as referred to in Art. 4 of that framework decision; 5) money laundering or 
terrorist financing, as defined in Art. 1 of Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 
2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (Text 
with EEA relevance); 6) child labour and other forms of trafficking in human beings as defined in Art. 2 of Directive 2011/36/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings 
and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA.
25  According to Art. 24(2), they include ‘staff members of the contracting authority or of a procurement service provider acting 
on behalf of the contracting authority who are involved in the conduct of the procurement procedure or may influence the 
outcome of that procedure’.
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Among the measures aimed at enhancing transparency, broad dissemination of information on 
tender procedures is the basic one. The directive clearly establishes the obligation to publish the prior 
information notice and then the award contract notice. Moreover, as a general rule, e-procurement 
should become mandatory: this means that all procurement documents should be made available 
electronically and free of charge from the date of publication, and that electronic means of 
communication should become the standard ones. In the intent of the EU legislator, these measures 
should enhance cross-border participation in procurement.26
The aggregation of demand is another core measure in the new directive. This includes several 
measures27 whose main aim is to obtain more efficiency in terms of a higher level of professional 
procurement management, economies of scale, and lower prices and transaction costs. Although 
there are some concerns in terms of excessive concentration of purchasing power and preservation 
of transparency and competition, these measures could reduce the possibility for criminal groups and 
corrupters to exercise their influence on contracting authorities.
As regards subcontracting, the directive introduces stricter rules. The rationale is that, in order to 
enhance transparency, contracting authorities should know who is working within building sites 
or who is actually providing the required services. The directive leaves open the possibility for MSs 
to introduce rules on subcontracting directly in the law or leave to the discretionary power of the 
contracting authority the choice of which measure is to be implemented case by case. However, 
the measures mentioned in the directive cover all the relevant issues on subcontracting, and they 
represent a step forward compared to previous regulations. MSs or the contracting authority:
OO may require the tenderer to state ‘any share of the contract it may intend to subcontract to third 
parties and any proposed subcontractors’ (Article 71, paragraph 2);
OO shall require the main contractor to inform the contracting authority of the name, contact details, 
and legal representatives of its subcontractors, and shall notify any changes in this information 
(Article 71, paragraph 5);
OO may provide direct payment from the contracting authority to subcontractors (Article 71, 
paragraph 3).
Finally, in order to monitor the application of public procurement rules, every three years (the 
first time by 18 April 2017), MSs shall submit to the European Commission a monitoring report 
on ‘the prevention, detection, and adequate reporting of cases of procurement fraud, corruption, 
conflict of interest and other serious irregularities’ (Article 83). The results of the monitoring shall 
be made available to the public through appropriate means of information. Should problems arise, 
procedures need to be established aimed at reporting such problems to proper bodies – ‘national 
auditing authorities, courts or tribunals or other appropriate authorities or structures, such as the 
ombudsman, national parliaments or committees’ (Article 83).
In conclusion, the measures established in the new directive on public procurement certainly 
represent something new. However, the success of this preventive system highly depends on the 
capacity of the public administration to lead the way. The public administration has to accept the 
challenge of assuming responsibilities, making decisions, and taking full ownership of the process. 
In other words, in some MSs a successful public procurement system requires a relevant reform of 
the public administration in terms of efficiency and responsibility. 
3.2 The directions taken by MSs
In August 2015, most of the countries were in the process of transposition, whereas Luxembourg 
and Malta had not yet started it and the United Kingdom had already completed it. It is worth 
mentioning that in the transposition of EU directives, the United Kingdom either applies the copy-out 
26 According to a recent study on the extent of cross-border contracting (Ackermann, Beke, and Sanz, 2015): ‘Between 2012 and 
2014, EU Member States awarded 113,749 contracts, related to EU funds, amounting to 116.17 billion EUR. Approximately 
90% of these contracts (by value) were awarded to contract operators within the respective Member State. There were 2,882 
cross-border contracts amounting to approximately 9.14 billion EUR. Italy and Spain accounted for 35% of all cross-border 
contracts by value. Poland, Romania, and Slovakia were the top cross-border buyers (5.5 billion EUR).”
27 Such as central purchasing bodies, aggregated procurement, framework contracts. For more details, see Lichere and Richetto, 
2014, Racca, 2014, and Risvig Hamer, 2014.
23
method, i.e. it adopts the same wording as that of the directive to be transposed, or makes direct 
reference to relevant provisions. 
Figure 5 .  State of play of the transposition of Directive 2014/24/EU 
As outlined above, most of the countries are still in the process of adoption of the directive under 
scrutiny.28
Several countries have carried out a consultation before starting the transposition process. 
Some of them (Austria, Bulgaria, France, Ireland29, Romania, and United Kingdom30) opted for an 
open consultation with the most relevant stakeholders (public administration, economic operators, 
and NGOs), while some others for the establishment of a working group (Lithuania and Portugal). 
Finland carried out a public consultation and then set up a working group. In addition, after the 
publication in May 2015 of the working group’s memorandum, everyone was given a chance to 
comment and provide written suggestions.
Among the countries that have started the procedure, some have not prepared a draft bill to be 
submitted to parliament. Ireland carried out a public consultation, which closed on 12 December 
2014, and the government is analysing the results and drafting a bill. Due to the Danish general 
election of June 2015, the draft presented to Parliament in March 2015 expired, and a new one is 
currently being prepared. A similar situation is experienced in Spain where the draft bill submitted in 
April 2015 is currently in abeyance due to the general election held in December 2015.
In Croatia, the Ministry of Economy is drafting a proposal. In August 2015, the Portuguese Ministry 
of Economy was analysing the results of the working group; the legislative election was then held in 
October and the new ministry took office in December.
In Finland, an initial draft in the form of a memorandum was published in May 2015. The 
government’s proposal, initially expected in the autumn, has been postponed to 2016.
A specific case is that of Romania: the draft law, submitted for public consultation in July 2015 
for only ten days, received strong criticism by NGOs and business associations. Consequently, the 
government was forced to extend the consultation period until September. Later on, in autumn 2015, 
the government resigned.
It is not easy to compare draft bills when all the countries are changing a previous comprehensive 
regulation whose strengths and weaknesses are country-specific. Therefore, we will outline 
some commonalities by grouping the countries moving in the same direction, although there are 
differences within each group.
As to the grounds for exclusion, Italy did not introduce in the ‘Enabling Law’ – the law through which 
the Parliament delegates to the government legislative power in specific fields – any rules to change 
the current norm, which sets out a longer list of compulsory grounds for exclusion, without room for 
any discretional power of the contracting authority. However, due to the prohibition of gold-plating, 
28 All the information provided below is updated as at August 2015.
29 The questionnaire used in the consultation is available at: http:/ www.procurement.ie/sites/default/files/news/transposition_
of_the_new_public_procurement_directives_-_consultation_document.pdf.
30 The government’s response to the consultation is available at: https:/ www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/400242/Government_Response_to_the_Consultation_on_UK_Transposition_of_new_EU_
Procurement_Directives_Public_Contracts_Regulations_2015.pdf.
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introduced as a general principle into the Italian legislation by Article 32 of Law No. 234 dated 24 
December 2012, the grounds for exclusion should be reviewed.
All other countries maintain the division between mandatory and discretionary grounds for exclusion 
as in the directive. However, some countries clearly state the possibility of waiving the mandatory 
exclusions (except those concerning convictions) when the exclusion could be disproportionate 
(Germany and Netherlands) or for compelling reasons of public interest (Germany and Slovenia).
Several countries (Finland, Netherlands, and Slovakia) seem not to intend transposing some of the 
non-mandatory grounds for exclusion, or using – to the largest extent possible – the flexibility 
given by the directive. On the other hand, the Estonian draft bill makes mandatory the grounds for 
exclusion related with payments of taxes and contributions, and Poland has already transposed as 
compulsory the ground for exclusion in the case of grave professional misconduct.
As to subcontracting, we can split the countries into two main groups.
In the first group, we can classify the countries (Czech Republic, France, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovenia, and Austria) that are opting for the introduction of compulsory or at least stricter provisions 
compared to the directive. This regards the implementation of the rules on the identification of 
subcontractors, the proof of subcontractors’ qualifications, and direct payments from the contracting 
authority to subcontractors. With some differences, all these countries identify as a compelling need 
the protection of the public administration from a lack of transparency in subcontracting, as well as 
the protection of SMEs from ‘a weak payment culture’.
In the second group (Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, and United Kingdom) 
are the countries that quote the wording of the directive, empowering the contracting authority to 
choose to what extent the provisions on subcontracting is to be implemented. 
In addition, the rules concerning direct payments to subcontractors appear not to be considered in 
several of these countries.
‘Conflict of interest’ is the more challenging area to comment on. In general, all the countries (except 
Germany31 and Italy32) leave contracting authorities free to take effective measures to ‘prevent, 
identify and remedy conflicts of interest arising in the conduct of procurement procedures so as to 
avoid any distortion of competition and to ensure equal treatment of all economic operators’, and 
make reference at least to the ‘financial, economic or other personal interests’ of those involved in 
the procedure on the side of the contracting authority.
In addition, several countries (Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovenia, and United Kingdom) intend to transposing the non-mandatory ground for exclusion in the 
case of a conflict of interest, leaving the contracting authority free to decide whether to exclude the 
bidder when the conflict of interest cannot be effectively remedied by other less intrusive measures. 
Among them, there are also some of the countries that do not transpose most of the non-mandatory 
grounds for exclusion. This suggests once again the importance of the conflict of interest.
As a final remark, it is worth noticing that several MSs do have other laws on conflict of interest, 
which can overlap with a specific regulation on public procurement. Therefore, conflicts of interest 
require a specific and broader analysis, which is not in the purpose of this project.
To conclude, when the research was conducted, all the countries were expected to meet the deadline. 
Today, less than three months before its expiration, this goal seems more difficult to attain.
31 In Germany, the rules on conflict of interest are set out in the Procurement Regulation and are not left to the discretion of the 
contracting authority.
32 Italy has not introduced in the Enabling Law the rules at hand according to the wording of the directive. It has instead 
introduced a specific rule on the necessity to assess any conflicts of interest of the people who are on the list of possible 
members of evaluation boards.
25
4. Integrity pacts
The Integrity Pact is a tool developed by TI with a view to supporting governments, businesses, and 
the civil society in fighting against corruption in the field of public procurement. It consists of an 
agreement signed by the contracting authority, and the bidders. In addition, a monitor agreement 
is signed by the contracting authority and the monitor. The basic commitment is to refrain from any 
form of corruption and to disclose any information and data requested by the monitor. In addition, 
bidders agree to refrain from colluding with other competitors (Transparency International, 2013).
What makes this tool different from other similar initiatives is the role played by the monitor: this 
acts as an observer, a sort of ‘watchdog’, working with a view to helping public authorities guarantee 
transparency and accountability of bidding processes and works execution, as well as to supporting 
bidders in fulfilling their tasks as set out in the integrity pact.
The guiding principle is the restoration of confidence and trust in public decision-making and in the 
relationships between the public authority and bidders. It has to be a win-win situation: bidders gain 
from a fair competition and promote themselves; contracting authorities reduce the costs generated 
by malpractices and corruption.
Among the 25 responding countries, seven have already implemented or are implementing integrity 
pacts, in the form described above.
Table 4 .  Integrity pacts: when and what
Where Monitoring organisation Some examples of implemented integrity pacts
Austria TI Austria Renovation of the parliament building
Bulgaria TI Bulgaria Trakia highway
Germany TI Germany Berlin airport1; Bremen hospital; Berlin Building Society 
‘Howoge’, Klinikum Region Hannover GmBH
Hungary TI Hungary Drinking water supply infrastructure of the town of Ózd; 
refurbishment of a nursery in the Municipality of Budapest
Italy TI Italy Public procurements of the Municipality of Milan
Latvia TI Latvia (Delna) Latvian National Library
UK TI UK Defence integrity pacts
1 A brief summary of the Berlin airport case study is available at: 
 http:/ integrity.transparency.bg/media/cms_page_media/2/Germany_1_1.pdf.
In addition to these countries, Transparency International Spain started in March 2015 a project 
named ‘Implementing and evaluating corporate integrity policies in the Spanish private sector: A 
holistic approach’33, which aims at promoting integrity in public contracting through integrity pacts. 
The pilot project will implement integrity pacts for some tenders of the Spanish central public 
procurement system.
This project is financed by the Siemens Integrity Initiative34, which supports organisations and 
projects fighting corruption and fraud.
In the previous funding round of the Siemens Integrity Initiative, TI Bulgaria’s project ‘Promoting 
integrity through advocacy: Counteracting corruption in public contracting’35 promoted actions in 
the country, aimed at enhancing – through policy change – integrity standards and transparency in 
33 Further information on the project is available at: http:/ www.siemens.com/about/sustainability/en/core-topics/collective-
action/integrity-initiative/status-second-funding-round/transparency-international-espana-ti-espana.htm.
34 Further information on the Siemens Integrity Initiative is available at: http:/ www.siemens.com/about/sustainability/en/core-
topics/collective-action/integrity-initiative/index.php.
35 Further information on the project is available at: http:/ www.siemens.com/about/sustainability/en/core-topics/collective-
action/integrity-initiative/status-first-funding-round/transparency-international-bulgaria.htm.
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the awarding of contracts with significant public interest. In particular, it promoted the concept of 
integrity pact and its pilot implementation, the change of the Bulgarian legal framework, and the 
creation of a Public Contracting Transparency and Integrity Indicators (PCTIIs) tool.
In the framework of the same initiative, other projects in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and 
Italy have been implemented with the aim of improving public procurement practices, increasing 
awareness on corruption and fraud in the business environment, promoting ethical business conduct 
or model compliance system, etc. 
In coming years, several integrity pacts will be implemented within the initiative of the Directorate-
General Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO)36, aimed at piloting integrity pacts in projects co-
funded by structural funds and the Cohesion Fund, named ‘Integrity Pacts – Civil control mechanism 
for safeguarding EU funds’. In the framework of the first phase of this pilot project, an international 
conference was organised by Transparency International Secretariat on 5 May 2015 in Brussels and 
another one by transparency International Croatia in June in Zagreb. In October 2015, 11 countries 
covering 17 projects run by 15 civil society organisations were selected to implement the second 
phase of the pilot project by testing integrity pacts in several EU-funded projects. 
The implementation of integrity pacts started in January 2016, and will run until December 2019.
Other countries have not implemented integrity pacts, but developed other soft-law policy 
instruments aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability in public procurement processes. 
For example, a circular on the promotion of SMEs in public procurement has been recently introduced 
in Ireland. More specifically, Circular No. 10/2014 ‘Initiatives to assist SMEs in public procurement’ 
is a non-mandatory government guidance document designed and adopted to ensure that SMEs 
are not prevented from tendering for contracts they could successfully enter into. One of the 
most significant features of this soft-law policy is the requirement for contracting authorities to 
advertise all contracts for supplies and services with an estimated value of €25,000 and upwards 
on the website www.etenders.gov.ie. The eTenders website is a central facility for all public sector 
contracting authorities to advertise procurement opportunities and contract notices. Suppliers can 
register for free on the site to view procurement opportunities of the Irish public sector on a daily 
basis. Contracting authorities are further encouraged to implement fully transparent procedures by 
posting all contract notices on the eTenders site. Similarly, Finland boasts a national contract notice 
system37, and the applicable legislation sets out that all contracting authorities shall publish in this 
national centralised notice system all contract notices on procurements above national thresholds.38
In Italy many legality pacts (protocolli or patti di legalità) have been signed over the years. They are 
written public agreements between the local representatives of the Ministry of the Interior (Prefetture) 
and the contracting authority whereby the parties commit themselves to adopting specific actions 
to implement legal rules countering corruption and organised crime, and to enhancing integrity and 
transparency in the entire procurement cycle. Between 2005 and 2013, more than 100 legality pacts 
were signed mainly in the domain of public procurement and public works, which appear to be among 
the areas most vulnerable to corruption and mafia-type infiltration.39
Legality pacts can differ somewhat in scope and content, but they generally encompass 
measures including the collection and sharing of information on companies, so as to allow for the 
implementation of preventive mechanisms of control, the inclusion of additional exclusion clauses 
into public contracts, the implementation of specific monitoring mechanisms, and the promotion of 
internal codes of conduct.
According to their scope, legality pacts might be signed by subjects such as ministers, national 
agencies (National Institution for Insurance against Accidents at Work – Inail, National Institute 
of Social Security – INPS, etc.), regional and local authorities, business associations (General 
36 http:/ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/how/improving-investment/integrity-pacts/
37 Available at: www.hankintailmoitukset.fi.
38 €30,000 in the case of supplies and services, and €150,000 in the case of works.
39 All signed agreements are listed at: http:/culturaprofessionale.interno.gov.it/exssai/contenuti/166056.htm.
27
Confederation of Italian Industry - Confindustria, Italian General Confederation of Companies, 
Professional Activities, and Self-employment – Confcommercio, etc.). Soft-law instruments have 
also been used to introduce specific rules in the bidding procedure of the Turin–Lyon high-speed 
railway line.40
4.1 Benefits and challenges of integrity pacts
Due to their limited application and absence of rigorous monitoring evaluation and learning (MEL) 
in the past, it is almost impossible to provide an extensive and conclusive evaluation of integrity 
pacts. However, some benefits are clear. Integrity pacts increase the access to information on public 
contracts and, in this way, they make it easier to raise the attention of the media and to mobilise a 
better-informed public opinion. Moreover, they help to reduce litigation on procurement processes 
and should provide support in detecting corruption or business malpractices. Besides, several cases 
have shown that integrity pacts decrease the cost of public contracts, avoiding waste of public 
money.
As an indirect effect, confidence and trust in public decision-making increase, reputation of bidders 
improves, and more bidders should be encouraged to participate. As a matter of fact, a clean 
business environment tends to attract more bidders.
Nevertheless, there are several challenges. The integrity pact is essentially a collaborative tool, built 
on trust and support and aimed at strengthening prevention. Its strengths should be in its nature of 
gentlemen’s agreement, of soft-law instrument, which also obliges participants to adopt or abstain 
from certain behaviours. Therefore, for integrity pacts to be successful, they need real political will 
along with commitments by the public administration, in order to face difficulties and introduce 
actual changes among public administration staff.
This also requires a monitor with advanced technical expertise not only in legal or technical aspects, 
but also in creating a constructive environment among bidders and between bidders and government 
authorities, and also in maintaining its own independence. Moreover, the risk that integrity pacts are 
used by governments or bidders as ‘window dressing’, should always be considered. Consequently, 
the role of the monitor appears to be crucial. Even in a case that appeared promising as the one of 
the Berlin airport, Transparency International Germany has recently unilaterally withdrawn from 
the agreement. This decision is related with two relevant corruption cases, which have involved 
the management of the airport (Imtech case41 and Großmann case42). Transparency International 
Germany reports a lack of transparency considering that information on these two cases has not 
been provided, as well as the fact that some proposals advanced by TI have not been accepted.43
The overall challenge of this tool lies in its potential to represent a vehicle for a systemic change. In 
all the cases where they have been implemented successfully, integrity pacts have been an example 
of good administration of public funding. However, in most of the cases, they represent a successful 
story against a background featuring the constant increase in corruption and business malpractices. 
Only if integrity pacts penetrate daily business practices in several countries, they could represent a 
major result.
40 Mazza and Thevand, The High-speed railway and the prevention of economic crimes, corruption and organised crime, Working 
Paper, available at: http:/ www.warningoncrime.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/w2_high_speed_railway.pdf.
41 ‘Backhanders amounting to several hundred thousand euros are said to have been paid to one of the airport’s divisional 
directors. In return for the bribes, the director is believed to have arranged the unmonitored payment of Imtech invoices 
totalling €65 million (US$72 million)’, available at: https:/ www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/08/17/berl-a17.html.
42 The former technical director of the Berlin international airport was convicted for corruption and fraud in October 2014 (he 
was accused of demanding bribes from a prospective contractor).
43 Some details are available at: http:/ www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/ausstieg-von-transparency-international-beim-ber-
fahnenflucht-oder-spektakulaerer-warnruf-gegen-bestechung/11620748.html.
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Integrity pacts and legislation
In most of the countries, the use of integrity pacts is not envisaged in legislation, but their application is the 
result of the long-lasting promotion of this tool by TI.
One interesting exception is Italy.
Pursuant to the new law on corruption (Article 1, paragraph 17 of Law No. 190 dated 6 November 2012), the 
contracting authority can include in public contract documents the rule according to which bidders can be 
excluded if they do not respect the provisions set out in legality or integrity pacts. This rule was introduced 
after several judicial cases that questioned the legitimacy of integrity pacts. However, this seems not to have 
tackled the issue. Several doubts remain due to the wording of the legal rules adopted. What is worth pointing 
out here is that the provision of a legal basis in order to legitimate legality or integrity pacts does not seem 
a fully successful choice. In Italy doubts have been raised also in relation to compliance of the provisions of 
legality protocols with EU legislation.
On 9 July 2015, the Council of Administrative Justice for the Region of Sicily referred a question for a 
preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
The question concerns the interpretation of the EU public procurement law on the exclusion clause in order 
to assess the compatibility of a provision set forth in a legality protocol that envisages exclusion in the case 
of non-acceptance – by the bidders – of the commitments set out therein and, more generally, in agreements 
between contracting authorities and participating undertakings, intended to prevent criminal organisations 
from infiltrating the public contract awards sector.
The CJEU enacted its final decision on 22 October 2015, stating that: ‘The fundamental rules and general 
principles of the FEU Treaty, in particular the principles of equal treatment and of non-discrimination and 
the consequent obligation of transparency, must be interpreted as not precluding a provision of national 
law under which a contracting authority may provide that a candidate or tenderer be automatically excluded 
from a tendering procedure relating to a public contract for not having lodged, with its tender, a written 
acceptance of the commitments and declarations contained in a legality protocol, such as that at issue in the 
main proceedings, the purpose of which is to prevent organised crime from infiltrating the public procurement 
sector. However, inasmuch as that protocol contains declarations that the candidate or tenderer is not in a 
relationship of control or of association with other candidates or tenderers, has not concluded and will not 
conclude any agreement with other participants in the tendering procedure and will not subcontract any type 
of tasks to other undertakings participating in that procedure, the lack of such declarations is not to lead to the 
automatic exclusion of the candidate or tenderer from that procedure.44
44 Available at: http:/curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-425/14. 
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The vulnerability of the public 
procurement lifecycle
This chapter scrutinises the vulnerability of public procurement in the MSs analysed. We asked 
the researchers to answer some questions (both general and specific) aimed at assessing the 
vulnerability of public procurement to criminal infiltration and corruption.
Answers had to be rated on a scale from 1 to 10. Researchers rated them relying on secondary 
sources, interviews with experts, as well as their own expertise. As a consequence, the results also 
reflect researchers’ individual perception. Subsequently, through the use of the Statistical Package 
for Social Science (SPSS) software, we analysed the results by means of descriptive analysis 
techniques and we grouped the countries into three areas of risk: high, medium, and low. While the 
answers on the overall vulnerability of the public procurement and business sector involve all the 25 
MSs analysed, the second group of questions does not include Sweden.
Methodological remarks and the answers to some questions are available in Annex 2.
1. Overall vulnerability and business sectors
Firstly, the researchers were asked to define the level of vulnerability of public procurement in their 
own country on a scale from 1 (very low) to 10 (very high). As already explained, the countries were 
grouped into three areas of risk: low vulnerability (1 to 5), medium vulnerability (6 to 7), and high 
vulnerability (8 to 10).






























It is worth clarifying that an assessment of high risk does not mean that public procurement in 
that specific country is affected by criminal infiltration, corruption, or unethical behaviours. It does 
not either mean that the situation in that specific country is worse than in the other MSs. It rather 
explains that public procurement is vulnerable according to the standards in that specific country. 
In the first group are Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg, Malta, Slovenia, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. It is worth noticing that this group is internally clearly divided in two groups: 
Denmark, Sweden, and Germany, whose score is below three, and all the other countries, whose 
score is four or five.
As to the former group of countries, the argument of being law-abiding societies and the relevance 
given to trust as a fundamental principle play a major role in defining the score. In addition, for the 
two Nordic countries, the perception of low corruption based on the TI Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI), Eurobarometer surveys, and the opinions of the experts interviewed complete the definition of 
the score. Germany, on the other hand, relies on the integrity of institutions and the government at 
national and federal state levels.
For all other countries, the arguments are mainly based on processes of reform and consolidation 
of the public administration and on the perceived effectiveness of legislative provisions on public 
procurement (Ireland, United Kingdom, and Slovenia, the latter with a different nuance due to the 
reform of the state apparatus); they are also based on the reduced opportunities provided in a 
small country (Luxemburg and Malta). On the other hand, the issue of small inner circles and close 
networks due to the size of the country appears relevant in Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia. 
As concerns the second group (Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, and 
Slovakia), all the countries except the Netherlands give a major role to the reform process and the 
progressive consolidation of their political and institutional structure. The Netherlands gives credit 
to its competitive economy and overall good public governance. On the other hand, all the countries 
belonging to this group emphasise the relevance of the entanglement and close interpersonal 
connections between public officials and private actors. As clearly affirmed by the Croatian 
researcher, ‘the State plays a key role as legislator, regulatory supervisor, and economic operator 
in the public procurement market. However, in the performance of these three functions, the State 
avails itself of the very same narrow group of people’.
In the third group (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, 
Romania, and Spain), the arguments change across the countries, with some commonalities though. 
Once again, the relevance of groups with preferential relationships with public administrators and 
political representatives is reported in all the countries.
The use of non-competitive public procurement for contracts below €100,000 and the widespread 
phenomenon of splitting contracts into smaller lots below the threshold are considered relevant 
indicators of vulnerability in Austria, even though this policy is justified as a support for the national 
economy.
The over-bureaucratisation of control measures or legal provisions on public procurement (Czech 
Republic and Italy) is seen as a crucial vulnerability factor because it tends to benefit business 
operators able to ‘play with the system’, instead of rewarding those who respect the rules.
In addition, the lack of control in business ownership (Czech Republic and France) and the lack of 
awareness in connection with high economic value of public expenditure (Finland and France) are 
referred to as relevant elements.
Finally, the presence of investments of organised crime in legitimate business in Italy is an additional 
element increasing the level of vulnerability in public procurement.
As regards the business sector (see Figure 7), construction and healthcare appear to be the most 
vulnerable sectors across the countries.
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Figure 7 .  Level of vulnerability by sector
Construction is a sector that represents in many countries a major proportion of public procurement 
procedures. In Austria and Estonia, for which recent statistics are available, this sector accounts for 
more than 50% – in terms of contract value – of all public procurement procedures every year. It is 
also the sector with much case law even in those countries traditionally featuring little case law on 
the matter (e.g. Finland). In particular, subcontracting turns out to be the most sensitive issue. In 
addition, being a less ‘sophisticated’ business sector (i.e. a conventional sector featuring a low degree 
of innovation, large staff with basic skills, etc.) with a significant amount of money involved increases 
the risks. The construction sector also provides a breeding ground for cooperation among white-
collar criminals and organised crime, as shown by judicial cases in Italy.
The healthcare sector is a high-risk one for almost opposite reasons. It also involves significant 
amounts of money but in a much more sophisticated supply chain. Procurements for medical 
supplies and equipment are targeted at a closed circle of business operators. Quite interestingly, 
it is very difficult to find a foreign bidder that is awarded these procurements.45 In some countries 
(Germany and Netherlands) not all the healthcare institutions qualify as contracting authorities, and 
consequently they can buy supplies outside public procurement procedures.
In both sectors, collusion, cartels, and bid rigging appear as common practices.
Transportation is a medium/high-risk sector, which in most countries is connected with construction 
in relation to infrastructure, and whose vulnerability is similar to the construction sector. Relevant are 
also corruptive practices for transport licences, supplies, and services mainly – but not exclusively – 
linked with public transportation. State-owned companies that manage public transportation need to 
be monitored due to their political influence and the high amount of money involved.
Energy and waste disposal are medium/high-risk sectors, too. Despite a more varied picture across 
countries, it is worth pointing to the relevance, on the one hand, of mono/oligopoly markets and, 
on the other, of public or state-owned companies in both sectors (and, as already said, partially in 
transportation). The risks featured by these two sectors seem to be intertwined with the level of 
concentration of economic powers due to mono/oligopolies or state-owned companies.
IT and telecommunication is characterised by some high-profile cases, in particular in eastern 
European countries (Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania), involving major international players in 
business. In the other countries, public procurement in this sector often entails a significant increase 
in costs, as well as important delays.
Mining is not an economically relevant sector in many countries, with the significant exception 
of France, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Mining is still an important sector in these 
countries, and involves public companies (in the case of France, even one newly established large 
public company), which makes the sector highly sensitive.
45 This finding is supported by a recent study (Ackermann, Beke, and Sanz, 2015), which shows that cross-border contracts 









































The following diagrams illustrate the level of risk for each sector by country. Looking at the bar 
graphs, we can have a clear understanding of the extension of the risk, as well as of the sectors 
where the risk is common and widespread among the countries (as in the construction sector) or 
where it turns out to be highly problematic for some countries and less or no problematic at all for 
others (as in the energy and waste disposal sectors and in the extreme case of the mining industry).
Beside the business sectors referred to above, the research shows other problematic areas. Public 
procurement related with defence, public security, and the military is considered very sensitive, 
mainly for a widespread lack of transparency. In several countries, the legislation that allows public 
authorities not to go through competitive procedures is broadly applied.
In addition, public procurement by municipalities and local governmental authorities emerges as a 
highly problematic area. First of all, because local administrators and local business are intertwined. 
Family ties, social relationships with family members, friends, and acquaintances, the need to provide 
job opportunities for local communities, especially in a time of crisis, and the lack of knowledge and 
professionalism in small contracting authorities are all factors that make it necessary to strictly 
monitor local governmental authorities.
Partly in connection with what has been outlined above, social services and education is emerging as 
a new sector where public procurement, mainly of services and supplies, is becoming more and more 
relevant and increasingly vulnerable. In particular, not only does the abuse of emergency procedures 
for social services, motivated by the necessity to address a compelling need, prevent any competitive 
bidding, but it also makes it impossible to implement any scrutiny in terms of transparency and 
accountability.
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2. Vulnerability of the public procurement life cycle
The public procurement process can be described as a flow (OECD, 2007) starting with planning in the 
allocation of funds and ending with final testing and payment. Along this process, several key activities 
can be isolated and each of them is potentially vulnerable to illegality and crime. In the questionnaire, 
three questions pointed out these key activities in the pre-tender, tender, and post-tender phase.
3.1 The pre-tender phase 
In more than 50% of the countries the risk is high or medium for: 1) wrong or inaccurate 
requirements; 2) too selective eligibility criteria; 3) splitting into lots with the aim of applying 
non-competitive procedures. In particular, for the first and the second point, the risk is high in 10 
(Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, and Spain) and 
9 (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, and Romania) countries, 
respectively, out of 24, among both old and new MSs.
While in the case of wrong or inaccurate requirements the lack of professionalism of the contracting 
authority is advanced as an explanation, not necessarily related with widespread illegality, the 
intention to restrict competition or to allow only one bidder to participate is the main explanation 
across the countries for tailor-made public procurement procedures with specifically designed 
eligibility criteria. Splitting into lots, although it features a high score in only eight countries, 
represents a common practice. The reasons are more varied. A certain degree of protectionism in 
favour of in-country bidders is widespread, along with the idea of reducing bureaucracy, and so being 
able to conclude the procedure more quickly.
Half of the countries feature high or medium risk for: 1) lack of clarity of tender specifications and 
2) low bid price accompanied by extensive possibilities of expanding the contract in the post-award 
phase. The lack of clarity of tender specifications is often connected with the lack of professionalism 
of contracting authorities, which can foster illegality and judicial litigations.
It is a common opinion that the criterion of the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) is 
limiting unfair competition on prices. However, bad practices consisting in negotiating contracts after 
the award are still widespread even in low-corrupted countries.
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Between 40% and 50% of the countries feature a high or medium risk in the planning phase, in terms 
of: 1) manipulation of needs; 2) manipulation of allocation of funding; and 3) risk of disclosure of 
confidential information. All these activities prior to launching a tender represent a good opportunity 
to influence the procedure, without intervening in the procedure itself. This is also the phase where 
serious episodes of corruption may occur, which are the most challenging to detect since they are 
outside the procedure itself.
The lack of a ceiling for non-competitive procedures entails a high/medium risk for eight countries. 
However, it is worth pointing out that this risk is considered more broadly relevant in relation to the 
so-called ‘emergency or public security public procurement’ and to the defence sector. Major abuses 
may occur, but due to the lack of accountability it is again very difficult to detect them.
Low is the risk entailed by limited publicity of, or failure to publish tender notices and by a reduced 
timeframe to respond to a tender call. As regards publicity, some of the countries have recently 
established well-functioning e-procurement platforms (e.g. Ireland, Latvia, and Slovakia). The limited 
timeframe is a difficult aspect to assess. However, very few reports and key experts interviewed 
referred to this as a relevant issue.
Finally, we can observe the position of the countries as a result of the comparison of the overall 
vulnerability (see paragraph 1) with the vulnerability of the pre-tender phase. To do so, we calculated 
a composite index of vulnerability for each phase by adding the vulnerabilities of any single item of 
each phase. The position of the countries on the x-axis shows the overall vulnerability, whereas the 
overall vulnerability of the pre-tender phase is displayed on the y-axis.
The figure below shows that vulnerabilities are widespread across Europe, with the notable 
exception of Nordic countries. As we will explain further, this is not the phase with the highest 
vulnerability.


























3.2 The tender phase
The tender phase is highly regulated, even for non-competitive procurement. However, vulnerabilities 
are still present.
Figure 11 .  Level of risks in the tender phase
The choice of non-objective selection criteria or the inadequate weighting of these criteria is the 
most frequent case. Evidence thereof has been found in case law in many countries (e.g. Austria, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, and Italy).
Weighting of criteria set after the submission of bids, new criteria or subcriteria added at the 
evaluation stage, vague criteria that do not allow for any checks, and evaluation processes that 
cannot be reviewed or controlled are just a few examples of what often occurs.
Fourteen countries report high or medium risk also in relation to the manipulation of the evaluation 
board. This risk is reduced in those countries that have introduced rules on the selection of members 
of evaluation boards or rely on external auditors.
Agreements (cartels and bid rigging) among bidders are a well-known issue (see the latest report by 
OECD, 2015). In the questionnaire we tried to assess a specific aspect, such as the risk of agreement 
among bidders not to take judicial action. This risk appears high in a limited number of countries 
(Croatia, Hungary, Netherlands, and Spain) and medium in six MSs (Estonia, France, Italy, Latvia, 
Romania, Slovakia, and United Kingdom). The same can be observed in relation to the risk of misuse 
of the judicial procedure to influence or threaten the winner, which is high for Bulgaria, Estonia, 
and Hungary, and medium for Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and the United Kingdom. So, the risk 
connected with manipulation of judicial actions is high or medium in 12 countries. In addition, several 
countries report the misuse of judicial actions by the current contractor in the subsequent tender 
procedure won by a different bidder. In this situation, judicial actions are often used to postpone the 
award and gain additional income from the extension of the contract. This suggests that the abuse of 
judicial review is a specific issue.
The lack of control over the winner is not widespread. Procurement documents are widely accessible 
pursuant to the rules on transparency, freedom of information acts, or similar legal provisions. 
However, it is difficult to assess whether and to what extent the access is effective, and this 
assessment certainly requires additional investigation.
Looking at the position of the countries as a result of the comparison of the overall vulnerability 
with the vulnerability of the tender phase, we can observe a more diverse picture than in relation to 
the pre-tender phase. The countries are not grouped together in the top-right quarter, but feature a 
higher degree of dispersion.
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Figure 12 .  Tender phase vulnerabilities across countries
3.3 The post-tender phase
The phase following the contract award presents several risks related to contract management and 
payment. All the outlined risks but one affect more than half of the countries.
Overall the post-award phase, which is the least controlled of all public procurement phases, turns out 
to be the most risky, also due to the lack of defined rules and procedures (see also OECD, 2013, p. 84). 
As effectively pointed out by the Finnish researcher, ‘contracting authorities seem to forget the contract 
after it is signed and they rarely control a contractor’s performance’. In addition, in almost all the 
countries, relevant institutions monitor the procurement procedure but rarely the contract execution 
phase. Courts of auditors often issue an assessment even long after the conclusion of the contract, but 
it is not considered an effective form of control in all the 24 MSs. The most significant exception is Italy 
with the anti-mafia legislation that stipulates that checks be carried out during public works execution. 
However, this experience is country-specific and its results are debatable (see chapter 4). 
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The risk of using lower-quality materials is high in 14 out of 24 countries. This is particularly 
frequent for construction and infrastructural works. Delays in works execution and inflated work 
volume and costs represent medium/high risks in 17 and 16 countries, respectively. Several experts 
pointed out that both risks have increased during the recent economic crisis.
Contract execution is a ‘living experience’. Consequently, the fact that changes occur is not necessarily 
a bad indicator, particularly considering the lack of clarity of tender specifications and the risk 
of wrong or inaccurate requirements. However, this confirms the need to increase contracting 
authorities’ professionalism.
Unjustified differences between tender specifications and executed works and the involvement 
of new subcontractors during the contract execution phase are considered high risks in 10 and 9 
countries, respectively, and medium risks in 5 and 8 analysed MSs, respectively.
The risk of inaccurate testing is high and medium in 14 countries, with no geographic specificity. Lack 
of experience, close affiliations with the contractor, and lack of standards for performing testing are 
the reasons behind this inaccuracy as pointed out in Finland and the Czech Republic, respectively.
In Italy and the Netherlands, testing is a routinised practice. According to the law, the scope is to 
verify the conformity of executed works with tender specifications, without carrying out a quality 
assessment. Bad planning choices cannot be tackled at the testing stage. Consequently, new rules 
need to be introduced to make testing something useful in terms of lawfulness and quality.
The lack of supervision is a general concern that could summarise most of the issues in the post-
award phase.
On the other hand, late payment as a form of bribe solicitation is a significant issue only for Hungary, 
Latvia, Poland, and Romania. In some countries (e.g. France and Italy), recent reforms – which tackle 
the problem of delayed payment by the public administration – seem to effectively reduce the 
possibility of using this tool to solicit bribes.
The scatter diagram shows that the dispersion of the countries is lower: they are grouped together 
in the top-right quarter and their position is closer. This confirms that the post-tender phase is 
perceived as the most vulnerable.


























The prevention system in public 
procurement
The vulnerability of the public procurement cycle to criminal infiltration and corruption focuses the 
debate on what type of preventive system is in place in MSs. In this regard, the various countries 
have increasingly adopted legal provisions and soft-law instruments and/or established special 
bodies with national specificities. 
The analysis thus focuses on bodies and measures (red flags, debarment instruments, and 
controls on bidders) that each country has established with a view to strengthening the national 
administrative preventive system beyond the ordinary checks performed by contracting authorities 
within the procedure. Both the bodies and measures aimed at monitoring and/or preventing criminal 
infiltration and corruption in public procurement are analysed.
1. Monitoring and prevention bodies
The national courts of audit carry out a monitoring function in all the MSs analysed. These 
institutions, as authorities responsible for overseeing the lawful and correct use of public funds, 
monitor the financial aspects of various sectors, including public procurement (both for the tender 
phase and contract execution - see chapter 4 of this report). In Ireland and Portugal, the courts of 
audit have moreover specific responsibility for auditing procurement activities and for notifying other 
authorities of suspected corruption.
In addition, MSs boast a wide range of institutions in place, focused on countering corruption and/
or organised crime in various sectors, which also play an important role in guarantying legality and 
transparency in public tenders. These bodies, not specifically tailored on public procurement, exist in 
12 out of 25 countries studied. In addition, some countries have specific bodies. Nordic countries and 
Luxembourg, instead, do not have any such bodies in place.
Figure 15.  Bodies in MSs
Beside the monitoring institutions mentioned above, six States46 boast parliamentary committees 
and/or committees at national or local level that carry out inquiries and hold hearings aimed at 
acquiring information in different fields – including corruption, conflicts of interest, and unethical 
conduct connected with public procurement and expenditure of public money – as well as at 
disseminating it. The existence in MSs of specific bodies responsible for monitoring and/or 
preventing criminal infiltration and corruption in public procurement reflects the approach and the 
features of the preventive system implemented at national level. Institutions specifically focused 
on public procurement procedures are established in 16 out of 25 countries studied, and most of 
them were established during the first decade of the 2000s, with different functions according to 
national provisions.  Among their tasks during the tender procedure or some stages thereof, there is: 
controlling bidders’ conduct; monitoring any conflicts of interest; reviewing tender procedures after 
46  Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Ireland, and Italy.
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contract award and, if need be, deciding remedial measures; controlling the actions of contracting 
authorities and/or of the public administration; providing advice to public contracting authorities; 
and identifying best practices and guidance in public procurement.
The majority of MSs where this kind of monitoring bodies exists feature a single institution that 
performs one or more preventive tasks. However, it is worth recalling some particular cases.  
The Netherlands, for instance, has a sophisticated administrative framework in place to prevent 
corruption-related offences in public procurement. It includes various bodies with specific tasks, such 
as investigating the integrity of tenderers and of applicants for licences (performed by the BIBOB Office) 
or, if specific conditions are met (in relation to financial risks and the branch involved), performing 
in-depth screening of high-risk contracts and projects, and providing advice and recommendations 
(these tasks are carried out by the Screening Unit). Italy, too, boasts several authorities involved in 
implementing in-depth controls on bidders. The particularity of the Italian case, as better explained in 
the next paragraph, is that law enforcement units carry out police investigations on companies that wish 
to participate in a public tender. In Germany there are public procurement tribunals that investigate only 
public procurement procedures even though only those above EU theresold. Finally, Romania boasts two 
public authorities that verify public procurement – the National Authority for Regulating and Monitoring 
Public Procurement (ANRMAP) and the Unit for Coordination and Verification of Public Procurement 
(UCVAP) – whose actions often overlap although they are formally tasked with different functions. 
Further details on the preventive bodies across countries are provided in the following table.
Table 5.  Monitoring/Prevention bodies in MSs
AUSTRIA
Federal Company Responsible for Public Procurement (BBG)
It is a public company founded by the Austrian government in 2001. The overall mission of BBG is 
to organise lawful public procurement processes at national level and to serve as a procurement 
provider for public procurers in Austria. Its tasks include prevention of corruption and criminal 
infiltration. To this aim, the company has developed an anti-corruption strategy envisaging 
organisational adjustments, awareness-raising measures, and emergency management processes.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
Parliamentary committees of inquiry
Two parliamentary committees were established at the end of the 1990s with the aim of dealing 
exclusively with corruption issues.
BULGARIA
Commission for Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflict of Interest (CPACI)
Established in 2010, it consists of five members: three elected by the National Assembly, one 
appointed by the President of the Republic, and one named by the Council of Ministers. This body 
assesses any conflicts of interest involving public officers, and submits to the National Assembly an 
annual report on the work carried out.
Centre for Preventing and Countering Corruption and Organised Crime (CPCCOC)
It is a specialised administrative structure responsible for implementing the national policy in the 
field of prevention and combatting of corruption and organised crime. The CPCCOC was established 
in 2011 following the recommendations contained in the reports of the European Commission and 
in the Integrated Strategy to Prevent and Counter Corruption. The CPCCOC implements preventive 
control measures on bills with a view to identifying weaknesses, shortcomings, contradictions, and 
obscure definitions that create an ideal breeding ground for corrupt practices. It moreover analyses 
legal acts, administrative procedures, and judicial procedures in order to detect any conditions and 
opportunities for corrupt behaviours, and to identify countermeasures.




State Commission for the Supervision of Public Procurement (SCSPP)
Established in 2003, it is an independent national body in charge of investigating potential breaches 
of law in connection with the rights and interests of concerned parties or competing tenderers. 
It acts only at the request of tenderers or potential tenderers, and its enquiries are limited to the 
irregularities reported by the complainant. Since 2010, the SCSPP has also been authorised to file 
indictments for misdemeanours set out in the Public Procurement Act and in other regulations 
pertaining to the public procurement field.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
Directorate for the Public Procurement System 
Established within the Ministry of Economy, this body is in charge of capacity building in the 
procurement system, supervising all aspects of public procurement. It is also in charge of initiating 
procedures before the Misdemeanour Court for violations of legal provisions set out in the Public 
Procurement Act. Since 2012, it has been tasked with initiating administrative proceedings.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
Commission for Conflicts of Interest 
It is appointed by the Croatian Parliament and checks whether there are any conflicts of interest in 
public procurement procedures (Article 13 of the Public Procurement Act provides a list thereof).
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED 
Entire tender lifecycle
CZECH REPUBLIC
Office for the Protection of Competition
Established in 1991, it supervises public procurement. Administrative proceedings are initiated ex 
officio or based on written complaints. This body’s main tasks are: adoption of interim measures (i.e. 
prohibition to conclude the contract or suspension of procurement procedures); assessment of the 
lawfulness of public procurement processes; adoption of remedial measures; implementation of 
monitoring mechanisms on the actions of contracting authorities in public procurement and analysis 
of administrative offences and adoption of sanctions.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
Government Council for Coordination of the Fight against Corruption 
Established 2011, it reports to the Cabinet of the national government. It is aimed at coordinating 
the fight against corruption within ministries and other relevant institutions. Its tasks include 





Created in 2003, it is responsible for supervising the implementation of public procurement 
legislation. Its main responsibility is to verify compliance of public procurements with the 
requirements established by law.





The Ombudsman is responsible for monitoring all actions of public authorities and entities 
performing public tasks (therefore including public procurement and corruption/unethical 
behaviours). More specifically, this body monitors that such authorities comply with applicable 
legislation. It does not have specific tasks relating to public procurement or corruption, but conducts 
investigations if a complaint is filed.
FRANCE
Central Service on Prevention of Corruption (SCPC) 
Created in 1993 as an autonomous interministerial structure within the Minister of Justice, it 
is in charge of centralising and processing information about corruption. It also monitors public 
procurements, even though this is not its exclusive competence.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
Commission for Deontology 
Established in 2000 under the authority of the Prime Minister, it is in charge of assessing the 
compatibility of any lucrative activity of a former civil servant within three years after the end of his/
her public functions. It is moreover involved in the prevention of corruption and unlawful taking of 
interest, and monitors various sectors, including public procurement.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
High Authority for Transparency in Public Life 
It was established in 2013 with a view to gathering declarations of assets and interests. It also deals 
with conflicts of interest.
Information, Advice, and Strategical Analysis Service on Organised Crime (SIRASCO)
It was established in 2009 as a body cutting across police and gendarmerie forces. It is in charge of 
gathering, centralising, and analysing information on organised crime in France, and covers various 
sectors, including public procurement. In 2013, local sections were established.




These bodies are in charge of monitoring tender procedures for contracts above EU thresholds. 
They are administrative authorities existing at both central and federal state level. These tribunals, 
whose structure is similar to a court as they exercise their functions independently and on their 
own responsibility within the limits of the law (their act is administrative, but their organization 
and procedure are quasi-judicial), decide whether the applicant’s rights have been violated and take 
suitable measures to remedy a violation of rights and to prevent any impairment of the interests 
affected. They have the competence to issue an order to stop the awarding procedure or to alter the 
status of the proceedings. 
Their decisions (first instance) can be challenged by filling an immediate complaint with the Higher 
Regional Court (appellate instance) within two weeks. In both instances the application for review 
generally has a suspensive effect, meaning that during the ongoing legal review, the contracting 
authority is not permitted to award a contract to any bidder. 




Most of the federal states have bodies, the so-called VOB-Stellen, which are the contact point for 
tenders below and above EU thresholds and are in charge of supervising tenders and giving advice to 
public awarding authorities in the field of construction below EU thresholds. Similar to them, there 
are VOL-Stellen, focusing on public supplies and services.
HUNGARY
National Defence Service
It was established in 2010 as an internal intelligence and crime prevention unit of the police. It is 
supposed to protect public services from corruption and criminal infiltration. Its main task is to 
guarantee the integrity of public officials.
Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH)
GVH was established in 1990 aimed at guaranteeing fairness and freedom of competition among 
companies in the market, and at strengthening the competition rules for the benefit of the public 
with regard to public procurement, GHV is supposed to issue recommendations intended for 
contracting authorities and the tenderers. 
IRELAND
National Public Procurement Policy Unit (NPPPU) 
It was established in 2002 within the Department of Finance. Though no formal control or 
supervision system has been developed in Ireland, the NPPPU is tasked with the formulation of 
policy, dissemination of best practices and guidance in public procurements, and the delivery of the 
government’s e-procurement strategy.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
ITALY
National Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC)
ANAC is in charge of corruption prevention in the public administration and in state-owned 
enterprises. Established in 2014, it also monitors public contracts since the authority formerly 
responsible for this task has been abolished and all the competences transferred to ANAC.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED 
Entire tender lifecycle
Anti-Mafia Parliamentary Committee 
This bicameral committee was established in 1996, and consists of 25 MEPs. Committee 
members are re-appointed at the beginning of each term of parliament. The committee 
‘investigates and monitors with the same power and limits as the judicial authority’ (Article 82 of 
the Italian Constitution). The results of monitoring activities are published in annual or thematic 
reports. Furthermore, there are other local and regional committees tasked with monitoring and 
disseminating information on mafia-type and other serious crimes.
Coordination Committee for Close Monitoring on Major Public Works (CCASGO)
It consists of representatives from the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Transport, and the Ministry for Economic and Financial Affairs, as well as from ANAC and the 
National Anti-Mafia Directorate (DNA) (the latter two being outside the government). Its guidelines 
for prevention and control of organised crime infiltration in major public works are compulsory for 
contracting authorities and winning tenderers. In some cases, ad hoc guidelines have been drafted 




It is a group coordinated by the Prefecture, consisting of one representative from each of the 
following institutions: Carabinieri, State Police, Financial Guard, Public Works Managing Authority, 
Labour Inspectorate, and Anti-Mafia Investigation Directorate (DIA). It carries out necessary and 
compulsory controls aimed at preventing criminal infiltration in public procurement. Inspections are 
targeted at assessing that firms are not controlled by (or are not linked to) criminal groups. 
Specific anti-mafia certificates are then issued following this assessment.
The Prefecture is in charge of coordinating monitoring activities on companies having their 
headquarters located in the provincial territory.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
Joint Task Force (JTF) 
For major public works, special JTFs (e.g. the Joint Task Force for the Turin-Lyon High-Speed Railway 
Line – GITAV, and the Joint Task Force for ExPO Milano 2015 – GICEx) were established in 2003. 
In addition to providing supporting information and analysis to the Prefect, the JTF ensures constant 
information to CCASGO, and cooperates with DIA. Investigations are planned by the Prefect. 
Controls are performed on all subjects involved in the major work, regardless of where the company 
is headquartered.




It is a state administrative authority established in 2002 and supervised by the Ministry of Finance. 
Among its various tasks, this body ensures conformity of procurement procedures with law 
requirements. It also co-operates with relevant foreign authorities, compiles and analyses statistical 
information on procurement in the country, provides methodological assistance and consultancy, 
organises training for contracting authorities, and verifies that complaints with respect to violations 
of procurement procedures are examined.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
LITHUANIA
Public Procurement Office (PPO)
Established in 1996 as an independent body, the PPO is the main body responsible for supervising/
controlling public procurement procedures in all sectors, as well as for implementing awarded public 
procurement contracts. The PPO submits an annual activity report to the government and the 
national Parliament.





Department of Contracts and its two Contracts Committees
Since 2010, the Department of Contracts has been responsible for the administration of 
procurement procedures. Its director is assisted by the General Contracts Committee and, should 
specialised expertise be needed, by the Special Contracts Committee. The two committees report 
any irregularities detected in the tendering process, and make recommendations. Moreover, they 
hear and determine disputes between contracting authorities and contractors, arising out of public 
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contracts, and formally investigate complaints concerning public contracts and procurements.




Established in 2002 within the Ministry of Justice, it reports directly to the minister. This office is 
tasked with advising authorised local authorities. At their request, the BIBOB Office investigates the 
integrity of applicants for licences, tenders, and subsidies. When the investigation is concluded, the 
office assesses the risks and likelihood that the applicant will adopt an abusive behaviour. However, 
its advice is not binding. The BIBOB Office is also tasked with coaching public bodies that wish to ask 
for its investigation activities. 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Pre-tender phase
National Office for Promoting Ethics and Integrity in the Public Sector (BIOS)
It is an institution specifically aimed at helping the public administration draft and enforce anti-corruption 
policies. It was created in 2006 within the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. BIOS supports 
the public sector in designing and implementing an integrity policy. It carries out a variety of tasks, 
including research, development, networking, and signalling functions. Furthermore, it has developed 
practical models, methods, products, and education and training materials tailored on its target group.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Pre-tender phase
Screening Unit
The Screening Unit, established in 2011, performs an in-depth screening of high-risk contracts and 
projects. This Unit adopts three different screening models (quick, standard and deep scan). The latter 
category has been developed to (re)intensify corporate integrity assessment in tender procedures 
with a high risk profile. As a result of the screening, the Unit gives advices and recommendations.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
National Ombudsman (NO)
Since 1999, the NO has been dealing with complaints against public bodies and people/local 
government organisations. The NO is an independent and impartial administrative body responsible 
for assessing the performance of public authorities and the lawfulness of their decisions, as well as 
for promoting citizens’ rights. This body does not have judicial powers but can attempt to resolve 
citizens’ complaints through non-binding judgments and interventions.
Regional Information and Expertise Centre (RIEC) and National Information and Expertise 
Centre (LIEC)
RIEC and LIEC support the integrated strategy combining criminal law, administrative law, and tax 
law measures. They make recommendations to partners, and advise on the administrative approach 
to organised crime. 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender life-cycle
POLAND
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA)
Established in 2006, it deals with: identification, prevention, and detection of crimes and offences; 
prosecution of perpetrators; and control, analytical, and preventive activities. Among its tasks, CBA: 
monitors the public procurement market; analyses and identifies abnormalities and dysfunctions 
in the public procurement system; detects irregularities and crimes; conducts investigations with 
prosecutors in the case of crimes connected with the carrying out of contract awarding procedures; 
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and carries out prevention and educational activities, implements training courses with public 
officials, and organises conferences.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
Public Procurement Office (PPO)
It was created in 2004 within the decentralised Polish public procurement system. Its responsibilities 
include: development of draft normative acts concerning contracts; decisions on individual 
cases indicated by law; publication of the Public Procurement Bulletin, i.e. the list of all public 
procurements; monitoring of procurement processes to the extent indicated by law; analysis of 
the functioning of the procurement system and training activities; and international cooperation in 
matters related to public procurement. CBA cooperates with the PPO (e.g. CBA provides PPO staff 
with training on anti-corruption in public procurement).
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK)
Established in 1919, it is the supreme audit organ. It reports to the Parliament, and carries out audits 
on its own initiative or upon recommendation from the Parliament. NIK is tasked with eliminating 
or minimising factors that account for the growth of unethical activities in public life, as well as with 
limiting corruption. 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
PORTUGAL
Court of Auditors and Council for Prevention of Corruption (CPC)
The Court of Auditors is the institution aimed at preventing corruption in public procurement. 
It boasts a good level of effectiveness in detecting irregularities and deviant practices in the 
management of public funds. It plays a significant role also in controlling contract execution. In 2008 
the CPC was established within the Court of Auditors with a view to coordinating and analysing 
prevention policies. The CPC recommends that all central and local public bodies prepare plans for 
the management of corruption-related risks.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
ROMANIA
National Authority for Regulating and Monitoring Public Procurement (ANRMAP) 
It plans public policies in the public procurement field, and assesses the conformity of procedures 
with legal requirements.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
Unit for Coordination and Verification of Public Procurement (UCVAP)
It is a unit within the Minister of Finance, endowed with ex ante control powers. Theoretically 
speaking, ANRMAP and UCVAP should assess different cases on the basis of the procedure used.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Post-award phase
National Council for Resolving Complaints
Established in 2007, it is an administrative body that receives complaints filed against contracting 
authorities. Its decisions can be – and often are – redressed in ordinary courts.




Established in 1996, it is an autonomous body dealing with anti-competitive behaviours, including 
among bidders in public procurement.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Tender phase
National Integrity Agency (ANI)
It is an independent body in charge of verifying public officials’ declaration of assets and conflicts of 
interest. It is implementing an EU-funded system aimed at preventing conflicts of interest in public 
procurement. The system has been set up recently (in the summer of 2015), and is activated on a 
voluntary basis for the time being: contracting authorities wishing to participate ask their officials 
and bidders to enter data into an IT system managed by ANI. This system can identify and report 
conflicts of interest.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Tender phase
SLOVAKIA
Office for Public Procurement 
Established in 2000, it is the central state administration authority that oversees public procurement 
procedures. It has been designed with a view to monitoring whether public procurement procedures 
comply with law provisions. It ensures the fulfilment of the principles of transparency, equal 
treatment, and non-discrimination of tenderers and candidates, along with the principles of 
economy and cost-effectiveness. The Office for Public Procurement can impose fines for violation/
infringement of the Public Procurement Act, and maintains a list of operators and individuals that 
have been prohibited from participating in public procurement procedures.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
Anti-Monopoly Office of the Slovak Republic 
Established in 1990, it ensures protection of competition in the country. It can initiate proceedings 
on bid rigging in public procurement, and is empowered to impose fines of up to 10% of a company’s 
turnover for the latest closed accounting period.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
SLOVENIA
National Commission for Reviewing Public Procurement Award Procedures (National Review 
Commission) 
It is a specific, independent, professional, and expert state institution that provides tenderers with 
legal protection. It performs a review of the public procurement award procedure. Reviews consist 
of two stages: a) before the contracting authority; b) before the National Review Commission. 
Proceedings before the National Review Commission can be initiated in the following cases: a) after 
a review before the contracting authority has proven unsuccessful; b) when the aggrieved party does 
not consent (partially or entirely) to the contracting authority’s decision on a claim for review; or c) if 
the contracting authority does not make a decision in due time (eight days). 
Beside the competences typical of an appellate body, the National Review Commission can advise 
a contracting authority about how to implement a procedure vitiated by an element that has been 
declared invalid.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (CPC) 
Established in 2004, it is an independent state body tasked with preventing and investigating 
corruption, breaches of ethics, and the integrity of public office holders. Although it is part of the 
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public sector, it does not report to any other state institution or ministry, and does not receive any 
direct instructions from executive or legislative bodies.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Tender and post-award phases
Office for Money-Laundering Prevention 
Established in 2007, it is a constitutive part of the Ministry of Finance, and performs duties referring 
to prevention and detection of money laundering and terrorist financing. It is moreover the central 
authority responsible for collecting and analysing financial data on clients and transactions in respect 
of which there exist reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering or terrorist financing, as well 
as for submitting these data to competent authorities.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Post-award phase
SPAIN
Comptroller General’s Office of the State Administration
It controls any public administration acts that recognise rights or commit expenses, including public 
procurement. Its main function is to prevent illegality. 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED
Entire tender lifecycle
Central Administrative Court for Public Contract Remedies
It was established in 2010 with external control functions. It does not act on its own initiative but 
at the request of the interested parties. It rules on the appeals against the following acts: calls for 
tenders, specifications, and documents that set out contract conditions; prior acts adopted in the 
procedure, provided that they directly or indirectly determine the award, make it impossible to 
continue the procedure, or cause irreparable harm to legitimate rights or interests; and agreements 
concluded by contracting authorities.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PHASE INVOLVED




Committee of Public Accounts (PAC)
It is a select committee of the British House of Commons, responsible for overseeing government 
expenditures to ensure they are effective and honest.
Ombudsmen
Ombudsmen are specific bodies for certain sectors, aimed at considering ‘complaints where an 
individual believes there has been injustice or hardship because an organisation has not acted properly 
or fairly or has given a poor service’. They can be involved also to resolve public procurement complaints.
2. Special preventive measures
Not only do MSs boast bodies that carry out preventive tasks, but they also have measures in place 
within the framework of the national anti-corruption strategy. No matter how different anti-
corruption policies are across countries, anti-corruption measures are adopted with a view to facing 
conflicts of interest, guaranteeing transparency in the public sector, and tackling misconduct by 
promoting codes of conduct, publishing information and financial data, or establishing monitoring 
systems. The measures impact on safeguarding legality in public tenders. 
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Nordic EU countries, too, adopt this approach, although they have no national and comprehensive 
anti-corruption strategies. However, they have established some new laws to cover various forms 
of corruption offences and to tackle misconduct in the public sector, which have regulatory effects 
in different fields, including public procurement (see chapter 2 in this report). Moreover, it is worth 
underlining that Nordic States do not have special preventive measures for public procurement, 
with the exception of the Municipality of Helsinki, which has adopted internal guidelines to fight 
against the shadow economy, including procurement-related matters. These guidelines include 
limitations concerning the length of subcontracting chains, which represents a problem especially 
in the construction and cleaning sectors. Subcontracting chains entail lower salaries, worse 
employment conditions, as well as illegal work. In addition, the Municipality of Helsinki recommends 
that all companies that have a tax debt of any amount whatsoever, and that have not entered into 
a payment agreement with the tax authority should be excluded from contract award procedures. 
This somehow anticipates the content of one of the non-mandatory grounds for exclusion set out 
in Directive 2014/24/EU. The Finnish case is important because it highlights two significant aspects 
of the phenomenon analysed: the role that municipalities can play in countering illegality in public 
tender procedures, and the high vulnerability of subcontracts and of the contract execution phase 
to the commission of offences and to criminal infiltration, as already outlined in chapter 2. This 
argument will be further developed in chapter 4.
Within this anti-corruption approach, it is worth mentioning some national specificities that underline 
a range of relevant aspects of the approach. First of all, more professionalism among employees of 
the contracting authority is certainly an asset. Austria, for instance, has attached great importance to 
learning models/seminars at national level, aimed at fighting against misconduct in the public sector, 
as well as at strengthening public officials’ knowledge of codes of conduct. Courses, seminars, and 
training as primary tools to tackle corruption and conflicts of interest are implemented also in Spain, 
Germany, Latvia, and the Netherlands.
Keeping records of what happens in the procedure is essential to ensure accountability. 
In particular, Germany boasts a document management system under the responsibility of the 
Federal Procurement Agency within the Ministry of the Interior. It is an electronic workflow 
that centralises all information and provides a record of the different stages of the procurement 
procedure. Employees can therefore count on, and certainly support the application of the four-eye 
principle. Each decision has to be well founded and documented all along the procurement procedure. 
In addition, supervisors within the procedure may access any document at any time and, in the case 
of suspicion, access to documents for inspection purposes is immediate, and it is not disclosed to 
the official concerned. The quality management department randomly examines documents in the 
system, while the internal audits review transactions of the previous year. These inspections are not 
exclusively used to prevent corruption, but also to ensure lawful and economically advantageous 
public procurement. Information analysis is another important aspect, as recognised by the 
Lithuanian Central Risk Management Analysis System of Public Procurement, created in 2014. 
This system aims at carrying out monitoring activities, prevention of violations, and assessment 
of performance results of public contracts. To achieve this goal, the system assesses and analyses 
information on public procurement in order to ensure operational plans, prevention programmes, and 
control measures. It also provides statistical information on public procurement issues.
A quite complex prevention system can be found in the Netherlands, where a professional and 
innovative public procurement network for contracting authorities, PIANOo, has been established 
within the Ministry of Economic Affairs to enable the exchange of know-how and training among 
contracting authorities. PIANOo assists in the exchange of information among government officials 
with a view to identifying and disseminating good practices. In addition to this peculiarity, the 
Dutch system considers two different kinds of preventive documents that consist of proper special 
measures: the declaration of integrity and the certificate of conduct. The former is a mandatory 
certificate that the contracting authority must request interested economic operators to submit.  
The declaration is provided by the Ministry of Security and Justice, and states that no objections have 
been raised against the economic operator on the basis of an investigation concerning the conduct of 
the economic operator in the past. This document leads to a sort of indirect white list of companies 
(see paragraph 4 of this chapter). The latter is a declaration from the Ministry of Security and Justice, 
stating that, pursuant to an assessment regarding the behaviour of a legal entity, no objections have 
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been raised regarding that corporation. The statement does not provide any additional information. 
If there are any objections, the certificate will not be issued. With this declaration, contract partners 
can prove their integrity to each other. 
Moreover, since 2011 every legal entity in the Dutch system has been monitored permanently by 
Dienst Justis, a monitoring department of the Ministry of Security and Justice. Legal entities are 
screened at various stages for fraud or abuse. When situational changes with regard to the legal 
person occur, for instance a takeover or a change of management, a new screening will be carried 
out. This increases the effectiveness of the activities carried out by enforcement and supervisory 
bodies against financial and economic crimes such as tax fraud and bankruptcy fraud. 
Permanent monitoring is introduced to prevent and detect misuse of legal entities for criminal 
behaviours and specific economic crimes. When there is an increased risk of abuse, the authorities 
responsible for countering this risk are informed. It is up to those authorities to take the necessary 
steps within their sphere of responsibility.
In the Netherlands, beside these controls over legal persons, screening of public employees is 
implemented as part of the national administration recruitment and selection process of top 
managers. This screening is performed by the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) every 
five years with a view to fighting against corruption. Furthermore, top managers in the national 
administration must take an oath in which special attention is paid to integrity. Top managers are 
obliged to report all their additional functions, which are checked in relation to any potential conflicts 
and/or incompatibility with their future position. Mayors and councillors at local and regional level 
have to comply also with a comparable set of rules on screening and integrity. Pre-employment 
screening, including all staff involved in procurement, is an integral part of the hiring process at 
Rijkswaterstaat, the executive arm of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment.
Finally, it is important to recall that the proposal for the new Dutch Public Procurement Act (which 
will probably enter into force in April 2016) envisages a new screening instrument. 
The new system consists of two parts: the self-declaration (tenderers state that none of the legal 
exclusion clauses applies in their case) and the declaration of good conduct in tender procedures. 
Contracting authorities are no longer allowed to use their own testing tools, so as to avoid too many 
overlapping rules. However, if the contracting authority still has any doubts after the issuance of 
the declaration of good conduct, it can ask an opinion on the basis of the BIBOB Act. This opinion is 
additional to the declaration of good conduct, and covers further issues, such as the financial stability 
of the company (see next paragraph). In addition to the anti-corruption system, which also involves 
public procurement, Italy adopts an administrative preventive approach towards mafia infiltration in 
business activities. There are two different types of certificates, depending on the threshold of the 
public contract: the anti-mafia communication (when the contract amount is higher than €150,000 
and lower than the EU threshold) and the anti-mafia information certificate (when the contract 
amount is higher than the EU threshold or when the amount of different types of contracts that need 
to be authorised is higher than €150.000).
These two certificates differ also due to the type of investigations performed by law enforcement 
institutions prior to their issuance. For the release of the anti-mafia communication, the Prefecture 
checks in the Single National Database whether there are any reasons for revocation, suspension, 
or prohibition following the application of a preventive measure47, as established in Article 67 of 
Legislative Decree No. 159 dated 6 September 2011 (Anti-Mafia Code).
For the release of the anti-mafia information certificate, in addition to the checks performed before 
issuing the communication, the authorities must verify the absence of attempts of mafia criminal 
infiltration aimed at changing or influencing choices and decisions made by enterprises. The legislation 
lists the situations the existence of such infiltration can be deducted from. There are not only charges 
or convictions for several offences, but also factual situations suggesting the existence of criminal 
infiltration. However, the simple suspicion without any factual basis does not suffice. Checks are 
carried out by law enforcement officers of Local Task Forces (see table above). Each law enforcement 
unit investigates those specific aspects falling within its sphere of competence: for instance, 
47  Preventive measures are applied to subjects that have been convicted for, or are suspected of some offences, as well as to 
persons who, on the basis of factual elements, are deemed to be involved in criminal activities or to live off the proceeds of 
such activities.
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the Financial Guard screens corporate and entrepreneurial aspects, and inspects the individuals 
who manage and/or influence the choices of the company under control. All people with financial 
responsibility or influence (such as administrators, control bodies, technical managers, and building 
site managers) are investigated. Instead, the Police and Carabinieri investigate whether people 
involved in the company under investigation, and their cohabiting family members are somehow 
connected with criminal organisations. For each major public work, the Italian system envisages, 
beside Local Task Forces, the activation of a specific JTF (see the table above).
When an anti-mafia banning measure is issued, the Prefect has the duty to inform a long list of 
subjects, among others:  contracting authorities, other Italian Prefectures, DNA, the Italian Antitrust 
Authority, ANAC, DIA, and the Chamber of Commerce. If the aforementioned certificates are not 
issued in due time, the contracting authority can sign the contract with the winner. Rules are also 
established for the payments to the winner pending the release of the certificates.
Close ties between corruption and organised crime prevention measures are evident in the guidelines 
on the use of special anti-mafia measures for managing, supporting, and monitoring companies. 
The President of ANAC can ask the Prefect to apply these measures (i.e. re-appointment of 
management bodies or extraordinary and temporary administration) in the case of companies 
suspected or accused of serious crimes against the public administration or in situations revealing 
criminal conduct (Article 32 of Decree-Law No. 90 dated 24 June 2014). When a winning tenderer 
features an unlawful behaviour, it is possible to adopt these special measures to re-establish legality 
and transparency with a view to finalising public works execution. Two authorities have the power 
to adopt these special measures: the President of ANAC, when there emerge situations related to 
corruption, and the Prefect, when an anti-mafia banning measure is adopted against a company. 
Finally, works that can be implemented pursuant to extreme urgency procedures (governed by 
Article 9 of Decree-Law No. 133 dated 12 September 2014) are monitored by ANAC. The latter is 
responsible for verifying, among other issues, how urgent the public work is.
3. Red flags
Red flags are indicators that can be used to detect corruption, frauds, collusion, and management 
failures in different fields, including public procurement. Although it is quite difficult to give a precise 
definition, a red flags is a ‘pattern, practice, or specific activity that indicate the possible existence of 
corruption, unethical practice or fraud’ (Harris, 2013, p. 6). Therefore, a red flag provides information 
on the potential presence of corruption or other misconduct, without giving any actionable evidence or 
proof thereof. So, a red flag is a warning signal revealing a potential problem that needs to be tackled 
(see Campos and Pradhan, 2007, pp. 122–203, and Wensink and de Vet, 2013).
There are several types of red flags, which change over time and in relation to the context. 
As highlighted by some scholars, ‘they range from the specific - such as falsification of documents 
- to the indirect - long negotiation times or overruns’ (Kenny and Musatova, 2010, p. 3). This 
distinction between direct and indirect indicators has been made also by the Austrian Association 
of Cities and Towns, which lists a number of natural red flags (e.g. secondary jobs associated with 
a job in the public sector, enjoyment of special conditions for shopping, a sudden change of mind 
in decision-making processes, etc.) and of specific ones (e.g. failing to conduct controls and checks 
despite there being a cause for it, repeatedly accepting invitations by external businesses, whose 
relevance for the public duty is not clear, repeatedly awarding tenders to specific contractors, etc.).48
In public procurement, other red flags hinting at corruption or collusion are: any connections between 
bidders, that would undermine effective competition; prices quoted by some bidders, that are 
substantially higher than the prices quoted by other bidders; indications of physical alteration of one 
or more bids, particularly at the last moment; bidding time not in compliance with legal provisions; 
contract award and selection justification documents not publicly available; etc. (see Campos and 
Pradhan, 2007, pp. 302-303, and Wensink and de Vet, 2013, p. 23).
In addition to these examples, it is also important to mention the list of indicators identified in a 
study (Wensink and de Vet, 2013) on the direct cost of corruption in public procurement. 
48  Available at: http:/ www.staedtebund.gv.at/gemeindezeitung/oegz-beitraege/oegz-beitraege-details/artikel/korruption-
korruptionsbekaempfungdas-phaenomen-einige-wesentliche-merkmale-vom-dunkelf.html.
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The 27 red flags listed here below give a quite complete idea of the vulnerabilities of this sector:
OO high inertia in the composition of the evaluation team;
OO any evidence of conflicts of interest for members of the evaluation committee (for instance, 
because the public official holds shares in any of the bidding companies);
OO multiple contact offices/persons;
OO the contact office does not directly report to the contracting authority;
OO contact person not employed by the contracting authority;
OO any elements in the terms of reference, that hint at a preferred supplier (e.g. unusual evaluation 
criteria or explicit mentioning of the brand name of a good instead of general product features);
OO shortened timespan for the bidding process (e.g. request advertised on a Friday for a bid to be 
submitted on the following Monday);
OO use of an accelerated tender procedure;
OO exceptionally large size of the tender (average value plus twice the standard deviation);
OO bidding time not in compliance with legal provisions;
OO acceptance of bids submitted after the deadline;
OO limited number of offers received;
OO any ‘bogus’ bids (e.g. bids from non-existing firms);
OO any (formal or informal) complaints from non-winning bidders;
OO an awarded contract including items not previously contained in bid specifications;
OO substantial changes in the scope of the project or in project costs after the award;
OO any connections between bidders, that would undermine effective competition;
OO all bids being higher than the projected overall costs;
OO not all/no bidders informed of the contract award and of the reasons for that choice;
OO contract award and selection justification documents not publicly available;
OO inconsistencies in reported turnover or in the number of staff;
OO winning company not registered in the local Chamber of Commerce;
OO no EU funding involved (as a percentage of total contract value);
OO share of public funding from a MS (as a percentage of total contract value);
OO failure by the awarding authority to fill in all fields in Tenders Electronic Daily (TED);
OO audit certificates issued by an unknown/local auditor with no credentials (cross-checks reveal that 
the external auditor is not registered, is inactive, or is registered in a different field of activity);
OO any negative media coverage about the project (e.g. failed implementation).
A good indicator is a starting point, but it is just an alert that has to be followed by further actions. 
Red flags are therefore valuable for analysing vulnerabilities. However, what really matters is the 
measure that follows the alert.
The research shows that eight countries out of 25 somehow have red flags or similar tools in place 
(Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, and United Kingdom). In Austria, 
red flags, which are mentioned in the Code of Conduct for the Prevention of Corruption, are of two 
types: failure to report any secondary employment, and unexpected adoption of an exceptionally 
high-quality lifestyle. Similarly, some German federal states adopt indicators complemented with 
guidelines on how to act in situations possibly linked to corruption. In Saxony, for instance, the Code 
of Conduct against Corruption for Public Authorities makes a distinction between neutral indicators 
(e.g. conspicuously and inexplicably high living standard, display of status symbols, sudden changes 
of behaviour towards colleagues and/or supervisors, etc.) and alarm indicators. The latter are divided 
into two types: internal (within a department, e.g. insufficient transparency of official documents) and 
external (e.g. purchases at non-market price, useless purchases, conclusion of a long-term contract 
without transparent competition and with unfavourable conditions, etc.). In the United Kingdom, 
too, a non-exhaustive list of indicators is provided by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) with a view to 
preventing corruption-related offences.
In Italy, the use of red flags is linked to the National Anti-Corruption Plan, which is renewed every 
three years. Its guidelines provide indications on how to implement corruption risk assessment by 
using risk identification mechanisms that are similar to red flags. In eastern EU countries, the use 
of these indicators is generally linked to specific projects. In Hungary, the use of red flags has been 
tested in a project implemented by K-Monitor, PetaByte, and TI Hungary. The project envisages 
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the use of red flags as an interactive tool that allows monitoring of procurement processes and its 
implementation by citizens, journalists, or even public officials, with a view to detecting fraud risks at 
different stages of the procurement process. This tool automatically checks procurement documents 
from TED, and filters risky procurements through the use of a special algorithm. 
In Lithuania, indicators of corruption were established in 2014 in the framework of the Project on 
Creation and Installation of the Central Risk Management Analysis System of Public Procurement, 
financed through the European Social Fund (ESF) (85%) as well as the budget of the Republic of 
Lithuania (15%).
In Romania, red flags are instead mentioned in a guide on fighting criminality and corruption in public 
procurement, published by Freedom House. This NGO has implemented a project on this issue, 
financed by the European Commission (see paragraph 4).
Finally, Portugal features indirect red flags, which have not been designed as a tool to identify 
possible corruption practices. However, they represent a form of detection of malfunctioning in 
all kinds of public contracts. In this regard, two types of flags should be considered: a) information 
provided on the government webpage entitled ‘15% increase in contract price’, concerning all 
contracts that have exceeded the initial contract value – this indicator might serve as a tool to 
identify irregular situations; b) information delivered yearly by the Court of Auditors and the Public 
Works Observatory, aimed at pointing out any possible malfunctioning of procedures.
4. Debarment tools
Debarment tools are used as selective criteria for bidders. In particular, white lists work as a pre-
selection condition for the selection of companies that take part in the bidding process, whereas 
black lists refer to a procedure that excludes companies and individuals (found responsible for 
bribery or corruption-related offences or serious misconduct, or not meeting legal requirements) 
from participating in public procurement. States and international organisations have increasingly 
suggested and used these tools in the last decade (Hjelmeng and Søreide, 2014; Transparency 
International, 2013b). Nevertheless, few States have established public and central registers of all 
listed companies and individuals entitled to access public procurement (Transparency International, 
2013b; OECD, 2005), and the rules on these debarment tools significantly differ across countries.
The research shows that public white/black lists are available in 11 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain) out of 25 
countries analysed.
Figure 16.  Use of white lists and black lists in MSs
Among the countries where no listing of firms currently exists, there were some examples in the past 
or there are law provisions establishing that information on companies and individuals suspected 
of misconduct shall be made public. For instance, 10 years ago Estonia tried to blacklist companies 
deemed not to comply with legal standards. However, the mechanism did not work, and the 
establishment of white lists is now on the agenda.
In Poland, too, lists of ‘dirty’ firms have been published on the Public Procurement Office website. 
However, they have been recently cancelled because of the lack of transparency of selection criteria. 
In France, although black/whitelisting is not established as a general rule, Article 8 of Law No. 
2014-790 dated 10 July 2014 (relating to the fight against unfair social competition) introduced 
the possibility for criminal courts to order the dissemination – for a maximum of two years, on 
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a dedicated website managed by the Ministry of Labour – of criminal judgments on concealed 
employment, employment of undocumented foreigners, or unlawful loan of labour. This could be 
considered as a first step towards the future introduction of white/blacklisting in the French legal 
system. In Lithuania, the new Public Procurement Law (not yet in force) includes a provision setting 
out that, if a company has a track record of not implementing works or being prosecuted, it is 
excluded from the public tender.
On the other hand, some MSs (mainly northern European countries) seem to be against blacklisting 
because they are reluctant to disclose information on individuals and companies. As outlined for 
Finland, from a cultural point of view, it is not appropriate to share information or have public 
databases on convictions.
All MSs but Romania refer to the so-called ‘institutional model’, governed by national laws and 
managed by public authorities, even though the types of listing differ.
This model includes both whitelisting and blacklisting.
Figure 17.  Types of debarment systems in MSs
The whitelisting system (available in the Czech Republic, Italy, and the Netherlands) identifies eligible 
firms willing to take part in the public bidding process. In spite of differences across MSs, public 
authorities investigate companies and evaluate their suitability in terms of licences (enterprises) and/
or of legality (individuals and companies that are not suspected of, or have not been convicted for 
corruption or other grave misconduct).
In Italy, white lists were used for the first time in April 2009, in the aftermath of the earthquake in 
Abruzzo, as a tool to identify eligible firms for rebuilding. From then on, white lists have been used 
only in exceptional situations until the entry into force of the new anti-corruption legislation, when 
they became a mandatory tool for some specific entrepreneurial activities (Article 1, paragraphs 
52–57 of Law No. 190/2012).49
In addition to the cases where they are compulsory, each company can ask to be inserted in these 
lists. The application is evaluated by the Prefecture, which has to assess the presence of legal 
obstacles that can debar access to the list (Articles 67 and 84, paragraph 3 of the Anti-Mafia Code – 
Legislative Decree No. 159/2011). 
Registration in a white list is valid for 12 months. The fact that the enrolment in white lists is 
mandatory for certain sectors but can be requested by any company creates misunderstanding 
among economic operators. They think that being on a white list can be an asset for the award of 
public works in general, and they thus apply even though they work in economic sectors for which 
registration is not required. As a result, the workload of Italian Prefectures increases.
49 The activities for which enrolment in white lists is compulsory are: transportation of materials to dumping sites on behalf of 
a third party; national and transnational transportation and treatment of waste on behalf of a third party; extraction, supply, 
and transportation of topsoil and inert materials; packaging, supply, and transportation of concrete and bitumen; rental of 
machinery without staff; supply of wrought iron; rental of equipment with staff; road transport on behalf of a third party; and 
building site guard service.
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In the Czech Republic, the Ministry for Regional Development maintains a list of approved economic 
operators (Article 125 of Act No. 137/2006 Coll., on Public Contracts). The list includes those 
economic operators that meet the requirements and qualifications set out in Articles 53 (basic 
qualifications criteria) and 54 (professional qualifications criteria) of the aforementioned legislation, 
have submitted evidence thereof to the Ministry for Regional Development, and have paid an 
administrative fee.50 In the procurement procedure, economic operators are entitled to replace 
evidence, thus demonstrating they meet both basic and professional qualifications criteria through 
the submission of a document certifying enrolment in the list of approved economic operators. 
The contracting authority is obliged to recognise that document unless it is older than three months.
The Dutch system features an indirect form of whitelisting, which is closely linked to the declaration 
of integrity introduced by the Public Procurement Act of 2012. As already explained, a contracting 
authority must request economic operators to submit the declaration of integrity as a compulsory 
document to access public procurement. Therefore, the issuance of this declaration does not 
automatically create a white list; however, failure to provide this document leads to the exclusion of 
companies from the tender procedure. In conclusion, this document has the same effect as a white list.
Black lists can be found in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. In these countries, the listing of individuals and companies banned 
from competing in public bidding and/or from executing public contracts is governed by national acts. 
Among these States, Spain represents a particular case because the blacklisting of companies is 
strictly linked to the national Official Register of Tenderers (Articles 326–333 of the Revised Text of 
the Public Contract Act). In addition to the qualifications of registered companies, the aforementioned 
register lists the firms banned from concluding contracts with the public administration. In addition, 
the State and some Autonomous Communities have published a list of companies with some 
prohibitions, to be added to the Official Register of Tenderers. Companies are included in the black 
list when they are banned from obtaining civil service contracts for different reasons (conviction for 
serious crimes, infringement of professional rules or financial/tax obligations, false information, 
conflicts of interest, etc.). The length of the ban will be determined by the court, either criminal or 
administrative, that imposes it in relation to specific circumstances: starting from a maximum of 
eight years when the company has been convicted, under a final criminal judgment, for serious 
offences (including terrorism, human trafficking, business corruption, influence peddling, bribery, 
prevarication, fraud, etc.) up to a maximum of two years in the case of conflicts of interest. Instead, 
when the company has been sanctioned for administrative or financial infringements (such as tax 
obligations), the ban remains in force until irregularities are tackled. A peculiarity of the Spanish 
system is that bans apply also to those companies that, due to the individuals managing them or 
other circumstances, may be assumed to be a continuation or derivative of other companies affected 
by such bans, by virtue of transformation, merger, or succession.
Latvia, too, features a roster of banned tenderers, aimed at implementing a debarment system. 
A company that has previously failed to execute a contract can be excluded from public bidding. 
All contracting authorities must verify the Register of Punishments to determine whether 
participants in public procurement have been the subject of a disqualifying conviction. The register 
includes natural persons that have been convicted, as well as legal persons that have been subject to 
50 The basic qualifications are related to the integrity of an economic operator. The latter a) has not been convicted with a final 
judgment for a criminal offence committed for the benefit of an organised crime group, for a criminal offence of participation 
in an organised crime group, legalisation of proceeds of criminal activities, accessoryship, taking of bribes, bribery, indirect 
corruption, fraud, loan fraud, including the cases involving preparation for, and attempts of complicity in such a criminal 
offence, or if the conviction on committing such a criminal offence has been expunged [...]; b) has not been convicted with a 
final judgment for a criminal offence that has been committed in relation to the object of business activities of the economic 
operator under separate legal regulations, or in case the conviction for committing such a criminal offence has been expunged 
[...]’ (Art. 53, paras. 1 and 2 of Act No. 137/2006 Coll.).
 Professional qualifications are linked to the bureaucratic and formal certification of the legal existence and expertise of an 
economic operator. The latter ‘has to prove the fulfilment of professional qualifications requirements by submitting: a) a 
certification of the company register; b) evidence of possession of a licence to carry out business activities; c) evidence issued 
by a professional self-governing chamber or any other professional organisation, aimed at proving membership thereof; d) 
evidence attesting to professional competence [...]’ (Art. 54, letters a), b), c), and d) of Act No. 137/2006 Coll.).
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coercive measures. Foreign natural and legal persons are required to provide separate proof that they 
have not been the subject of a disqualifying conviction.
The German federal system does not envisage a national register of banned companies: only nine 
federal states51 have black lists in place as a statutory provision. However, civil society is increasingly 
calling for a nationwide register, and its establishment has been under discussion for 11 years so far; 
even the Federation of German Industries (BDI) is in favour of the establishment of such a system. 
As a result, a proposal, supported by the Ministers of Economy and Justice, has been submitted to 
create a nationwide corruption register aimed at facilitating investigations on tenderers, applicants, 
and potential contractors, as well as at effectively combatting and preventing further white-collar 
crimes. The register will offer the possibility of deleting registered data in 1–3 years in the case of 
recovered and proven reliability. The authority has to consider all circumstances before imposing a 
blocking period of six months to three years.
In the Czech Republic, a black list of persons banned from performing public contracts came into 
effect on 1 January 2010. Based on Article 120(a) of Act No. 137/2006 Coll., an economic operator 
(legal or natural person) is blacklisted when it commits an administrative infringement by submitting 
false or incorrect information or evidence to demonstrate the fulfilment of basic and professional 
qualifications (the same criteria as for white lists apply, see note No. 50), which has or could have 
impacted on the assessment of the qualifications of such an economic operator in the following 
situations: award procedure, application procedure for enrolment in the list, application procedure 
for a change in the records, and issuance of the certificate. Moreover, the Czech legal framework 
envisages the publication of the list of subcontractors that are involved in each public work and that 
have reimbursed more than 10% and, in the case of a major public contract, more than 5%.
In Hungary, the Public Procurement Authority website publishes a list of tenderers excluded from 
participating in bids (based on previous behaviours, misconduct, irregularities, frauds, etc.). When 
tenderers are found in a conflict of interest or provide false data or false statements that may 
compromise the fairness of competition, they are excluded from bidding for a maximum of three years.
Finally, the Dutch system also considers a sort of warning list instrument aimed at bringing the 
conduct of economic operators under control. The Dutch Authority for Financial Markets (AFM) 
publishes the name of the companies that are breaching the law, and ‘strongly advises’ investors 
not to do business with them. In this way, a company that does not comply with internal rules (or 
tries to back out of the pre-consultation system) is immediately isolated and stigmatised by other 
businesses. This reputational mechanism for debarring access to public bidding has been activated in 
the construction sector, where companies both act as investors, and constantly need to cooperate in 
subcontracting relationships (van Erp, 2008).
Similarly to the Netherlands, Slovakia features shame lists published by the Social Security Office 
as well as by the Tax Authority and public health insurance providers. Companies failing to pay their 
contributions on time are included in the list, which provides information on the amount of their debt, 
as well. Shame lists could be devised also for other obligations, such as payment of fees or penalties 
levied by regulation authorities with a view to protecting consumers.
In Slovenia a listing system is under development. It will be implemented with the new Public 
Procurement Act (currently under parliamentary discussion). The type of listing and the criteria to be 
applied have not yet been established in a definitive way.
In conclusion, as to blacklisting, it is worth underlining that the criteria for the inclusion of banned 
companies are similar across countries, and that they refer to both criminal integrity and/or 
bureaucratic conformity, and professional expertise of economic operators. Instead, the duration of 
the ban varies in relation to the kind of misconduct and to national regulations. 
Alongside the institutional model, it is worth highlighting a significant experience of listing ruled 
by civil society organisations rather than by authorities. Although it is an exception across MSs, it 
represents an interesting experience. 
In Romania, the lead was taken by Freedom House, an NGO that implemented a project financed 
by the European Commission. This project led to the publication of a guide on fighting criminality 
and corruption in public procurement, containing important advice on the most useful instruments. 
51  North Rhine-Westphalia, Berlin, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen, Hesse, Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and Rheinland-
Palatinate (http:/ www.bvdcm.de/news/aktuelle-korruptionsregister-deutschland).
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Freedom House moreover trained public officials (prosecutors, judges, and civil servants) on 
procurement cases. As a result, the Competition Council published a guide on how to prevent anti-
competitive deals between companies participating in public biddings. This experience seems to 
be leading to a proper listing system. Such a measure has in fact been included in the action plan 
of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2012–2015. However, the National Authority for Public 
Procurement hampered the activation of this mechanism due to the lack of a legal basis.
4.1 Effects and benefits of listing systems
Are debarment tools useful? Several authors and organisations hold that these tools, especially 
blacklisting, are useful not only as a means to strengthen procurement processes, but also as a form 
of sanction for companies involved in corruption and other grave misconduct and/or as an incentive 
for firms to comply with legal standards (Transparency International 2013b, pp. 2–3; Transparency 
International 2006, pp. 58–59; OECD, 2005, p. 14; van Erp, 2008, pp. 146–149).
However, the use of withe lists and black lists raises several challenges and concerns. They can 
have an impact on the economy. If these tools are not used fairly and based on clear and uniform 
rules, they could negatively affect competition, which governs the markets. The new EU procurement 
directive of 2014 (Article 57, paragraphs 1 and 3) pays great attention to this issue, allowing 
contracting authorities to exclude economic operators from participating in a public procurement, 
but warning that the fair competition principle has to be respected (see Hjelmeng and Søreide, 
2014, p. 2). Moreover, the EU legislation allows MSs to use debarment rules, warning governments 
that their implementation must respect the principles of equal treatment and proportionality. In 
fact, blacklisting and whitelisting have relevant reputational effects on individuals and companies 
and affect their rights. The exclusion from participation in a public bidding has to be limited in time 
and proportionate to the misconduct. Then, debarment systems have to consider the risks of a 
wrong evaluation, and have to guarantee the rights of defence and appeal. In this perspective, it is 
important to underline that, among all countries analysed in the present research, only six consider 
the right of appeal for individuals and firms.52 In addition, several countries are reluctant to use black 
lists ‘because of the risk of manipulation or lack of sufficient evidence of companies’ involvement in 
corrupt activities’ or other serious misconduct (OECD, 2013, p. 88).
5. Databases
Databases represent a crucial tool for information sharing. Scholars (Zanotti, 2015; Di Nicola et al., 
2015) have pointed to the need to set up databases for collecting and sharing information about 
companies, and experiences in some countries seem to confirm it. Almost all countries have registers 
of companies rather than databases. These registers store different information on features, 
qualifications, and financial data of firms. Some countries have a single register of national companies 
managed by a public authority (such as commercial courts), whereas others have different types of 
registers focused on specific data (e.g. tax liability or identity of firms, etc.) and managed by both public 
and private organisations (e.g. research institutes or associations).
In the former group (Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Italy, 
Lithuania, Poland, and United Kingdom), the register is usually aimed at ensuring transparency of the 
national market, and access is generally public and free of charge (except for certain sensitive data). 
However, these registers can have various functions, including providing information to contracting 
authorities for monitoring tenderers. With particular reference to Luxembourg, the register of 
companies can be used also in the case of suspected corruption. For example, if an unsuccessful bidder 
52 The countries are: Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, and Poland. In Slovenia, the draft law envisages the 
right of appeal. The Italian legal system does not envisage a proper right of appeal, but companies whose registration in 
white lists has been denied by the Prefecture have 10 days (from the formal denial) to file a complaint. In Slovenia, the draft 
law envisages the right of appeal. Moreover the system in place in Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) is proposed 
as a model to be adopted at national level in the future: in this federal state, the Central Information Authority recognises 
companies’ right to be heard before a final decision imposing a blocking period is made.
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has doubts about the winner, it can check the latter’s financial health, and report to the authority.
In the latter group (Estonia, Finland, France, Portugal, and Slovenia), access to registers can be 
free of charge, depending on the kind of information required or the rules of the organisations that 
manage them. A peculiarity of this second group of countries is that registers also contain criminal 
records on firms. 
Contracting authorities can consult these registers to gather information on tenderers. Nevertheless, 
registers do not serve the same function as the databases used by law enforcement agencies to 
investigate candidates in relation to the access to procurement processes. 
Only five MSs (Austria, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, and Slovakia) use these databases.
In Italy, the use of databases with investigative purposes is strictly linked to the national system 
of anti-mafia monitoring. To screen all the companies that compete or wish to compete in a public 
bidding, several databases, both private and public, are accessed by police forces. In particular, the 
Financial Guard53 consults both public (free-of-charge) and private (fee-based) databases.54 Moreover, 
the Financial Guard also consults a database named ‘Telemaco’55, which alerts the Financial Guard, 
should any changes in managerial bodies of companies occur. In addition, the Italian Prefectures 
consult the Investigation System (SDI) database, which contains information collected by national 
law enforcement agencies, both at local and national level, during their surveillance and ordinary 
monitoring activities. This database stores also all data on convictions and judiciary procedures.
In addition, DIA has developed the Central Observatory of Public Procurement (OCAP), a database 
that includes information and data gained by the Local Task Force during on-site inspections.
In the future, all law enforcement agencies in charge of anti-mafia controls will use the Single National 
Database (Article 96 of Legislative Decree No. 159/2011), which is not yet operational. 
This database will contain all anti-mafia documents issued at national level, and it will be linked 
to almost all existing databases, both national and international, that are useful for anti-mafia 
investigations, thus allowing for immediate consultation of different kinds of information.56 Last but 
not least, ANAC manages the National Database on Public Contracts, which collects and processes 
data on public procurement, useful for authorities to carry out their supervising and monitoring duties.
The Netherlands has a National Administrative Vulnerabilities Register located within LIEC. The 
register is an important source of information for all administrative authorities active in the fight 
against organised crime. The information on systemic vulnerabilities is usually compiled by the 
police in cooperation with the Public Prosecution Service, the Royal Military and Border Police, or 
a Municipality, and helps to address structural bottlenecks in combatting crime. In addition, LIEC 
– together with the Ministry of Security and Justice, the police, and the Public Prosecution Service – 
analyses, evaluates, and addresses these vulnerabilities. This makes LIEC the hub of knowledge for 
the administrative approach to organised crime. LIEC compiles existing information and expertise, 
which would otherwise be available only in a piecemeal fashion, and would thus prove difficult to 
access. Moreover, Municipalities can receive police information in a structured way. To this end, an 
agreement (so-called ‘covenant’) will be concluded between Municipalities and police bodies. Data 
gathered by the various covenant partners in the framework of their surveillance and detection task 
can be shared with other partners.
53  The Financial Guard is specialised in financial and economic controls.
54  It is worth recalling: a) among public databases, the Tax Registry, a database held by the Income Revenue Authority, which 
stores fiscal information on individual persons and companies; b) among private databases, those owned by Cerved (an 
entrepreneurial group that works as a rating agency, also assessing financial conditions and reliability of companies), and 
Mint (a worldwide database held by Bureau Van Dijk - BvD, which stores information on firms, persons, banks, and insurance 
agencies concerning financial data, managers, corporate managerial bodies, etc. This database includes two specific 
operational systems: the first one is named ‘Mint Italy’, and is focused on Italian subjects; the second one is known as ‘Mint 
Global’, and stores information on economic data of subjects from all over the world). For further information, see Furciniti and 
Frustagli, 2013.
55 Telemaco is managed by the Chamber of Commerce.
56  The use of this national database is governed by Article 8 of Law No. 121 dated 1 April 1981. The databases the Single 
National Database will be linked to are already in use, and are being constantly consulted by law enforcement agencies. 
Moreover, the Single National Database will be connected to the operational system of DIA, which allows for access to data 
collected during inspections at building sites (see Furciniti and Frustagli, 2013, p. 217).
59
Moreover, in the Netherlands, the BIBOB Office (see paragraph 1) uses a wide range of sources, 
including judicial databases and databases of the police and tax authorities, with a view to 
investigating the integrity of applicants for licences, tenders, and subsidies. The information obtained 
is processed and can be retained in a BIBOB database for a maximum period of two years.
In Austria, the total number of databases could not be established due to the prohibition for law 
enforcement agencies to disclose information and data on inspections. Moreover, the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office maintains another database, from where information on companies can be 
obtained in case there exists a justification according to law.
In Latvia, an electronic system on various kinds of information on bidders is in place. The contracting 
authority uses it to check, for instance, fiscal records of bidders or any tax violations, exclusion 
criteria, and technical resources of the bidder (infrastructural public works).
Finally, Slovakia features register of financial beneficial owners (containing around 4400 records 
and information on the ownership structure of legal persons that have been awarded a public 
procurement contract) and a register of persons that have been banned from participating in public 
procurement procedures. These public registers tend to be considered effective and transparent 
databases for contracting authorities and bidders in Slovakia.
Beside these public databases, there is another electronic monitoring tool managed by the NGOs TI 
Slovakia and Fairplay Alliance. This portal displays procurement expenditures by procurers, suppliers, 
sectors, and Regions, as well as it provides a large downloadable amount of structured procurement-
related data.
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Control measures in the 
post-award phase
1. Systems of control and supervision on contract execution
In the previous chapter, the preventive systems of the countries have been analysed, highlighting 
that the prevention of corrupt behaviours is one of the main purposes in planning national 
mechanisms of protection of administrative procedures, including tendering. Here, we focus on the 
systems of control and monitoring of the post-tender phase. 
The questionnaire shows that basically two kinds of control are used in all countries: internal and 
external monitoring. The former is carried out by bodies that have taken part in the contract award 
procedure. This kind of controls is usually carried out directly by contracting authorities and is related 
to the compliance of public works execution with contractual provisions. So, monitoring bodies have 
to check whether the work has been accomplished within the deadline set out in the contract, all 
invoices and fiscal aspects are correct and law-abiding, the quality of executed works complies with 
the agreements, and so on. 
Despite for all sectors the responsibility for supervising contract execution is usually delegated to 
the contracting authority, in Austria a private body is tasked with monitoring in the construction 
sector: the Local Construction Supervision Body. This private body performs a certified function that 
is contracted by constructors to civil engineers with the aim of overseeing and monitoring the overall 
compliance of executed works with contractual agreements: quality, financial limits, time, and so 
on. It is crucial to note that, by performing this function, the Local Construction Supervision Body, in 
order to contribute to the success of a construction project, carries out also control tasks that can 
prevent corruption.
External monitoring is carried out by institutions not directly involved in tendering procedures and 
works execution. These independent and external bodies (such as courts of auditors, finance or tax 
agencies, labour inspectorates, etc.) usually focus their attention on economic and financial aspects, 
the transparency of accounts, the efficient use of public funds, and compliance with labour laws.
Among MSs having external monitoring institutions in place, Italy is a particular case because of 
the role played by ANAC. Although tasked with performing preventive monitoring, ANAC also has 
repressive powers (supervision, sanctions, and compulsory administration). ANAC plays a significant 
role in monitoring public contracts because it has been assigned all control duties previously 
performed by the former Authority for Monitoring Public Contracts (AVCP). 
In addition, when the companies being awarded the works have subsequently become involved in 
investigations for crimes against the public administration (including bribery), ANAC has the power 
to propose that the local Prefect either (a) order the reorganisation of the corporate bodies of the 
corporation, by replacing the individuals involved in the alleged improper conducts, or (b) appoint up 
to three new managers in charge of the extraordinary and temporary management of public tender 
contracts within the company.
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Table 6 .  Control measures
Country External controls
Austria As regards independent oversight in sectors other than construction, a system made up of 
different bodies is in place, which involves national and regional courts of auditors and the 
municipal auditing bodies (responsible for financial control), and the Federal Procurement 
Agency (responsible for controlling public procurement procedures).
Bulgaria Control mechanisms (especially concerning quality checks and contract execution in compliance 
with specific requirements) are managed by the Public Finance Inspection Agency and the Court 
of Audit (Public Procurement Law, chapter 19, Article 123).
Croatia For all sectors, the State Audit Office monitors all financial aspects of public contract execution. It 
also verifies whether the public procurement procedure has been applied whenever mandatory. 
Moreover, the Procurement Act includes a clause on monitoring public procurement contract 
execution. Although this clause came into effect on 1 January 2012, the institution responsible for 
overseeing this part of public procurement processes has not yet been established.
Czech Republic For all sectors, the Supreme Audit Office, as an independent institution, performs audits on state 
procurement and contracts awarded (financial controls and budget performance).
Denmark The National Audit Office is an independent institution that oversees the use of public funds in 
various sectors, including public procurement. The Danish Public Accounts Committee is the only 
body that can call upon the National Audit Office to examine a particular area. The audit approach 
is, however, determined by the latter.
Estonia The National Audit Office is an independent institution tasked with monitoring the expenditures 
of public funding, including financial aspects of public procurement processes and public contract 
execution. Moreover, it issues non-binding recommendations on public procurement cases, 
targeted at contracting authorities and the Ministry of Finance.
Finland The National Audit Office inspects the use of public funding by any entity subject to monitoring, 
including the accounts for public contract execution. The National Tax Agency carries out fiscal 
controls. It can then report corruption in various contexts, including public procurement.
France Additional checks are either internal controls (by inspection services) or controls launched by 
financial jurisdictions (Regional Audit Chambers, Court of Auditors, and Budget and Finance 
Disciplinary Court). 
Germany The Federal Court of Audit monitors public procurement and expenditures related to public 
contracts. Similar to that, the State Audit Courts supervise cost-effectiveness and public 
procurement procedures at central and local level.
Hungary The State Audit Office monitors accounts and the use of public resources.
Ireland The Office of Government Procurement (OGP), established in 2014, takes full responsibility 
for procurement policy and procedures and is considering enhancing mechanisms to curb cost 
overruns in the implementation of the new rules. The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) 
provides independent assurance that public funds and resources are used in accordance with the 
law in various areas, including public procurement.
Italy The Court of Audit inspects financial aspects of public contract execution. Although tasked with 
performing preventive monitoring, ANAC can exercise repressive powers (supervision, sanctions, 
and compulsory administration) aimed at guaranteeing that public contract execution complies 
with applicable legislation and the principles on public procurement and economic efficiency. 
Latvia The State Audit Office (SAO) oversees the use of central and local government resources, and 
enjoys a high degree of independence in monitoring administrative proceedings. 
Lithuania The Public Procurement Office assesses how the contract has been implemented. Other 
institutions involved in the monitoring of awarded public contracts are: the National Audit Office, 
the Competition Council, and public legal persons authorised by government resolution to 
administer EU financial assistance.
Luxembourg The Commission of Tenders is a body of the Ministry of Sustainable Development and 
Construction that plays a small consultative role during the execution phase. Upon request, 
it can intervene and give its opinion on contract execution and monitoring. Besides, if the 
contracting authority decides to terminate the contract on grounds of lack of financial probity, 
the Commission has to be consulted in advance. Any other issue regarding contract execution 
and supervision must be reported to the Administrative Courts. Moreover, the Court of Auditors 
oversees financial management of public funds. As a result, it also monitors public contract and 
works execution. 
Malta The National Audit Office monitors the management of public resources, including those used for 
public contract and works execution.
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Country External controls
Netherlands With regard to monitoring of financial aspects of the procurement process, the audit offices, both 
at national and local level, play a pivotal role. Every municipality has its own audit office, which 
is tasked with overseeing the procedure that has to be followed, as well as with carrying out an 
ex post evaluation thereof.
Poland The Supreme Audit Office is an institution with an independent executive organ responsible for 
overseeing the use of public funding.
Portugal The Court of Auditors and the Public Works Observatory are generally responsible for monitoring 
contract execution. However, recommendations from external bodies (especially the Court of 
Auditors) are not complemented with substantive measures. Moreover, the Inspectorate General 
of Finance is responsible for monitoring financial aspects in various sectors, including public 
procurement.
Romania The only institution that is responsible for monitoring works execution is the Accounts Court. 
However, it has no explicit policy on procurement in place, and it pays attention to this issue only 
if during the overall verification of budgets (the budget of each institution is audited by this body), 
something odd stands out. 
Slovakia The Audit Authority is the institution within the central coordination body for the area of public 
contracts that carries out financial audits linked to the management of public financial resources. 
Moreover, the National Audit Office is the independent body responsible for monitoring the use 
of public budget.
Slovenia Inspection Services are responsible for on-site monitoring in the case of public construction 
works, or for other type of checks during works execution. Financial aspects are monitored by the 
Court of Audit.
Spain Systems of control and supervision of contract execution are carried out by the Comptroller 
General’s Office of the State Administration, which assesses the quality of works execution and 
its compliance with contract provisions, before instructing payments to the contracting company. 
If controllers report any irregularities, they will refer the case to the Court of Auditors, which will 
carry out thorough investigations. Moreover, the assessment of workers’ conditions is carried 
out by the Labour Inspectorate, which monitors safety conditions at work and compliance with 
employment legislation.
Sweden The National Audit Office audits all financial and economic aspects linked to the expenditure of 
public resources.
United Kingdom The Crown Commercial Service (which replaced the former Buying Solutions and the Government 
Procurement Service) has been operating since 2014 as a central purchasing body for the 
government and public entities. It does not have a specific ‘control and supervision’ duty, but 
it is responsible for: managing the procurement of common goods and services; improving 
supplier and contract management across the government; increasing savings for taxpayers by 
centralising buying requirements for common goods and services, and bringing together smaller 
projects; and leading on procurement policy on behalf of the national government. Moreover, 
the National Audit Office is an independent parliamentary body responsible for auditing central 
government departments, agencies, and non-departmental public bodies. 
In Italy, the same special law enforcement units that work under the provisions of the Anti-Mafia 
Code57 and carry out preventive controls (see Chapter 3 paragraph 1) are in charge of inspections at 
building sites during public works execution. This kind of control is performed only over public works. 
As shown in the previous table, each unit of the Local Task Force, based on its own specific field of 
expertise, monitors various aspects: access to building sites and workforce; means of transport and 
materials used; and accounts. With reference to major public works, inspections are implemented 
by both this Local Task Force and a JTF specifically established for each major public work (the two 
most relevant examples of JTF are: GITAV, and GICEx). Another specific feature of major public works 
is that the contract is signed by one general contractor that takes on responsibility for all companies 
working at the building site and that acts as contact point for monitoring authorities.
The national JTF carries out various tasks: 1) monitoring and analysis of information in order to 
strengthen prevention and countering criminal and mafia-type infiltration into major works (for 
instance, the Turin-Lyon high-speed railway line or ExPO Milano 2015). This information is related to 
the data collected during the inspections periodically carried out inside the building site; 2) control of 
all companies winning tenders (or being awarded subcontracts). As to the construction sector, the 
first controls are focused on companies that carry out works related to the so-called ‘cement cycle’ 
(transport/purchase of materials, waste transport, etc.). Besides, all other companies working at the 
57 Legislative Decree No. 159/2011.
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building site are monitored; 3) monitoring of property transfer of the plot of land where a building 
site is settled. It is important to verify that this transfer is not led by criminal organisations. The JTF 
makes sure that expropriation procedures are lawful and that the owner of the plot of land does 
not belong to a criminal organisation (the latter could have bought the land with a view to gaining 
significant profits during expropriation).
Every JTF carries out in-depth monitoring, inspecting only a single and specific major public work. It 
has therefore the opportunity to check every aspect of a major work (physical persons, legal entities, 
materials, workforce, etc.), outlining the international and national context. More specifically, Local 
Task Forces carry out inspections inside building sites, whereas the JTF examines collected data 
and carries out closer and more complex inspections. At a later stage, these two task forces meet in 
plenary to discuss investigation results related to the specific major public work under monitoring, as 
well as to deliver all relevant information to the Prefect, who will make a decision. 
Moreover, in relation to the Turin-Lyon high-speed railway line, the JTF screens all data registered 
by the general contractor in a weekly building site book and in a monthly report. The role of the JTF 
and its relationships with the general contractor are established in a legality pact in compliance with 
the CCASGO guidelines (see Table 5). It is worth recalling that on 3 August 2011 the Inter-Ministerial 
Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE) established that legality pacts are compulsory for each 
major public work, and approved the CCASGO guidelines. These kinds of agreement are concluded in 
the post-tender phase in order to meet three needs: 1) monitoring commitment procedures of the 
public work (including the winning company, all other works contractors and subcontractors, and any 
other person or company that has been granted access to the building site; a database containing 
information on all the subjects involved is thus set up); 2) preparing for the operational stage (e.g. 
checking materials to be used for building); 3) inspecting the building site.
Finally, the questionnaire shows that only Italy features different control measures and bodies in 
relation to the typology of public work. Local Task Forces, ANAC, and the Court of Audits carry out 
controls, based on their own procedures, for all kinds of public works, whereas the JTF is responsible 
for monitoring major public works and/or transnational ones. All the other 25 MSs analysed feature a 
unique control mechanism for all kinds of public contracts and works.
Although it is very hard to evaluate the effectiveness of control measures, it is important to reflect 
on the real control power of the various authorities in charge of this task. The role of contracting 
authorities needs to be supported and complemented with the monitoring activities carried out 
by other independent and impartial authorities. From an operational perspective, however, the 
autonomous bodies, which are completely out of the awarding procedures, may not always be able 
to carry out their monitoring tasks in an effective and continuative way. So, in order to strengthen 
monitoring activities, it is important to guarantee that more than one external body is involved. The 
public, the civil society, and naming-and-shaming institutions (both national and international) all 
could play a role.
Finally, it is worth inquiring whether the complex control systems that are focused also on abusive 
conduct could be a good practice for all EU MSs. In fact, contract and works execution offers several 
opportunities for the commission of criminal offences. As shown by Italian judicial cases, if a building 
site is controlled by a criminal organisation, the latter can easily be awarded subcontracts, or use 
materials and human resources with a view to achieving various purposes: gain additional income, 
strengthen its own criminal networks, commit other felonies such as money laundering, etc. (see 
Ordinanza San Michele, 2014, and Commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sul fenomeno mafia e sulle 
altre associazioni criminali, anche straniere, 2013). Consequently, it is important to reflect on the 
usefulness of establishing in all countries some measures aimed at monitoring both compliance with 
economic and contractual provisions, and abusive behaviours that can occur during works execution. 
Finally, another important issue that has to be pointed out is related to the best way to implement 
controls on abusive practices. For instance, Italian control mechanisms are mainly based on desk 
monitoring. As a result, they imply a great deal of bureaucracy and delays. These aspects raise 
concerns on the effectiveness and efficiency of controls on illegal behaviours. 
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2. Law enforcement and prosecuting bodies 
Considering law enforcement authorities and prosecutor’s offices with investigative powers in 
relation to the post-tender phase, the questionnaire shows that the countries investigated have 
substantially similar authorities. In fact, as described in the following table, two thirds of MSs feature 
law enforcement bodies specialised in detecting corruption in various economic sectors, including 
public procurement. Half of these countries also feature a specialised prosecutor’s office in charge 
of prosecuting corruption. Along with these bodies, it is worth highlighting that one third of the 
countries have special law enforcement units in place that have been specifically established to 
investigate serious organised crime and/or economic and financial crimes.
In those countries where such special law enforcement units are not present, organised crime and 
corruption are investigated by the ordinary law enforcement units. 
As far as the following crimes are concerned – corruption, organised crime, and economic crimes – 
specialised law enforcement authorities and special prosecutor’s offices in all the M5s analysed are 
not exclusively focused on the public procurement sector, but they are in charge of investigating all 
economic and social areas. Slovenia represents an exception due to its Special Prosecutor’s Office, 
which investigates serious forms of crimes – in particular organised crime infiltration and corruption 
– in public procurement/concessions.
Italy too represents a particular case because it features investigative bodies that specifically work 
on monitoring public works execution: DIA, among its other investigative duties, is tasked with 
coordinating and stimulating the JTF and the law enforcement units forming part of Local Task 
Forces. Local task forces and the JTF perform both preventive and repressive actions (see paragraph 
1 and Chapter 3).
Further details on the various investigative bodies are provided in the following table.




Austria Federal Anti-Corruption Bureau 
(BAK)
It is a federal office tasked with preventing and fighting 
corruption with a nationwide jurisdiction over security 
police and criminal police matters concerning corruption. 
It was established in 2010 as an institution of the 
Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior. 
Special Prosecutor’s Office for 
White-Collar Crime and Corruption 
(WKStA)
It is a special anti-corruption prosecution authority, 
created in 2011, which can moreover make policy 
recommendations to the Minister of Justice, based on its 
experience from past and ongoing cases.
Bulgaria National Anti-Corruption Policy Body It is a new single anti-corruption body established 
in the framework of the strategy for preventing and 
combatting corruption in the Republic of Bulgaria for the 
period 2015–2020. It acts as a specialised coordinating 
body liaising between the Prosecutor’s Office, the State 
Agency for National Security (SANS), and the Ministry of 
the Interior, and its main goal is to investigate corruption.
Croatia Bureau for Combatting Corruption 
and Organised Crime (USKOK)
Specialised in investigations related to corruption and 
organised crime, it has been operating within the State 
Attorney General’s Office since 2001.
USKOK National Police (PNSKOK) Since 2009, PNSKOK has been USKOK’s counterpart in 
the Criminal Police Directorate. PNSKOK is well equipped 
to carry out effective investigations with a view to 





Czech Republic Corruption and Financial Crime 
Detection Department (ÚOKFK) 
Established in 2003 as a special unit within the Czech 
police, it investigates corruption and financial crimes. 
ÚOKFK is recognised as a valuable element in the 
Czech security system, especially for its professional 
investigators who are able to unravel a broad range of 
key cases also with connections to classic organised 
crime (financial crimes, VAT frauds, money laundering, 
etc.).
Organised Crime Detection 
Department (ÚOOZ)
Established as a special unit within the Czech police in 
January 1995, ÚOOZ deals with an increasing number of 
corruption investigations connected to organised crime. 
It is headquartered in Prague and has six regional branch 
offices. Its main tasks are: acquiring, gathering, storing, 
analysing, and using information relevant to the fight 
against organised crime; and detecting, investigating, 
and arresting organised crime offenders.
Department for Serious Economic 
and Financial Crimes
It was established by the Supreme Public Prosecutor 
as a body specialised in serious forms of economic and 
financial crime in capital markets and in the banking and 
tax fields. It is also tasked with confronting some forms 
of corruption. Its main activities are:  
supervising compliance with the law in pre-trial 
proceedings in the abovementioned cases of intentional 
criminal offences; and developing methodological tools.
Denmark Public Prosecutor for Serious 
Economic and International Crimes
It is the main body responsible for investigating serious 
financial and international crimes. Its multidisciplinary 
team is composed of prosecutors and investigators. It 
was established in 1973 and works with the police with 
a view to prosecuting crimes in pursuance of the Danish 
administrative regulations.
Estonia Estonian Internal Security Service 
(KAPO) 
It is a governmental agency established in 1991 within 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It is responsible for 
maintaining national security through collection of 
information and implementation of preventive measures, 
as well as investigation of offences. It deals with crimes 
committed by high-rank officials, judges, prosecutors, 
and high-rank police officials, as well as major crimes 
and corruption in Estonia’s five largest cities (the ordinary 
police deal with the other cases).
Finland National Bureau of Investigation 
(NBI)
There is a special anti-corruption unit within the NBI 
(created in 2007), which however consists of only one 
officer. Investigations of corruption-related crimes are 
conducted by local law enforcement units.
France Central Office for the Fight against 
Organised Crime (OCLCO) 
It was established in 2006 with the aim of fighting 
against criminal organisations, regardless of the nature 
of their illicit activities. 
Directorate for the Fight against 
Organised Crime and Financial 
Crimes (SDLCODF)
Since 2004, the specialised interregional jurisdictions 
have been fighting against organised crime (organised 
groups and criminal associations) and financial and 
economic criminality (for instance, violation of probity), 







Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) Established in 1951, BKA is a nationwide/federal 
investigative police agency tasked with monitoring and 
investigating various forms of crime. It reports directly to 
the Federal Ministry of the Interior.  
By acting as an information and communications centre 
of the German police, BKA provides support to national 
and federal state police forces in relation to prevention 
and prosecution of crimes that involve more than one 
German federal state and that are of international 
significance or otherwise of considerable significance. 
The fight against structural corruption is carried out 
by centralised investigation units within the national 
criminal police or central criminal departments with 
specialised staff. Moreover, each federal state has a 
specific organisation tasked with fighting corruption 
and financial crimes (e.g. the Department for Interior 
Investigations in Hamburg and the Central Anti-
Corruption Office in Bremen). Investigations of corruption 
are not under the responsibility of the police; they are 
instead carried out by the Department of the Interior.
Specialised Public Prosecution 
Offices/Departments in Federal 
States
Fourteen out of 16 federal states feature Public 
Prosecution Offices/Departments specialised in 
corruption and/or economic crimes.
Hungary Coordination Centre against 
Organised Crime
It reports to the Minister of National Security and its 
main task is to gather and analyse information gleaned 
by law enforcement agencies and other authorities.
Criminal Directorate (NAV BF) It plays an important role in detecting and tackling 
financial crimes connected to organised groups.
Hungarian Prosecution Service It has its own investigative branch, wich investigate 
prosecutors, judges, notaries, police officers, tax and 
custom officers in relation to certain crimes, including 
corruption.
Ireland Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) Established in 1996, the CAB is a multi-agency law 
enforcement body which uses a multi-disciplinary 
partnership approach in its investigations into the 
suspected proceeds of criminal conduct. It works closely 
with international crime investigation agencies and 
bodies.
Office of the Director of Corporate 
Enforcement (ODCE)
One of the important functions of this body (established 
in 2001) is to encourage compliance with the 
requirements of the Companies Acts. The investigative 
and enforcement function of the ODCE is quite extensive, 
including white-collar crimes.
Garda Bureau of Fraud Investigation 
within the Police
It is a specialised division of Ireland’s national police 
forces (formed in 1996) which investigates financial 
crimes. It operates as part of the Garda National Support 
Services branch, and works alongside other sections of 









Established in 1991, it is a law enforcement interagency 
body that carries out investigations on crimes related to 
the mafia and other organised criminal groups. It carries 
out both preventive and repressive actions.
Anti-Mafia National Directorate 
(DNA)
Established in 1991, it is a national body under the 
authority of the National Anti-Mafia Prosecutor. It is 
specialised in mafia investigations all over Italy
Anti-Mafia District Directorate (DDA) Established in 1991, it is composed of 26 local sections 
located within the 26 districts of the Courts of Appeal. 
Local units are in charge of carrying out investigations on 
organised crime and the mafia. 
Local Task Forces They are composed of five law enforcement agencies 
(Financial Guard, Police, Carabinieri, State Forestry 
Forces, and Fire Brigade) and the DIA, and are led by the 
Italian territorial Prefectures. Their main task consists in 
carrying out necessary and compulsory controls aimed 
at preventing criminal infiltration in public procurement 
and at detecting criminal activities during public works 
execution.
Joint Task Force (JTF) The Italian system envisages the activation of a JTF 
for each major public work (e.g. GITAV and GICEx), in 
addition to the local task force. In addition to providing 
supporting information and analysis to the Prefect, the 
JTF ensures constant information to CCASGO, as well 
as cooperation with DIA. Investigations (carried out by 
the JTF during both the pre-tender phase and works 
execution) are planned by the Prefect and are related 
only to the work falling under the responsibility of that 
specific JTF.
National Anti-Corruption Authority 
(ANAC) 
It is a body that beside the prevention of corruption 
(see table 5), also monitors public contracts and has 
repressive powers.
Latvia Bureau for Preventing and 
Combatting Corruption (KNAB)
Established in 2012, it is the leading anti-corruption 
authority of Latvia. It is aimed at fighting corruption 
in a coordinated and comprehensive way, through 
prevention, investigation, and education. It is an 
independent public institution under the supervision 
of the Cabinet of Ministers, specifically of the Prime 
Minister – supervision is limited to monitoring the 
lawfulness of its decisions. KNAB is also a pre-trial 
investigatory body, and has traditional police powers.
Lithuania Special Investigation Service (STT) Established in 1997, it is a statutory law enforcement 
institution reporting to the President and the Parliament 
of Lithuania. It is aimed at detecting and investigating 
corruption offences, as well as at developing and 
implementing corruption prevention measures. STT acts 
as a facilitator in streamlining anti-corruption activities.
Immunity Service It is a body responsible for the prevention and 
investigation of corruption within the police. It reports to 
the Police Commissioner General.
Luxembourg Service of the Judiciary Police (SPJ) Within the Judiciary Police, there are specialised 
departments dealing with organised crime and economic 
and financial crimes.
Public Prosecutor’s Office The Luxembourg Public Prosecutor’s Office boasts a 
section dealing with economic and financial crimes and a 





Malta Malta Police Force It is the main law enforcement agency and is composed 
of different investigative units. Among the various 
units, the Economic Crimes Unit investigates corruption 
offences and produces annual statistics on its 
investigations. 
Anti-Fraud and Corruption Unit 
within the Internal Audit and 
Investigative Department (IAID)
This unit examines governmental activities, and provides 
internal financial investigative services, separate from 
criminal investigations. 
Netherlands Anti-Corruption Service of the Dutch 
Police
Established in 1897, it is a specialised investigation 
service within the Dutch police, aimed at combatting 
corruption. It has both repressive and proactive tasks, 
and investigates cases of possible criminal conduct 
of government officials and civil servants, such as 
corruption involving police officials, members of the 
judiciary, and prominent public office holders. Other 
investigations are carried out by ordinary police forces. In 
some investigations, the Anti-Corruption Service of the 
Dutch Police is assisted by local police units or special 
law enforcement agencies.
Public Prosecution Service (PPS) The PPS is responsible for criminal enforcement of 
the legal system and for other tasks as established by 
law. It includes two specialised offices: the National 
Prosecution Office for Serious (Organised) Crime and 
the Functional Prosecution Office. In 2000, the Ministry 
of Justice established a National Public Prosecutor for 
Corruption.
Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation 
Service (FIOD)
The FIOD, which was established in 1945, is a special 
unit of the tax authorities, and acts as a special 
investigation service. It is aimed at contributing to the 
prevention of fiscal, financial, and economic frauds, at 
ensuring the integrity of professionals and businesses, 
and at fighting against organised crime. In addition to 
conducting its own investigations, FIOD also provides 
assistance to the police and prosecution service, notably 




Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA) It is a separate agency established in 2006 with the aim 
of investigating all forms of corruption, including those 
related to public procurement. It combats corruption 
in the public and private sectors and any activities that 
may endanger national economic interests. CBA engages 
in criminal investigation, corruption prevention, anti-
corruption information, and operational activities. 
Internal Security Agency (ABW) Established in 2002, ABW is aimed at identifying, 
preventing, and detecting corruption of public office 
holders, likely to undermine the security of the country.  
The prosecutor may delegate inquiry and investigation 
powers to CBA and ABW.
Both can also carry out specific tasks ordered by courts 
or by prosecutors, as specified in the Criminal Procedure 
Code and in the Executive Criminal Code.
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) It is a specialised unit within the Polish police, which is in 
charge of combatting organised crime.
Portugal Judiciary Police (PJ) It is the national police force in charge of criminal 
investigations related to the offence of criminal 
association, as well as to a range of other serious 
offences.
National Unit for Combatting 
Corruption (UNCC)
UNCC is a police branch aimed at investigating corruption 
cases. It is responsible for prevention, detection, 
criminal investigation of, and assistance to judicial and 
prosecuting  
authorities, regarding corruption, embezzlement, 
influence peddling, and unlawful profit sharing. In the 
case of corruption and economic criminality, UNCC 
assists, with its investigations, the Central Department 





Central Department of Investigation 
and Penal Action (DCIAP)
DCIAP was created in 1986 as part of the Portuguese 
Public Prosecutor’s Office, and is headed by a Deputy 
Public Prosecutor assisted by four Junior Public 
Prosecutors. Its mission is to coordinate and steer 
investigations and prevention of violent criminality, 
organised crime, and very complex criminality. 
Although this body works on specific areas of crime, its 
investigations are carried out along the lines of ordinary 
police investigations of other crimes.
Romania Directorate for Investigating 
Organised Crime and Terrorism 
(DIICOT) 
It is the only structure within the Public Ministry that is 
specialised in investigating and countering organised 
crime and terrorism. It has its own legal status and 
budget. Like the National Anti-Corruption Directorate 
(DNA), it is headed by a chief prosecutor having 
autonomy from the general prosecutor over budgetary 
decisions and activities. 
National Anti-Corruption Directorate 
(DNA) 
DNA is a prosecutor’s office specialised in combatting 
high and medium-level corruption. It carries out criminal 
investigation activities in the case of offences equivalent 
and directly connected to corruption. It moreover 
investigates offences committed against the financial 
interests of the European Communities, as well as 
certain categories of serious economic and financial 
crimes.
Anti-Corruption Directorate General 
(DGA)
DGA is a specialised police structure within the Ministry 
of Home Affairs, mainly responsible for investigating 
corruption within the police, while also covering other 
sectors.
Slovakia National Criminal Agency (NAKA or 
NCA)
It was created from the combination of the Bureau for 
Combatting Organised Crime (UBOK) and the 
Bureau for Combatting Corruption (UBPK), with a view to 
making investigations more effective.
Specialised Criminal Courts (SCC) Slovakia has a specific SCC in place, with exclusive 
jurisdiction over corruption cases, including domestic 
and foreign bribery.
Slovenia National Bureau of Investigation It has criminal investigation powers in several fields, 
including corruption crimes.
Criminal Police The Criminal Police boasts several specialised teams 
(Organised Crime Unit, Economic Crimes Unit, and 
National Investigation Unit – NPU) that are focused 
on corruption, organised crime, and economic crimes 
in different fields, including public procurement/
concessions.
Specialised Prosecutor’s Office It investigates serious forms of crime, in particular 
organised crime infiltration and corruption in public 
procurement/concessions. 
Spain Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office Created in 1995, it does not feature a geographically 
limited scope, but covers the whole Spanish territory. It 
intervenes in particularly important cases on corruption 
at the discretion of the Attorney General. Other cases are 
dealt with by different institutions acting on behalf of the 
Attorney General, or by ordinary prosecutors.
Central Bureau of Investigation of 
Money Laundering and Corruption
Established in 2013, it is a special body of the criminal 
police, responsible for investigating corruption in 
general, including those cases related to procurement 
procedures. Its tasks include investigation of criminal 
offences related to money laundering from criminal 
acts, economic crimes related to international piracy, 
corruption in its various forms, and asset recovery.
Organised Crime Intelligence Unit 
(CICO)
CICO centralises intelligence services, and coordinates 





Sweden National Anti-Corruption Unit of the 
Office of the Prosecutor General
Established in 2002, it is part of the Swedish Prosecution 
Authority. It is not specifically designed to investigate 
crimes in public procurement/concessions, but is 
responsible for investigating corruption in all public 
authorities. It deals with all criminal suspicions of bribery 
and acts of bribery, as well as with all suspected crimes 
closely linked with these criminal offences. 
National Anti-Corruption Police Unit This police unit was created in 2012 to support the 
National Anti-Corruption Unit of the Office of the 
Prosecutor General in corruption investigations, 
including foreign bribery.
Economic Crime Bureau It is a police unit specialised in the 
fight against economic and financial crimes.
United Kingdom National Crime Agency (NCA) The NCA is a non-ministerial government department. 
It replaced the Serious Organised Crime Agency in 
2013, and leads the British law enforcement’s fight to 
cut serious and organised crime. It works closely with 
Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs), the SFO, as 
well as individual police forces, and other international 
law enforcement agencies.
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) It is an independent governmental department that 
investigates and prosecutes serious or complex fraud 
and corruption, and it is accountable to the Attorney 
General. 
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Main findings in pills
1. Potential use of organised crime offences in public procurement. The organised crime offence 
could be used to criminalise the conduct of criminal organisations involved in public procurement-
related offences, if these offences reach the threshold required for predicate offences. However, 
there is little evidence in case law. White-collar crime as organised crime is not yet a reality in the 
daily practice.
2. Bribery and trading in influence in public procurement. All MSs have criminalised active and 
passive bribery, and a common trend in increasing penalties is observed. However, due to difficulties 
in proving bribery, easier-to-prove offences are charged much more frequently. The criminalisation of 
trading in influence is not yet a reality in many MSs, and in most of them the offence is so recent that 
it proves difficult to assess. Reluctance towards this offence in some MSs is justified by the claimed 
difficulties in distinguishing collusive practices from legitimate lobbying activities.
3. New safeguards in public procurement in theory but still big differences among MSs in 
practice. MSs’ draft bills show that relevant differences remain among MSs as regards grounds for 
exclusion, subcontracting, and conflicts of interest. The room left in many countries for the initiative 
of the contracting authority may result in zero increase in safeguards.
4. Construction, healthcare, and transportation are the highest-risk sectors across MSs. New 
sectors are also emerging and, in particular, social services and education.
5. State-owned enterprises and local governments pop up. No matter which is the sector or how 
high the risk is, public companies are always lacking transparency and accountability. 
Local governments are the weak link of the chain. Intertwining between the local government and 
local businesses, familism, localism, and lack of professionalism are the most frequent shortcomings 
among local governments as contracting authorities.
6. The challenges of the tender procedure are outside it. The pre-tender and post-tender phases 
are those featuring the highest risk across MSs. In particular, the post-tender phase is the most risky. 
Delays, lower-quality materials, inflated costs and work volume are some of the risks that emerge, 
while the contracting authority seems to forget the contract after it is signed. Moreover, in almost all 
MSs, no specific controls are performed apart from ordinary monitoring activities carried out by the 
contracting authority. 
7. The system aimed at preventing illegality in public procurement is highly country-specific. 
Bodies involved in prevention vary across countries. In 16 MSs, there are bodies that focus their 
preventive or monitoring actions on public procurement. Overlapping of competences and excessive 
workload represent problems in several countries. In almost all the countries, no assessment is 
carried out on the effectiveness of the measures adopted.
8. Debarment tools show limitations and concerns in practice. Eleven countries use white lists or 
black lists and encounter problems in terms of transparency, equal treatment, and proportionality.
9. Red flags have been tested in several MSs. Red flags, as warning signals of the potential 
presence of corruption, collusion, unethical practices, and frauds, are used in eight countries, ranging 
from more traditional risk assessment systems to algorithms and automated decision-making.
10. Databases are crucial tools for sharing information but, to date, information system are not 
very widespread among MSs. Five of them use these tools to monitor tenderers. Great differences 
and lack of a comprehensive approach are however observed.
72
The Way forward
1. Increase the awareness of legislators and policy-makers. Corruption and criminal infiltration 
in public procurement are once again not considered as urgent and even actual issues in several 
countries.
2. Enhance capacity building. Effective protection of public funds requires understanding of the 
harmful nature of crimes in public procurement and of the organisational element of these crimes. 
Training for practitioners, based on case reviews, should be developed.
3. Assess the effectiveness of preventive systems. The conduction of a regular review of the 
functioning and shortcomings of the system is essential to avoid that a system works only in theory. 
The new monitoring report on prevention, detection of frauds, corruption, conflicts of interest, and 
other irregularities – envisaged in the new public procurement directive – could represent a starting 
point for more consistency across preventive systems, provided that this is not performed by the 
States as a bureaucratic task.
4. Bring detection of red flags into action. Once a red flag has emerged, the issue is what kind 
of actions and measures should follow the alert signal. These actions, which should be based on 
well-defined criteria, and comply with the principle of proportionality, range from further analysis to 
operational consequences.
5. Build information systems on companies. Information systems on companies for investigative 
purposes should be built at national level, guaranteeing interconnections between existing databases 
and putting in place the needed safeguards.
6. Overcome the limitations and concerns of debarment systems, and guarantee fairness, 
accountability, and transparency, as well as redress mechanisms. To make debarment systems 
effective in all MSs, coordination mechanisms across countries should be implemented, along with 
the establishment of clear and common rules. In this regard, a renovated effort for an EU debarment 
mechanism on EU funds should be considered.
7. Strengthen controls on public works execution. For all public works, in addition to ordinary 
monitoring on the compliance of executed works with contractual provisions, controls should be 
performed systematically during works execution on several aspects (e.g. quality of materials, 
employment conditions of the workforce, duration and volume of works, etc.).
8. Raise demand for social accountability. Legal rules and administrative procedures prove to be 
weak if citizens do not call for accountability on how public funds are used.
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Annex 1. Questionnaire
CHAPTER 1. The Legal Framework




Q 1.1. please specify the legal act/article of the criminal code;
Q 1.2. please quote and translate into English the main provision/s of your national law;
Q 1.3. please provide statistics (crimes recorded by the police) on its application since 2001 (or later if not available).




Q 2.1 If no/partially, please briefly explain.




Q 3.1. please specify the legal acts/articles of the criminal code;
Q 3.2. please quote and translate into English the main provision/s of your national law and briefly explain which 
kinds of conduct are punished and which are not;
Q 3.3. please provide statistics59 (crimes recorded by the police) on their application since 2001 (or later if not 
available).
Q 4. Does the national legislation distinguish between petty and grand corruption?
  Yes, the sanction is different.
  Yes, the offence is different.
  Yes, the procedure is different.
  No
58 In this context, corruption does not include private-to-private corruption. The attention is focused on a private party (a citizen 
or a corporation) that gives or promises to give money or any other advantages to a public party (e.g. a politician or a public 
official) in exchange for an advantage or to avoid a disadvantage.
59 We refer to statistics on bribery and similar offences (e.g. embezzlement of public money, bribery in the exercise of a public 
function, bribery through an act contrary to official duties, corruption in judicial proceedings, induced bribery, etc.). The 
availability and level of detail of the statistics change across countries.
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Q 5.1. Please briefly explain.
Q 6. Does the national legislation implement Article 3 of the Convention on the fight against 





Q 6.1. If no/partially, please briefly explain.
Q 7. What is the current state of the transposition process of Directive 2014/24/EU?
  Not yet started
  Started
  Completed
Q 7.1. If completed, please indicate the date of adoption and the legal act.
Q 7.2. If not completed yet, please explain the current state of the process.
Q 7.3. If available, please summarise the provisions on grounds for exclusion, conflicts of interest, and 
subcontracting.
Q 8. As regards soft-law instruments, has your country foreseen integrity pacts60, legality pacts, 
or other forms of agreement between contracting authorities and economic operators, aimed at  
enhancing transparency and accountability in the public procurement process?
  Yes
  No
Q 8.1. If yes, please provide a copy and/or summarise the content. In case there are many examples, please 
choose the one you deem the most relevant (because of its impact or the relevance of the public work). Please 
specify if any of them has been used for major public works or transnational ones.
60 An integrity pact is a tool for preventing corruption in public contracting. It is an agreement between the contracting authority 
and bidders, whereby they undertake to abstain from bribery, collusion, extortion, and other corrupt practices during contract 
execution. With a view to ensuring accountability, integrity pacts also include a monitoring system typically led by civil society 
organisations. For further information, please see: https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/tools/integrity_pacts/4/ and 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/integrity_pacts_in_public_procurement_an_implementation_guide.
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CHAPTER 2. The Phenomenon
Q 9. According to the available studies and case law, on a scale from 1 (very low) to 10 (very high), 
how would you define the vulnerability of the public procurement procedure to criminal infiltration 
and corruption in your country?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Q 9.1. Please briefly explain the reasoning behind your answers and quote relevant studies or publications (if 
any).
Q 10. Are there any specific institutions/bodies (e.g. monitoring body, parliamentary commission, 
Ombudsman, etc.) in your country, at either local or central level, that are designed to monitor and/
or prevent organised crime infiltration and corruption in public procurement (i.e. not included in the 
measures adopted by the contracting authority in the procedure)?
  Yes
  No
Q 10.1. Please explain the role and tasks of this body. Please also quote relevant legal rules, studies, or 
publications.
Q 10.2. Please explain in which stage of the public procurement process they intervene.
Q 11. In your country, on a scale from 1 (not vulnerable) to 10 (very vulnerable), to what extent are 
the following economic sectors (linked to public procurement/concessions) vulnerable to serious 
forms of crime (in particular organised crime infiltration and corruption)?












Q 11.1. Please briefly explain the reasoning behind your answers.
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Q 12. The table below shows a breakdown of the pre-tender phase, with some examples of 
possible situations that suggest a risk of corruption or organised crime infiltration. In your country, 
to what extent do these situations occur?  
Please rate your answer on a scale from 1 (least frequent) to 10 (very frequent).
Steps of the pre-tender phase Situations that can occur
Identification of needs Manipulation of needs (needs are ‘fabricated’)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Allocation of public funding Manipulation of allocation of funding (funding is allocated for the benefit of 
someone in particular and not of the public good).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Choice of the tender procedure No ceilings for non-competitive procurements
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Subdivision of large-scale projects into lots in order to be allowed to go through 
non-competitive procurements
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Drafting of public bidding  
and tender specifications
Risk of disclosure of confidential information
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Wrong or inaccurate requirements
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Too selective eligibility criteria
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Lack of clarity of tender specifications
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Limited timeframe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Low bid price accompanied by extensive possibilities of expanding the contract 
in the post-award phase
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Publication of tender documents Limited publicity of, or failure to publish tender notices
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Q 12.1. Please quote relevant sources and explain the reasoning behind your answers.
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Q 13. The table below shows a breakdown of the tender phase, with some examples of possible 
situations that suggest a risk of corruption or organised crime infiltration. In your country, to what 
extent do these situations occur? 
Please rate your answer on a scale from 1 (least frequent) to 10 (most frequent).
Steps of the tender phase Situations that can occur
Designation of the evaluation board Manipulation of the evaluation board
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Selection procedure Non-objective and/or inadequate weighting of selection criteria
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Choice of the tender procedure Risks of agreement among bidders not to take judicial action
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Risks of misuse of judicial procedures to threaten/influence the winner
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lack of control over the winner
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Q 13.1. Please quote relevant sources and explain the reasoning behind your answers.
Q 14. The table below shows a breakdown of the post-award phase, with some examples of 
possible situations that suggest a risk of corruption or organised crime infiltration. In your country, 
to what extent do these situations occur? 
Please rate your answer on a scale from 1 (least frequent) to 10 (most frequent).
Steps of the post-award phase Situations that can occur
Contract execution Execution of non-existent works
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Inflated work volume and costs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Unjustified differences between tender specifications and executed works
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Involvement of new subcontractors during works execution
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Delays in works execution
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Use of lower-quality materials
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Contract supervision Lack of supervision
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Testing and certification of works 
completion in compliance with 
legislation
Inaccurate testing
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Payment Delayed payment as a form of bribe solicitation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Q 14.1. Please quote relevant sources and explain the reasoning behind your answers.
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CHAPTER 3. Prevention Measures
Q 15.  Has your country adopted special measures to prevent the risk of corruption and/or 
organised crime infiltration (at either local or central level) in public procurement/concessions (i.e. 
not included in the measures adopted by the contracting authority in the procedure)?
  Yes 
  No
Q 15.1. Please provide examples of these measures. Please also quote relevant legal rules, studies, or 
publications.
Q 15.2. Please specify which stage of the public procurement process they refer to.
Q 15.3. Please specify whether any of them has been used for major public works or transnational ones.
Q 16. Has your country (at either local or central level) developed indicators/red flags for the 
detection of corruption/organised crime in public procurement/concessions?
  Yes
  No
Q 16.1. Please provide details.
Q 17. Has your country developed systems such as white lists or black lists of companies?
  Yes
  Under development
  No
Q 17.1. If yes or under development, what does the list refer to?
  National companies
  Foreign companies
  Both
  Other
Q 17.2. If yes or under development, how do they work? Please quote legal rules (if any).
Q 17.3. If no, please explain the reasons and the source of information.





Q 19. Has your country developed databases or repositories to store and exchange information on 
companies?
  Yes
  Under development
  No
Q 19.1. If yes, could you please specify how many they are, what kind of information they store, and who has 
access to them?
Q 19.2. If yes, are they (or some of them) effective and functional? Please provide examples of functional and 
dysfunctional systems.
Q 19.3. If under development, please provide some details.
CHAPTER 4. Control Measures




Q 20.1. If yes, could you please specify how controls are carried out, which body is involved, etc.? Please clarify 
whether there are specific systems in place for major public works or transnational ones.
Q 20.2. If no, could you please explain why and what happened in practice?
Q 21 Does your country have a special law enforcement body to investigate serious forms of crime 
(in particular organised crime infiltration and corruption) in public procurement/concessions?
  Yes
  No
Q 21.1. If yes, could you please specify when it was created, what type of body it is, how it works, and what type 
of powers it has?
Q 21.2. If no, is the investigation carried out by the ordinary law enforcement body in the same way as an 




CHAPTER 5. Case Law
Please provide national case law relating to criminal infiltration and corruption in public procurement (first, 
second, and third-instance decisions). Please include a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 15 decisions for 
2010–2015, depending on the size of your country. Both administrative and criminal case law could be included 
according to the system in place in your country.
1.3.1. Case title 
1.3.2. Decision date 
1.3.3. Reference details (type and name of the court/
body in original language and in English –please 
include the official translation, if available).
1.3.4. Key facts of the case (maximum 500 words)
1.3.5. Main reasoning/argumentation (maximum 500 
words)
1.3.6. Key issues (concepts and interpretations) 
clarified by the case (maximum 500 words)
1.3.7. Results (sanctions) and key consequences or 
implications of the case (maximum 500 words)
CHAPTER 6. Academic and other publications and reports on your country
Please provide a list of reports and publications by the government, parliament, academia, NGOs, or other bodies 
in relation to corruption and other forms of serious crime in public procurement.
Please include a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 15 publications.
1.4.1 Title (in original language 
and in English), author, publisher 
and year of publication, and web 
link (or soft copy attached)
1.4.2 Main topics dealt with 1.4.3 Research methods (desk research, 
qualitative research, or quantitative research) 
and design (e.g. comparative design – 
comparing countries/groups – or case study). 
Briefly explain the methodology.
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Annex 2. Methodological remarks
Most of the questionnaire is based on the analysis of secondary sources and on interviews with key 
experts. A specific remark is needed for questions 9 and from 12 to 14. In this questionnaire a certain 
degree of subjectivity of the author cannot be avoided. The researchers involved based their answers 
on their knowledge, collected sources, and interviews. However, the final choice is personal in nature 
and it may reflect the points of view of the researchers themselves.
For the abovementioned questions, we chose a numerical scale (from 1 to 10) in order to have a 
wider distribution of responses, which allowed us to better process data.
We grouped responses into classes (low, medium, and high risk) by observing the frequency 
distribution of question 9 by quartiles (0%–25%, 25%–50%, 50%–75%, and above 75%)61 and by 
percentiles (0–33%, 33%–66%, and above 66%)62, and then the same frequency distributions for 
questions 11, 12, 13, and 14.
The qualitative and quantitative information supporting the answers to question 9 made us opt for 
the percentile distribution (33%–66%) and we consequently built three groups of answers: the first 
group includes answers from 1 to 5, the second one from 6 to 7, and the third one from 8 to 10.
We maintained the same groups for questions 11, 12, 13, and 14 in order to facilitate comparison. 
This guarantees higher consistency throughout the analysis. This choice was also underpinned by 
the quantitative and qualitative information that supports the choice of responses. See below for the 
answers to questions 9, 12, 13 and 14.
Table Annex 2.1.  Overall vulnerabilities of the tender procedure (Q 9)
According to the available studies and case law, on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest), how would you define the 
vulnerability of the public procurement procedure to criminal infiltration and corruption in your country?
Austria 8 Lithuania 7
Bulgaria 8 Luxemburg 3
Croatia 8 Malta 5
Czech Republic 7 Netherlands 6
Denmark 1 Poland 7
Estonia 6 Portugal 8
Finland 6 Romania 8
France 9 Slovakia 6
Germany 2 Slovenia 4
Hungary 8 Spain 8
Ireland 3 Sweden 4
Italy 9 United Kingdom 5
Latvia 7
61 Quartiles were at score 4, 7, and 8.
62 Percentiles were at score 5 and 8.
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Table Annex 2.2. Pre-tender vulnerabilities (Q 12)
The table below shows a breakdown of the pre-tender phase, with some examples of possible 
situations that suggest a risk of corruption or organised crime infiltration. In your country, to 
what extent do these situations occur? Please rate your answer on a scale from 1 (least frequent) 
























    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
































































































































































































































































































Austria 5 10 3 10 5 10 10 10 5 5 2
Bulgaria 7 9 9 8 9 8 9 8 7 8 9
Croatia 7 6 3 8 3 9 9 9 7 7 8
Czech Republic 7 7 1 7 8 3 9 1 5 8 7
Denmark 5 3 2 3 2 1 3 7 7 4 1
Estonia 8 4 9 10 9 7 9 4 4 5 2
Finland 2 2 5 7 4 7 7 7 2 5 3
France 2 2 4 5 8 9 4 9 2 6 3
Germany 3 2 2 2 1 1 3 3 2 1 1
Hungary 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9
Ireland 5 3 2 2 3 5 5 5 5 4 2
Italy 5 5 1 8 10 9 10 9 5 10 5
Latvia 6 6 2 5 2 8 8 3 3 5 2
Lithuania 8 8 2 2 8 3 4 2 5 3 2
Luxemburg 4 4 4 4 4 3 5 4 3 3 3
Malta 7 7 3 8 2 2 2 4 1 7 6
Netherlands 8 4 4 7 8 5 4 3 4 7 2
Poland 3 5 7 7 7 7 5 7 3 6 1
Portugal 7 5 1 3 5 8 7 7 5 8 6
Romania 6 7 8 5 8 8 8 8 6 7 2
Slovakia 5 6 6 5 4 4 3 3 4 5 7
Slovenia 1 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 3 2
Spain 2 2 10 10 2 10 6 10 6 8 1
United Kingdom 5 5 7 7 5 5 7 5 5 5 5
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Table Annex 2.3.  Tender vulnerabilities (Q 13)
The table below shows a breakdown of the tender phase, with some examples of possible 
situations that suggest a risk of corruption or organised crime infiltration. In your country, to 
what extent do these situations occur? Please rate your answer on a scale from 1 (least frequent) 












not to take 
judicial action
Risks of misuse 




Lack of control 
over the winner
Austria 10 10 3 3 3
Bulgaria 8 9 4 9 10
Croatia 4 9 2 3 7
Czech Republic 7 7 9 2 8
Denmark 1 8 1 3 1
Estonia 7 2 6 9 5
Finland 2 7 2 5 5
France 4 3 7 3 1
Germany 2 2 2 2 2
Hungary 9 8 9 9 8
Ireland 4 4 2 2 2
Italy 8 8 8 6 5
Latvia 7 4 7 7 7
Lithuania 3 2 4 7 2
Luxemburg 3 4 3 3 3
Malta 6 5 5 4 7
Netherlands 3 4 9 2 5
Poland 8 8 5 5 5
Portugal 6 7 3 1 5
Romania 6 6 7 7 5
Slovakia 7 6 6 5 6
Slovenia 6 6 5 5 4
Spain 3 5 10 1 10
United Kingdom 7 7 7 7 7
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Table Annex 2.4.  Post-tender vulnerabilities (Q 14)
The table below shows a breakdown of the post-award phase, with some examples of possible 
situations that suggest a risk of corruption or organised crime infiltration. In your country, to 
what extent do these situations occur? Please rate your answer on a scale from 1 (least frequent) 



































































































































































Austria 8 10 10 8 10 10 10 7 3
Bulgaria 4 7 8 8 6 8 8 4 4
Croatia 5 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 1
Czech Republic 8 9 10 7 6 7 5 3 6
Denmark 1 1 1 5 5 5 1 1 1
Estonia 9 9 9 8 8 9 8 7 2
Finland 7 6 7 8 8 5 8 4 1
France 2 9 9 5 2 8 9 9 1
Germany 3 4 3 2 4 2 3 2 2
Hungary 8 8 8 8 7 8 8 9 9
Ireland 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 2
Italy 7 10 9 10 10 10 6 9 3
Latvia 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 8
Lithuania 5 6 5 3 7 8 8 7 2
Luxemburg 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Malta 8 8 9 6 8 9 10 8 6
Netherlands 9 8 5 7 8 5 7 4 3
Poland 5 6 3 3 3 9 8 9 8
Portugal 2 5 6 6 8 5 8 8 1
Romania 6 6 5 8 8 10 5 8 9
Slovakia 7 6 5 6 6 6 5 7 6
Slovenia 6 6 7 6 8 8 7 6 5
Spain 1 10 10 8 10 10 5 5 1
United Kingdom 5 5 7 7 5 5 7 5 7
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Shrnutí
Projekt ‘Warning on Crime’ (WOC; www.warningoncrime.eu) se uskutečnil za finanční podpory 
Generálního ředitelství pro migraci a vnitřní věci (DG HOME) Evropské komise v rámci Programu 
prevence a boje proti zločinu (ISEC).
Předkládaný výzkum je komparativní studií infiltrace zločinem a korupcí ve veřejných zakázkách, 
která pokrývá všechny členské státy Evropské unie s výjimkou Belgie, Kypru a Řecka. Cílem studie 
je porovnání zranitelnosti veřejných zakázek, stejně jako legislativy a opatření přijatých k prevenci a 
potlačování zločinu v této věci v 25 členských zemích EU. To má vést k objasnění co dělá z veřejných 
zakázek úrodnou půdou spolupráce zločinců v bílých límečcích, nečestných úředníků a členů 
kriminálních organizací. Zvláštní pozornost je přikládána velkým a přeshraničním veřejným zakázkám. 
Zpráva je rozdělena do čtyř kapitol. První kapitola reflektuje dostupný právní rámec pro postihování 
nezákonných aktivit při zadávání a realizaci veřejných zakázek; druhá kapitola se zabývá odhadem 
zranitelnosti veřejných zakázek vůči infiltraci zločinem; třetí kapitola popisuje preventivní opatření 
přijatá jednotlivými členskými zeměmi k redukci takového jednání; a čtvrtá kapitola analyzuje 
kontrolní opatření namířená na fázi po dokončení veřejných zakázek.  
Právní rámec
Postihování nezákonného jednání ve veřejných zakázkách zahrnuje nejen tvrdá, ale i měkká právní 
opatření. Projekt se zaměřuje na čtyři oblasti: působení zločineckých skupin, úplatkářství, zákon o 
veřejných zakázkách a na pakty integrity. 
Ve shodě s Rámcovým rozhodnutím Evropské rady 2008/841/JHA z 24. října 2008 o boji proti 
organizovanému zločinu, všechny studované země kriminalizují zločinecké skupiny a ve většině z nich 
by měl trestný čin účasti na zločinecké skupině představovat také jeden z nástrojů k potrestání těch 
skupin, které provozují nezákonné aktivity včetně korupce ve vztahu k veřejným zakázkám.   
Italský právní systém navíc rozpoznává specifický trestný čin, který samostatně nezákonnou činnost 
organizací mafiánského typu vůči veřejným zakázkám pokrývá. Rakouská legislativa pro změnu 
zahrnuje trestný čin postihující aktivity zločinecké organizace při korupčním jednání. V každém 
případě je nutno říci, že judikatura v této věci napříč všemi členskými zeměmi značně omezená. 
Právní rámec týkající se úplatkářství a obchodování s vlivem (trading in influence) se v průběhu 
posledních let napříč jednotlivými zeměmi postupně vyvíjel a zpřesňoval. Přes některá přetrvávající 
bílá místa a nesrovnalosti je celkový dojem v této věci mnohem příznivější než v minulosti. 
Nové evropské direktivy k veřejným zakázkám soustředí svou pozornost na prevenci, transparentnost 
a odpovědnost, jež mají nezákonné jednání namířené vůči veřejným zakázkám výrazně redukovat. 
Výzkum ale ukazuje, že transpozice pravidel k vyloučení z možnosti soutěžit o zakázku a 
subkontraktování jednotlivých částí zakázky se stát od státu výrazně liší. To je dáno částečně tím, 
že veřejné zakázky jsou považovány za specifický národní trh, který čelí lokálním hrozbám na které 
je nutno lokálně reagovat, v potaz je pak nutno brat i spíše technické hledisko zodpovědnosti ve věci 
posuzování rizikovosti, které musí zákonodárce přenechat veřejnému zadavateli.  
Stále větší relevanci v potlačování nezákonného jednání ve veřejných zakázkách získávají měkká 
právní opatření. Pakty integrity – nástroj vyvinutý Transparency International (TI) sestávající z dohody 
podepsané zadavatelem veřejné zakázky, příjemcem a nezávislým dohlížitelem, která podepsané 
zavazuje k předcházení jakýchkoliv forem korupce nebo tajných dohod – má být testována v 11 
zemích na 17 projektech dotovaných EU. Itálie má s pakty legality, které smluvní strany zavazují 
k přijetí a implementaci právních opatření proti korupci a organizovanému zločinu stejně jako k 
posilování integrity a transparentnosti veřejných zakázek, dlouholeté zkušenosti. Podobná měkká 
právní opatření (reglements des contracts) byla v nedávné době využita při stavbě vysokorychlostní 
železniční trati Turín-Lyon a sloužila k tomu, aby stanovila společná pravidla nezávislá na národnosti 
příjemců zakázky. Především pak tato opatření rozšířila již existující italské mechanismy proti infiltraci 
mafií na všechny příjemce, kteří se na zhotovení zakázky podílejí. 
CZ
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Podobně jako u všech měkkých opatření je i při přijetí shora uvedených nástrojů největším 
problémem vymahatelnost dohody v případě, že by problémy spojené s dokončením veřejné zakázky 
musel řešit správní soud. 
Zranitelnost veřejných zakázek v různých fázích jejich životního cyklu
Veřejné zakázky jsou vůči nezákonnému jednání náchylné prakticky v každé fázi svého životního 
cyklu. Zatímco některá odvětví jako je stavebnictví nebo zdravotnictví jsou ve všech zkoumaných 
zemích obecně považovány za zranitelnější, jiná odvětví jako je doprava, energetika, odpadové 
hospodářství nebo IT a komunikační služby oscilují mezi středním a vyšší rizikovostí v závislosti na 
konkrétních podmínkách v jednotlivých zemích. Vysoké riziko zranitelnosti platí i pro státy se stále 
přetrvávajícím důlním průmyslem. Veřejné zakázky spojené s obranným sektorem jsou tradičně 
považovány za nejméně transparanentní, sociální služby a vzdělávání se pro změnu stávají sektory, 
kde riziko zneužívání veřejných zakázek nově vzrůstá. Rizikovost je v některých ze zkoumaných zemí 
obecně v této věci spojena s vysokou mírou korupce a nezákonného jednání spojeného s výkonem 
místní samosprávy nebo řízením státem vlastněných společností. 
Samotný životní cyklus veřejných zakázek (před-tendrová, tendrová a post-tendrová fáze) je ve všech 
zkoumaných zemích označován za zranitelný. Předtenderová (pre-tender) fáze, stadium plánování, 
které předchází celé další proceduře veřejné zakázky, je považována za vysoce zranitelnou v téměř 
polovině studovaných zemích. Tato fáze vykazuje také největší problémy v rámci zavádění různých 
konkrétních protiopatření. To je připisováno jak manipulacím s potřebami a přidělováním finančních 
prostředků, tak i rizikům úniku informací o detailech plánované zakázky. 
Nejasné a nekonkrétní podmínky tendrů, kritéria nízké nabídkové ceny s možností jejího extenzívního 
navýšení po určení příjemce, byly identifikovány ve většině zkoumaných zemí.  
Samotná tendrová fáze (tender phase) je vysoce regulovaná. Proces výběru příjemce byl však 
v 60 % zemí označen za středně až vysoce rizikový, a to z důvodu mnohdy neobjektivních nebo 
neadekvátních vážení kritérií pro výběr příjemce a manipulací s hodnoticími výbory. Ve většině 
zkoumaných zemí je také rizikem i (záměrně) nesprávný výklad soudních rozhodnutí a s ním 
související průtahy v nápravě škody. 
Celkově nejrizikovějším stadiem životního cyklu veřejné zakázky je její post-tendrová fáze (post-
tender phase). Zadavatel zakázky obvykle zapomene na smlouvu ihned po jejím podepsání, což 
podporuje i fakt, že ve většině zemí pak neexistuje žádný orgán, který by průběh plnění veřejné 
zakázky monitoroval. U zakázek na veřejné stavby pak právě z tohoto nedostatku vyplývají 
opakované problémy s použitím nekvalitních materiálů, nečekaným nárůstem množství práce nebo 
průtahy v předání vyhotoveného díla.
Systém prevence ve veřejných zakázkách 
Vzhledem k rizikům ovlivňujícím životní cyklus veřejných zakázek, se měkká opatření neustále 
vyvíjejí, a to směrem ke komplexnímu systému prevence. Součástí tohoto systém jsou jak 
zodpovědné orgány, tak samotné nástroje předcházení korupce a zločinu. Mimo důležitou roli, kterou 
v monitoringu zacházení s veřejnými dotacemi hrají různé účetní dvory, existuje ve zkoumaných 
členských zemích bohaté spektrum orgánů zaměřených na prevenci korupce a organizovaného 
zločinu včetně prevence takového jednání při zadávání a realizaci veřejných zakázek. 
Přestože se jejich význam často liší, některé členské země disponují orgány, jejichž hlavním úkolem 
je boj proti zločinu a ilegalitě přímo ve veřejných zakázkách. V některých zemích jako je Nizozemsko 
nebo Itálie jsou dokonce přijata taková opatření, jejichž podstatou je monitoring společností, které se 
o zakázku ucházejí, jejich majitelů a zástupců. V Itálii je toto prověřování ukotveno v rámci speciální 
legislativy namířené proti mafii. 
Indikátor korupce “red flag” má původ v různých nástrojích ustavených k monitorování nezákonného 
jednání ve veřejných zakázkách. “Red flags” je tak možno chápat jako signály včasného varování o 
potenciálních možnostech spáchání trestných činů jako je korupce, podvod a podobně. Přestože jsou 
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indiktátory “red flags” obecně považovány za užitečné prediktory korupčních rizik, v nějaké konkrétní 
formě je využívá pouze osm ze zkoumaných států. 
O něco častěji, ve 14 zemích, jsou používána různá vylučovací opatření. Zatímco bílá listina funguje 
jako preselektivní podmínka pro konečný výběr příjemců zakázky, černá listina způsobuje vyloučení 
z možnosti podílet se na realizaci veřejné zakázky. Ve všech zemích kromě Rumunska jsou tyto 
nástroje koordinovány veřejnými orgány. Přestože i tyto nástroje jsou pokládány za užitečné (s 
ohledem na možné poškození reputace uchazeče jsou v souladu s právními opatřeními), jejich 
rozšíření brání praktická úskalí při jejich řízení, jako jsou rizika manipulace a obtíže s definicí jasných 
kritérií a pravidel pro odvolání se proti zařazení na černou listinu. 
Dalším preventivním opatřením je využívání databází pro sdílení informací s donucovacími orgány 
státní správy (zejména policie). S výjimkou Itálie a Nizozemska však není využívání databází příliš 
obvyklé. Vzhledem k nedostatkům ve společných pravidlech na úrovni EU a vzhledem k omezenému 
přístupu zahraničních zájemců na jednotlivé národní trhy s veřejnými zakázkami není navíc ustavení 
společného mechanismu pro sdílení informací o společnostech aktuálním tématem. 
Kontrolní opatření v post-tenderové fázi
Kontrolní opatření v post-tenderové fázi (post-tender phase) mohou být rozdělena do dvou velkých 
skupin a jsou společná pro všechny členské země: 
OO Vnitřní monitoring, většinou zajišťovaný zadavatelem veřejné zakázky;
OO Vnější monitoring, zajišťovaný nezávislými a externími institucemi (jako jsou účetní dvory, finanční 
nebo daňové úřady, pracovní inspektoráty apod.), které zaměřují svou pozornost na ekonomické a 
finanční aspekty zakázky, transparentní účetnictví, dodržování pracovního práva apod.)
Jedinou výjimkou je Itálie, která mimo uvedená opatření disponuje i kontrolním systémem 
zaměřeným na nekalé praktiky zaregistrované v průběhu plnění veřejné zakázky. Itálie navíc také 
jako jediný členský stát EU zřídila speciální policejní složky zodpovědné za monitoring a vyšetřování 
nezákonných aktivit ve vztahu k velkým veřejným stavbám. Všechny ostatní členské státy, respektive 
jejich kontrolní a/nebo monitorovací orgány, nedělají ve vztahu k výši a důležitosti zakázky žádné 
rozdíly 
Dvě třetiny členských států disponuje speciálními policejními orgány k potlačování korupce v různých 
ekonomických odvětvích včetně veřejných zakázek. V polovině těchto zemí navíc existuje i speciální 
státní zastupitelství, které je zodpovědně za vyšetřování závažných zločinů týkajících se (nejen) 
veřejných zakázek.
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Zusammenfassung
Das Projekt „Warning on Crime“ (WOC) (www.warningoncrime.eu) wurde mit finanzieller 
Unterstützung der Europäischen Union (Generaldirektion für Migration und Inneres) im Rahmen des 
Programms zur Prävention und Bekämpfung von Kriminalität (Programme Prevention of and Fight 
against Crime, ISEC) durchgeführt. 
Das Projekt hat eine vergleichende Studie von krimineller Infiltrierung und Korruption in der 
öffentlichen Auftragsvergabe zum Gegenstand, die alle Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Union mit 
der Ausnahme Belgiens, Zyperns und Griechenlands einschließt. 
Das Ziel des Projekts ist der Vergleich der Anfälligkeit öffentlicher Auftragsvergabe in 25 
EU-Mitgliedsstaaten sowie der Gesetzgebung und daran anschließender Maßnahmen, um 
kriminelle Infiltrierung und Korruption zu verhindern und zu bekämpfen. Insbesondere soll geklärt 
werden, wodurch die öffentliche Auftragsvergabe zu einem attraktiven Betätigungsfeld für 
Wirtschaftskriminelle, untreue öffentliche Beschäftigte und Mitglieder krimineller Organisationen wird. 
Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird auf große und grenzübergreifende öffentliche Bauprojekte gelegt. 
Der Bericht ist in vier Kapitel gegliedert. Kapitel 1 reflektiert den bestehenden rechtlichen 
Rahmen zur Bekämpfung illegaler Aktivitäten in der öffentlichen Auftragsvergabe. Kapitel 2 ist 
einer Bewertung der Vulnerabilität öffentlicher Auftragsvergabe gewidmet. In Kapitel 3 werden 
die präventiven Maßnahmen der Mitgliedsstaaten beschrieben und in Kapitel 4 werden die 
Kontrollmaßnahmen in der Phase nach der Auftragsvergabe analysiert. 
Der Rechtsrahmen
Die Bekämpfung illegaler Praktiken in der öffentlichen Auftragsvergabe mit rechtlichen 
Maßnahmen umfasst sowohl rechtliche Regelungen als auch Instrumente unterhalb der Ebene 
von Rechtsvorschriften (Soft Law). Das Projekt fokussiert hier vier thematische Gebiete: kriminelle 
Organisationen, Bestechung, öffentliches Vergaberecht und Integritäts pakte.
Alle in der Studie untersuchten Länder haben kriminelle Organisationen in Übereinstimmung mit 
dem Rahmenbeschluss zur Bekämpfung der Organisierten Kriminalität (2008/841/JHA) vom 24. 
Oktober 2008 kriminalisiert. In den meisten dieser Staaten bilden die entsprechenden rechtlichen 
Maßnahmen ein Instrument zur Verfolgung von Gruppierungen, die den entsprechenden rechtlichen 
Definitionen entsprechen und kriminellen Aktivitäten wie Korruption im Kontext öffentlicher 
Auftragsvergabe nachgehen. In Italien sehen die entsprechenden Regelungen im Zusammenhang 
mit öffentlicher Auftragsvergabe explizit den Straftatbestand einer mafia-ähnlichen Organisation 
vor. Im österreichischen Recht ist auch die Bildung krimineller Vereinigungen im Zusammenhang 
mit Korruption unter Strafe gestellt. Die Anzahl tatsächlicher Ermittlungen gegen kriminelle 
Organisationen ist jedoch in allen Mitgliedsstaaten gering.
Der rechtliche Rahmen zur Bekämpfung von Bestechung und Einflussnahme wurde in den 
Mitgliedsstaaten einer Evaluation unterzogen und nähert sich zunehmend an. Obwohl hier 
Schlupflöcher und widersprüchliche Regelungen bestehen bleiben, sind die Regelungen wesentlich 
umfassender als noch vor wenigen Jahren. 
Neue Direktiven zur Reduzierung illegaler Aktivitäten in der öffentlichen Auftragsvergabe sind 
auf Prävention, Transparenz und Verantwortlichkeit gerichtet. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die 
Umsetzung von Regeln zum Ausschluss aus Vergabeverfahren und zur Vergabe von Unteraufträgen 
deutlich von Land zu Land variiert. Dies hängt zum einen mit der Konzipierung öffentlicher 
Auftragsvergabe als nationalem Markt zusammen, der lokalen Bedrohungen durch illegale 
Aktivitäten begegnen muss. Zum anderen sind die Unterschiede einem technischen Verständnis des 
Grades an Ermessensspielräumen geschuldet, die der Gesetzgeber den Vergabebehörden einräumt.
Instrumente unterhalb der Ebene von Rechtsvorschriften gewinnen in der Bekämpfung illegaler 
Aktivitäten bei der öffentlichen Auftragsvergabe an Bedeutung. Integritätspakte – ein Instrument, 
das von Transparency International entwickelt wurde – werden in naher Zukunft in 17 EU-
DE
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geförderten Projekten in 11 Mitgliedsstaaten getestet. Die Pakte bestehen aus einem Abkommen, 
zwischen den Vergabebehörden, Bietern und einem unabhängigen Monitor zur Unterlassung 
jeglicher Form von Korruption und Absprache. In Italien konnten schon seit einigen Jahren 
Erfahrungen mit sogenannten Legalitätspakten gemacht werden, welche von den Beteiligten 
die Umsetzung von Maßnahmen zur Befolgung rechtlicher Vorschriften zur Bekämpfung von 
Korruption und organisierter Kriminalität sowie zur Verbesserung der Integrität und Transparenz 
im öffentlichen Vergabekreislauf verlangt. In einem Fall grenzüberschreitender öffentlicher 
Bauvorhaben, der Hochgeschwindigkeitsstrecke Turin-Lyon, wurde das Instrument des reglement des 
contracts eingesetzt, um gemeinsame Regeln für das Bauvorhaben, unabhängig von der Nationalität 
der Partner festzulegen. Dadurch wurden insbesondere Anti-Mafia Maßnahmen auf alle Bieter 
ausgedehnt. Wie bei allen Instrumenten unterhalb der Ebene von Rechtsvorschriften ist jedoch der 
Bestand der Regeln vor Verwaltungsgerichten umstritten. 
Die Verwundbarkeit des öffentlichen Vergabekreislaufs
Der öffentliche Vergabekreislauf ist anfällig für Kriminalität. Einige Geschäftsfelder erweisen sich als 
besonders anfällig: Der Bau- und der Gesundheitssektor sind besonders verwundbar. Die Transport-, 
Energie-, Abfall- sowie die IT- und Telekommunikationswirtschaft sind Sektoren mittleren bis hohen 
Risikos, hier zeigen sich große Unterschiede zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten. In Ländern mit einer 
bedeutenden Bergbauwirtschaft gilt dieser Sektor ebenfalls als sehr anfällig für Korruption. Bei 
der öffentlichen Auftragsvergabe im Verteidigungsbereich herrscht mangelnde Transparenz vor. 
Soziale Dienstleistungen und Bildung sind aufkommende neue Sektoren, in denen die öffentliche 
Auftragsvergabe als zunehmend verwundbar erweist. Die Verwundbarkeit einiger Mitgliedsstaaten 
ist eng mit der Korruption und anderen illegalen Aktivitäten von lokalen Regierungsbehörden und 
staatlichen Unternehmen verbunden. 
Der gesamte Vergabekreislauf (vor, während und nach der Auftragsvergabe) ist verwundbar. 
Insbesondere die Phase vor der Auftragsvergabe, in der Planungen vor dem Beginn des 
formellen Vergabeprozesses stattfinden, gilt in etwa der Hälfte der Länder als besonders 
anfällig. Hier bestehen auch einige Probleme hinsichtlich der Umsetzung von Gegenmaßnahmen. 
Ausschlaggebend dafür sind vor allem Delikte wie die Manipulation von Anforderungen und die 
Vergabe von Mitteln, sowie das Risiko der Offenlegung von Informationen.
In den meisten Ländern wurde oft ein Mangel an Klarheit der Ausschreibungsbedingungen und 
die Einreichung eines niedrigen Angebots, einhergehend mit umfangreichen Möglichkeiten zu 
Vertragserweiterungen in der Phase nach Zuschlagserteilung beobachtet.
Die Ausschreibungsphase ist stark reguliert. Das Auswahlverfahren ist, jedoch, durch hohes/
mittleres Risiko in 60% der Länder gekennzeichnet, bedingt durch unsachliche oder inadäquate 
Gewichtung der Auswahlkriterien, sowie durch Manipulation des Bewertungsgremiums. Der 
Mißbrauch von juristischen Maßnahmen seitens der Bieter scheint ebenfalls ein konkretes Risiko in 
den meisten Ländern zu sein. 
Insgesamt stellt sich die Phase nach der Zuschlagserteilung als die risikoreichste heraus. Es scheint, 
der öffentliche Auftraggeber habe den Vertrag nach der Unterzeichnung vergessen und in den 
meisten Ländern gibt es keine Instanz, die die Vertragserfüllung überwachen würde. 
Die Verwendung von Material niedriger Qualität, überhöhte Arbeitsvolumen und Kosten, 
Verzögerungen bei der Arbeitsausführung sind alles weitverbreitete Probleme, besonders, aber nicht 
ausschließlich, bei öffentlichen Arbeiten. 
Das präventionssystem in der öffentlichen Auftragsvergabe
Aufgrund unterschiedlicher Risiken, die den öffentlichen Vergabekreislauf betreffen, ist das 
Präventionssystem recht komplex und entwickelt sich konstant weiter. Es schließt präventive Organe 
und Instrumente mit ein. 
Neben der Rolle, die die Rechnungshöfe bei der Kontrolle der Verwendung von öffentlichen Mitteln 
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spielten, gibt es in den Mitgliedsstaaten eine breite Palette von Organen, die sich auf Prävention 
von Korruption und organisierter Kriminalität richten und deren Handlungen die öffentliche Vergabe 
betreffen. Manche Mitgliedsstaaten haben spezialisierte Organe, deren Aufgabe es ist, Straftaten 
und Gesetzeswidrigkeiten bei öffentlichen Vergaben entgegenzuwirken, wenn auch mit großen 
Unterschieden zwischen den Ländern selber.
Wenn es um präventive Mittel geht, können die Niederlande und Italien spezifische Maßnahmen 
zum Monitoring von Unternehmen, ihren Besitzern und gesetzlichen Vertretern aufweisen. In Italien 
werden diese Kontrollen im Rahmen der Anti-Mafia Gesetzgebung ausgeführt. 
Warnzeichen („Red Flags“) rühren aus unterschiedlichen Mitteln der Kontrolle von Fehlverhalten 
im öffentlichen Vergabewesen her. Red Flags sind Warnsignale für Sachverhalte, die es potentiell 
anzugehen gilt, wie zum Beispiel Korruption, Fehlverhalten und Betrug. Obwohl diese Indikatoren als 
nützliche Prädiktoren (Vorhersagefaktoren) für Korruptionsrisiko angesehen werden, benutzen nur 
acht Länder bestimmte Arten von Red Flags mit nationalen Besonderheiten. 
Ausschlussmaßnahmen werden in 14 Mitgliedsstaaten angewendet. Weiße Listen fungieren als 
Vorauswahlkriterien um Unternehmen, die im Bieterprozess teilnehmen werden, auszusuchen; 
während schwarze Listen ein Verfahren, das Unternehmen und Einzelpersonen ausschliesst, nach 
sich ziehen. In allen Ländern, außer Rumänien, liegen diese Instrumente in der öffentlichen Hand. 
Trotz der allgemeinen Anerkennung der Nützlichkeit dieser Instrumente als Anreiz zur Einhaltung 
rechtlicher Vorgaben und als Reputationssanktion, ist ihre Verwendung aufgrund praktischer 
Schwierigkeiten bezüglich ihrer Regelung (Manipulationsrisiko und Probleme bei der Definition klarer 
Beschwerderegeln) noch nicht weit verbreitet. 
Datenbanken sind ein entscheidendes Instrument, um Informationen zur Strafverfolgung 
(Rechtsdurchsetzung) zu teilen. Mit der Ausnahme von Italien und den Niederlanden, ist der 
Gebrauch von Datenbanken zur Kontrolle von Unternehmen noch immer nicht sehr üblich. 
Wegen dem Mangel an gemeinsamen Regeln auf EU-Ebene, sowie dem begrenzten Zugang für 
ausländische Bieter zu nationalen öffentlichen Vergabemärkten, steht die Einrichtung gemeinsamer 
Datenaustauschmechanismen über Unternehmen nicht hoch auf der Agenda. 
Kontrollmaßnahmen nach der Zuschlagsphase
Kontrollmaßnahmen nach der Zuschlagsphase, die in allen Mitgliedsstaaten üblich sind, können in 
zwei Gruppen unterteilt werden:
OO Internes Monitoring, normalerweise vom öffentlichen Auftraggeber durchgeführt;
OO Externes Monitoring, ausgeübt durch unabhängige, externe Institutionen (wie Rechnungshöfe, 
Finanzagenturen oder Steuerbehörden, Arbeitsaufsichtsbehörden, usw.), die ihren Fokus 
allgemein auf wirtschaftliche und finanzielle Aspekte, Transparenz der Rechnungslegung, 
Einhaltung von Arbeitsrecht, usw. legen.  
Italien rühmt sich eines Kontrollsystems, das auf mißbräuchliche Praktiken, die während der 
Vertragsabwicklung beobachtet werden können, ausgerichtet ist. Darüber hinaus ist Italien der 
einzige Mitgliedsstaat mit besonderen Strafverfolgungseinheiten, die verantwortlich für das 
Ausführen des Monitoring und der Untersuchungstätigkeiten in Bezug auf große öffentliche Arbeiten 
sind. Alle anderen Mitgliedsstaaten machen keine Unterscheidung zwischen Kontroll- und/oder 
Monitoring(Überwachungs)instanzen, die sich auf den Typ der öffentlichen Arbeit, und somit auf die 
Höhe des öffentlichen Auftrags, beziehen würden. 
Zweidrittel der Mitgliedsstaaten zeichnen sich durch Strafverfolgungsbehörden aus, die spezialisiert 
sind, Korruption in unterschiedlichen Wirtschaftssektoren, öffentliche Vergabe eingeschlossen, zu 
ermitteln. Die Hälfte dieser Länder weist zudem eine auf die Verfolgung von Korruption spezialisierte 
Staatsanwaltschaft auf.
Neben diesen Instanzen hat ein Drittel der Länder Sondereinheiten der Polizei, die eigens zur 
Ermittlung schwerer organisierter Kriminalität und/oder wirtschaftlicher und finanzieller Straftaten 
geschaffen worden sind. Namentlich Slowenien hat eine Sonderstaatsanwaltschaft, die für die 
Verfolgung schwerer Straftaten im Bereich der öffentlichen Vergabe/Konzessionen verantwortlich ist. 
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Resumen ejecutivo
El proyecto “Warning on Crime” (WOC) (www.warningoncrime.eu) se ha llevado a cabo con el 
apoyo financiero de la Comisión Europea, en concreto, de la Dirección General de Migración y 
Asuntos de Interior (DG HOME), en el marco del programa específico “Prevención y lucha contra la 
delincuencia” (ISEC).
La investigación consiste en un estudio comparativo sobre la infiltración criminal y la corrupción en 
la contratación pública en el que han participado todos los Estados miembros (en adelante, EEMM), 
excepto Bélgica, Chipre y Grecia.
El objetivo es comparar la vulnerabilidad de la contratación pública en los 25 EEMM, así como la 
legislación y las medidas adoptadas para prevenirla y contrarrestarla, con el fin de aclarar qué hace 
que la contratación pública sea un terreno fructífero para la cooperación entre delincuentes de cuello 
blanco, funcionarios públicos corruptos y miembros de organizaciones criminales. En el estudio se 
presta especial atención a las obras públicas de gran dimensión y a las transfronterizas.
El informe se divide en cuatro capítulos. El capítulo 1 reflexiona sobre el marco legal existente en 
la lucha contra la ilegalidad en la contratación pública; en el capítulo 2 se presenta la evaluación de 
la vulnerabilidad de la contratación pública; en el capítulo 3 se describen las medidas preventivas 
puestas en marcha por los EEMM; y en el capítulo 4 se analizan las medidas de control previstas en 
la fase posterior a la licitación.
Marco legal
La lucha contra la ilegalidad en la contratación pública a través de las disposiciones legales implica 
diferentes normas e instrumentos de Derecho indicativo -“soft law”-. El proyecto se centra en cuatro 
áreas: las organizaciones criminales, la corrupción, la ley de contratación pública, y los pactos de 
integridad.
Todos los países estudiados criminalizan la participación en organizaciones criminales, de 
conformidad con la Decisión Marco 2008/841/JAI, del Consejo, de 24 de octubre de 2008, relativa 
a la lucha contra la delincuencia organizada, y en la mayoría de ellos estos delitos representan 
una herramienta para castigar a grupos que ejecuten actividades delictivas, incluida la corrupción 
relacionada con la contratación pública–siempre y cuando se cumplan los requisitos establecidos 
por la ley-. Además, el sistema jurídico italiano prevé específicamente el delito de asociación de tipo 
mafioso, mencionando explícitamente la contratación pública. La legislación austríaca incluye un 
delito de asociación ilícita que también puede abarcar la corrupción. Sin embargo, la jurisprudencia es 
muy limitada en los EEMM.
El marco jurídico sobre el cohecho y el tráfico de influencias de los EEMM ha sido sometido a un 
proceso de evolución y de aproximación, y, aunque siguen existiendo lagunas y contradicciones, la 
respuesta global es mucho más amplia que hace unos años.
Las nuevas directivas sobre contratación pública centran su atención en la prevención, la 
transparencia y la rendición de cuentas como medios para reducir la ilegalidad en la contratación 
pública. La investigación muestra que la transposición de las normas relativas a los motivos de la 
exclusión y a la subcontratación varía significativamente entre países. Esto se debe, en parte, a la 
idea existente de que la contratación pública es un mercado nacional que necesita hacer frente a las 
amenazas de ilegalidad en sede local, así como a la intención técnica del legislador de dejar un alto 
grado de discrecionalidad al órgano de contratación.  
Los instrumentos de Derecho indicativo cada vez adquieren mayor relevancia en la lucha contra la 
ilegalidad en la contratación pública. Los pactos de integridad -una herramienta desarrollada por 
Transparencia Internacional (TI), consistente en un acuerdo firmado por la autoridad contratante, 
los licitadores, y un supervisor independiente, en el que se comprometen a abstenerse de toda 
forma de corrupción y pactos de colusión- están a punto de ser probados en 11 países a través de 
17 proyectos financiados por la Unión Europea. Italia tiene una amplia experiencia en este punto 
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debido a los pactos de legalidad que han sido firmados en los últimos años, en los que las partes 
se comprometen a adoptar medidas concretas para aplicar las leyes anticorrupción y el crimen 
organizado y para mejorar la integridad y la transparencia en el procedimiento de contratación 
pública. En la mayor obra pública estudiada, la línea ferroviaria de alta velocidad Turín-Lyon, se utilizó 
un instrumento de Derecho indicativo -reglement des contracts- para establecer reglas comunes 
para esta obra pública, con independencia de la nacionalidad de los postores que participaron. 
En concreto, se extendieron los controles italianos antimafia a todos los licitadores que participaron 
en la ejecución de las obras. Sin embargo, como ocurre con la mayoría de los instrumentos de 
Derecho indicativo, es discutible si podrían tener valor vinculante ante un tribunal administrativo. 
La vulnerabilidad del procedimiento de contratación pública   
El procedimiento de contratación pública es vulnerable a la delincuencia. Algunos sectores 
empresariales están más expuestos que otros a la misma: la construcción y la salud son muy 
vulnerables. Transportes, energía, eliminación de residuos e informática y telecomunicaciones son 
sectores con riesgo medio/alto, habiendo diferencias entre los distintos países. En aquellos países en 
los que persiste la industria minera, este sector se considera altamente vulnerable. La contratación 
pública en relación con el sector de la defensa carece de transparencia. Los servicios sociales y la 
educación se están convirtiendo en sectores en los que la contratación pública es cada vez más 
vulnerable. La vulnerabilidad de varios de los países objeto de investigación está estrechamente 
relacionada con la exposición a la corrupción y a la ilegalidad de los gobiernos locales y de las 
empresas de propiedad estatal.
Así, todo el procedimiento de contratación pública en conjunto (fases pre-licitación, licitación, y post-
licitación) resulta vulnerable. En la fase de pre-licitación, en concreto, la etapa de planificación -la 
anterior al inicio del procedimiento- se considera altamente vulnerable en casi la mitad de los países, 
y cuenta con algunos problemas relativos a la adopción de contramedidas. Todo esto es debido a la 
manipulación de necesidades y de la financiación de la asignación, así como el riesgo de revelación de 
información.
La falta de claridad del pliego de condiciones y la presentación de un precio de oferta demasiado bajo, 
acompañado por extensas posibilidades de ampliar el contrato en la fase posterior a la concesión se 
observan con frecuencia en la mayoría de los países.
La fase de licitación está muy regulada. El procedimiento de selección, sin embargo, cuenta con un 
riesgo medio/alto en el 60% de los países, debido a la ponderación no objetiva o inadecuada de los 
criterios de selección y a la manipulación del pliego de condiciones. El mal uso, también, de las acciones 
judiciales por parte de los licitadores parece ser un riesgo concreto en la mayoría de los países.
En general, la fase posterior a la licitación resulta ser la más arriesgada. El órgano de contratación 
parece olvidar el contrato después de su firma, y  en la mayoría de los países, no hay autoridad para 
supervisar la ejecución del contrato.
El material de baja calidad, el volumen  de trabajo y de costes inflado y los retrasos en la ejecución 
de las obras son problemas generalizados en particular -pero no exclusivamente- en relación con las 
obras públicas.
Medidas preventivas
Debido a los diversos riesgos que afectan al procedimiento de contratación pública, el sistema de 
prevención es bastante complejo y está en constante evolución. En él se incluyen los organismos y 
herramientas de prevención.
Junto al papel desempeñado por los tribunales de cuentas en el seguimiento del uso de fondos 
públicos, existe una amplia gama de organismos en los EEMM, centrados en la prevención de la 
corrupción y del crimen organizado, y cuya acción se refiere a la contratación pública. Algunos EEMM 
tienen otros cuerpos específicos cuya tarea es luchar contra la delincuencia y la ilegalidad en la 
contratación pública, aunque con diferencias entre países.
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En lo que se refiere a las herramientas de prevención, los Países Bajos e Italia cuentan con medidas 
específicas encaminadas a la vigilancia de empresas y sus propietarios y representantes legales. 
En Italia, estos controles se llevan a cabo en el marco de la legislación antimafia.
Las banderas rojas están surgiendo como herramienta utilizada para controlar la mala conducta en 
la contratación pública. Las banderas rojas advierten sobre posibles problemas que deben abordarse, 
como la corrupción, la mala conducta y los fraudes. Aunque estos indicadores se consideran 
predictores útiles para el riesgo de corrupción, sólo ocho países utilizan algún tipo de banderas rojas, 
con las especificidades nacionales.
Las medidas de inhabilitación se utilizan en 14 EEMM. Las listas blancas funcionan como una 
condición pre-selección para elegir las empresas que participarán en el proceso de licitación, 
mientras que las listas negras implican un procedimiento que excluye a empresas y particulares. 
En todos los países, excepto en Rumania, estas herramientas son gestionadas por las autoridades 
públicas. A pesar del reconocimiento general de la utilidad de estas herramientas como un incentivo 
para cumplir con las disposiciones de la ley y como sanción reputacional, su uso no está aún 
generalizado debido a dificultades prácticas en la gestión de las mismas (riesgo de manipulación y 
dificultades en la definición de criterios claros y reglas para la apelación).
Las bases de datos son una herramienta crucial para compartir información. Con la excepción de 
Italia y de los Países Bajos, el uso de bases de datos para supervisar las empresas aún no es tan 
común. Debido a la falta de normas comunes a nivel de la Unión Europea y a los mercados nacionales 
de contratación pública con acceso limitado para licitantes extranjeros, la puesta a punto de un 
mecanismo de intercambio de información común en las empresas no es una prioridad en la agenda.
Las medidas de control en la fase posterior a la licitación
Las medidas de control comunes en todos los EEMM en la fase posterior a la licitación se pueden 
dividir en dos grupos:
OO Control interno, por lo general, realizado por el poder adjudicador;
OO Control externo, llevado a cabo por instituciones independientes y externas (como tribunales de 
cuentas, agencias de financiación o fiscales, inspecciones de trabajo, etc.) que, por lo general, 
centran su atención en los aspectos económicos y financieros, la transparencia de las cuentas, el 
cumplimiento de las leyes laborales, etc.
Además, sólo Italia cuenta con sistemas de control centrados en las prácticas abusivas durante la 
ejecución del contrato. Por otra parte, Italia es el único EM con unidades especiales de las fuerzas del 
orden responsables de llevar a cabo actividades de investigación de control en relación con grandes 
obras públicas. El resto de los EEMM no hacen ninguna distinción -entre el control y/o de los órganos 
de vigilancia- en función del tipo de obra pública y, por lo tanto, del importe del contrato.
Dos tercios de los EEMM cuentan con cuerpos policiales especializados en la detección de la 
corrupción en diversos sectores económicos, incluyendo la contratación pública. La mitad de estos 
países también cuentan con una fiscalía especializada encargada de perseguir la corrupción.
Junto con estos cuerpos, un tercio de los países cuentan con unidades especiales de policía 
establecidos específicamente para investigar el crimen organizado grave y/o los delitos económicos y 
financieros. Eslovenia, en particular, cuenta con una Fiscalía especial encargada de investigar formas 
graves de delincuencia en la adquisición y concesiones públicas.
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Tiivistelmä tutkimuksen 
loppuraportista
“Warning on Crime” (WOC) -projekti (www.warningoncrime.eu) toteutettiin Euroopan komission, 
Muuttoliike- ja sisäasioiden pääosaston (DG HOME) taloudellisella tuella osana rikosten 
ennaltaehkäisyä ja torjuntaa koskevaa komission erityisohjelmaa (ISEC).
Kyseessä on oikeusvertaileva tutkimus rikollisuuden soluttautumisesta ja korruptiosta julkisissa 
hankinnoissa kattaen kaikki jäsenvaltiot Belgiaa, Luxembourgia ja Kreikkaa lukuun ottamatta.
Tavoitteena on tarkastella julkisten hankintojen haavoittuvuutta 25 jäsenvaltiossa sekä vertailla 
lainsäädäntöä että rikollisuuden ja korruption ennaltaehkäisyyn ja torjuntaan suunnattuja 
toimenpiteitä tarkoituksena selventää, miksi julkiset hankinnat mielletään hedelmälliseksi 
maaperäksi “valkokaulusrikollisten”, epäluotettavien virkamiesten ja järjestäytyneiden rikollisryhmien 
jäsenten yhteistyölle. Tutkimuksessa kiinnitetään huomiota erityisesti suuriin ja rajat ylittäviin 
julkisiin rakennusurakoihin.
Raportti jakautuu neljään lukuun. Ensimmäisessä luvussa tarkastellaan lainsäädäntöä, jolla 
pyritään puuttumaan väärinkäytöksiin julkisissa hankinnoissa; toisessa luvussa arvioidaan julkisten 
hankintojen haavoittuvuutta;
kolmannessa luvussa käsitellään eri jäsenvaltioissa omaksuttuja väärinkäytösten 
ennaltaehkäisykeinoja ja neljännessä luvussa tarkastellaan tarjouskilpailun jälkeen käytettävissä 
olevia valvontakeinoja.
Lainsäädäntö
Julkisissa hankinnoissa ilmeneviin väärinkäytöksiin voidaan puuttua lainsäädännöllä tai eri soft law 
-keinojen avulla. Tutkimusprojekti keskittyy neljään osa-alueeseen: järjestäytyneet rikollisryhmät, 
lahjonta, hankintalainsäädäntö ja vastuullisuussopimukset (integrity pacts).
Kaikki tutkimuksen kohteena olevat maat ovat kriminalisoineet järjestäytyneet rikollisryhmät 
Euroopan neuvoston järjestäytyneen rikollisuuden torjunnasta annetussa puitepäätöksessä 
2008/841/JHA, 24 päivänä lokakuuta 2008, edellytetyin tavoin. Useimmissa tarkastelun kohteena 
olleissa maissa rikoksesta voidaan tuomita myös ryhmiä, jotka syyllistyvät rikoksiin julkisissa 
hankinnoissa, kuten korruptioon, edellyttäen, että laissa määritelty rikoksen tunnusmerkistö 
muutoin täyttyy. Lisäksi Italian oikeudessa säädetään erityisesti mafialuonteista toimintaa   
koskevasta rikkomuksesta, joka sanamuotonsa mukaisesti kattaa myös julkiset hankinnat. Itävallan 
lainsäädännössä säädetään järjestäytynyttä rikollisryhmää koskevasta rikkomuksesta, joka voi 
käsittää myös korruptiota. Aiheesta on kuitenkin varsin vähän oikeuskäytäntöä jäsenvaltioissa. 
Lahjontaa ja vaikutusvallan väärinkäyttöä koskeva lainsäädäntö on kehittynyt jäsenvaltioissa 
viime aikoina ja vaikka porsaanreikiä ja ristiriitaisuuksia on edelleen, ovat tutkimuksessa saadut 
vastaukset paljon kattavampia kuin vielä muutama vuosi sitten. Uusissa hankintadirektiiveissä 
pyritään vähentämään laittomuuksia kiinnittämällä huomiota erityisesti väärinkäytösten ehkäisyyn 
sekä menettelyn läpinäkyvyyteen ja vastuullisuuteen. Tutkimus osoittaa, että eri maiden välillä 
hankintadirektiivien voimaansaattamisessa on suuria eroja tarjoajan poissulkuperusteiden 
ja alihankintoja koskevan sääntelyn osalta. Tämä johtuu osittain siitä, että julkiset hankinnat 
koetaan osaksi kansallisia markkinoita, jolloin hankinnoissa puututaan kansallisesti tyypillisiin 
lainvastaisuuksiin ja toisaalta siitä, että jotkut lainsäätäjät jättävät paljon harkintavaltaa 
hankintayksiköille, kun taas toisissa maissa säännöt eivät ole yhtä joustavia. 
Soft law -työkalujen merkitys väärinkäytösten torjunnassa julkisissa hankinnoissa on kasvussa. 
Integrity pact, Transparency Internationalin (TI) kehittämä työkalu , on hankintayksikön, tarjoajien 
ja ulkopuolisen valvojan allekirjoittama sopimus, jossa osapuolet sitoutuvat pidättäytymään 
kaikenlaisesta korruptiosta ja kilpailunrajoittamisesta. Integrity pactia tullaan  testaamaan 
11 maassa 17 eri EU-rahoitteisessa projektissa. Italialla on pitkä kokemus vastaavista 
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laillisuussopimuksia, joissa osapuolet ovat sitoutuneet korruption ja järjestäytyneen rikollisuuden 
vastaista lainsäädäntöä täytäntöönpaneviin toimenpiteisiin ja edistämään läpinäkyvyyttä 
julkisen hankinnan koko elinkaaren ajan. Tutkimuksen kohteena olleessa suuressa Torino-Lyon 
suurnopeusjunan raideyhteyttä koskeneessa rakennusrukassa, soft law työkalua (reglement des 
contracts) käytettiin urakkaa koskevien yhteisten ja tarjoajan kansallisuudesta riippumattomien 
sääntöjen luomiseen. Sillä ulotettiin erityisesti Italian mafianvastainen valvonta kaikkiin tarjoajiin, 
jotka osallistuivat urakan toteuttamiseen. Kuten kaikkien soft law -työkalujen osalta, on kuitenkin 
tulkinnanvaraista, katsottaisiinko tällaisella sopimuksella olevan osapuolia sitovaa vaikutusta 
tuomioistuimessa.
Julkisen hankinnan haavoittuvuus sen elinkaaren aikana
Julkisia hankintoja voidaan pitää haavoittuvaisina rikollisuudelle. Jotkut toimialat ovat alttiimpia 
kuin toiset: erityisesti rakentamista ja terveydenhuoltoa pidetään hyvin haavoittuvaisina. 
Liikenne-, energia-, jätehuolto- sekä IT- ja tietoliikennesektorit ovat kohtalaisen tai korkean 
riskin omaavia toimialoja. Maissa missä edelleen harjoitetaan kaivostoimintaa, on tätä pidetty 
hyvin alttiina rikollisuudelle. Puolustushankinnoissa läpinäkyvyys on puutteellista. Sosiaali- ja 
koulutuspalvelusektorit nousevat esiin uusina toimialoina, joissa julkisten hankintojen haavoittuvuus 
on kasvussa. Useissa tutkimuksen kohteena olleissa maissa julkisten hankintojen haavoittuvuus 
liittyy paikallishallinnon ja julkisomisteisten yhtiöiden korruptoituneisuuteen ja lainvastaisiin 
menettelyihin.
Koko hankinnan elinkaari (hankinnan valmistelu, kilpailutusvaihe ja sopimuskausi) on 
haavoittuvainen. Lähes puolessa tutkimuksen kohteena olleista maista, hankinnan kilpailutusta 
edeltävää suunnittelu- ja valmisteluvaihetta pidetään hyvin haavoittuvaisena. Tutkimuksen 
perusteella voidaankin nostaa esiin joitain ongelmia väärinkäytösten torjunnassa. Ongelmat liittyvät 
hankinnan tarveharkintaan tai rahoituksen jakamiseen kohdistuvaan manipulointiin sekä tietojen 
paljastumiseen liittyviin riskeihin.
Suurimmissa osassa tutkimuksen kohteena olevista maista tehdään hankintoja, joissa 
tarjouspyynnön ehtojen epäselvyys ja halvimman hinnan mukaan kilpailuttaminen on yhdistetty 
mahdollisuuteen muuttaa tai laajentaa sopimusta sopimuskauden aikana.
Hankintojen kilpailuttamisvaihe on tarkkaan säänneltyä. 60 % maista hankintamenettelyn 
valintaan liittyi kuitenkin korkea tai kohtalainen riski tarjousten valintaan osallistuvien henkilöiden 
manipulointiin ja siihen, etteivät vertailuperusteet tai niiden painotus ole objektiivisia tai riittävän 
selviä. Useissa maissa vaikuttaa olevan myös todellinen riski oikeussuojakeinojen väärinkäytöstä. 
Yleisesti ottaen hankintasopimuskausi näyttää olevan riskialttein kaikista hankinnan elinkaaren 
vaiheista. Vaikuttaa siltä, että hankintayksikkö unohtaa sopimuksen sen allekirjoittamisen jälkeen 
eikä useimmissa maissa ole sopimuksen toteuttamista valvovaa viranomaista.
Huonolaatuiset materiaalit, työmäärien ja kustannusten vääristeleminen ja viivästykset ovat kaikki 
laajalle levinneitä ongelmia erityisesti julkisissa rakennusurakoissa, mutta myös muutoin.
Ennaltaehkäisevät toimenpiteet
Useista hankinnan elinkaareen kohdistuvista riskeistä johtuen ennaltaehkäisevien toimenpiteiden 
tulee olla moniulotteisia ja jatkuvasti kehittyviä. Toimenpiteet sisältävät paitsi valvontaviranomaisia 
myös erilaisia ennaltaehkäisykeinoja. 
Tilintarkastustuomioistuinten julkisten varojen käyttöä harjoittaman valvonnan lisäksi jäsenvaltioissa 
on lukuisia korruption ja järjestäytyneen rikollisuuden torjuntaan ja ennaltaehkäisyyn keskittyviä 
virastoja, joiden toimenkuvaan sisältyy myös julkisten hankintojen valvonta. Joissain jäsenvaltioissa 
on puolestaan erityisiä, rikosten ja lainvastaisten menettelyiden torjunnasta nimenomaisesti 
julkisissa hankinnoissa vastaavia virastoja, joskin näiden virastojen välillä on paljon eroja. 
Alankomaissa ja Italiassa on käytössä erityistoimenpiteitä yritysten, niiden omistajien ja laillisten 
edustajien valvontaan. Italiassa valvonnasta on säädetty osana mafianvastaista lainsäädäntöä. 
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Väärinkäytöksistä varoittavia merkkejä (“Red Flags”) nousee esiin lukuisten hankintoihin liittyvien 
valvontatoimien kautta. Red Flags -merkit varoittavat mahdollisista huomiota vaativista ongelmista, 
kuten korruptiosta, rikkomuksista tai vilpistä. Vaikka merkkejä pidetään käyttökelpoisina viitteinä 
korruptioriskistä, vain kahdeksassa maassa on käytössä jonkinlaisia kansallisia erityispiirteitä 
sisältäviä Red Flags -merkkejä.
Osallistumiskieltotoimenpiteitä on käytössä 14 jäsenvaltiossa. Valkoisia listoja (white lists) 
käytetään kelpoisuusehtona valittaessa tarjoajia, jotka voivat jättää tarjouksen tarjouskilpailuun, 
kun taas mustia listoja (black lists) käytetään yritysten ja yksityisten henkilöiden sulkemiseen pois 
menettelystä. Romaniaa lukuun ottamatta näitä järjestelmiä hallinnoidaan viranomaisten toimesta. 
Vaikka osallistumiskieltoja pidetään toimivina, yrityksen mainetta vahingoittavina sanktioina ja 
niiden on yleisesti katsottu kannustavan yrityksiä noudattamaan sitä velvoittavaa lainsäädäntöä, 
järjestelmien käyttö ei ole kuitenkaan levinnyt kovin laajalle niiden hallinnoimiseen liittyvistä 
käytännön haasteista johtuen (manipulointiriskit sekä vaikeudet määrittää selkeitä sääntöjä 
kieltolistalle päätymisestä valittamiseen). 
Erilaiset tietokannat ovat tärkeitä työkaluja lainvalvontaviranomaisille. Tietokantojen käyttö yritysten 
valvonnassa ei kuitenkaan Alankomaita ja Italiaa lukuun ottamatta ole vielä kovin yleistä. EU-
sääntelyn puuttumisesta ja ulkomaisille tarjoajille rajoitetulla pääsyllä varustetuista kansallisista 
hankintamarkkinoista johtuen yrityksiä koskevien tietojen jakaminen ja sen yhteinen kehittäminen ei 
ole noussut kärkihankkeiden joukkoon. 
Valvontatoimenpiteet hankintasopimuskaudella
Hankintasopimuskauden aikana valvontatoimenpiteet voidaan kaikissa jäsenvaltioissa jakaa kahteen 
ryhmään:
OO sisäinen valvonta, suoritetaan yleensä hankintayksikön toimesta;
OO ulkoinen valvonta, hoidetaan usein itsenäisten ja ulkopuolisten toimijoiden (kuten 
tilintarkastustuomioistuimen, rahoitus- tai veroviranomaisten, työsuojelutarkastajien jne.) 
toimesta, jotka keskittyvät muun muassa taloudellisten seikkojen, kirjanpidon läpinäkyvyyden ja 
työlainsäädännön noudattamisen valvontaan jne.
Sitä paitsi ainoastaan Italiassa on käytössä valvontajärjestelmiä, joilla voidaan puuttua myös 
hankintasopimuskaudella ilmeneviin väärinkäytöksiin. Lisäksi Italia on jäsenvaltioista ainoa, jolla on 
erityisiä, suuriin julkisiin rakennusurakoihin keskittyneitä lainvalvontaviranomaisia. Missään muussa 
jäsenvaltiossa valvontaviranomaisia ei erotella urakkatyypin tai sen arvon perusteella. 
Kahdessa kolmesta jäsenvaltiosta on useilla eri sektoreilla, julkiset hankinnat mukaan lukien, 
korruption tunnistamiseen erikoistuneita lainvalvontaviranomaisia. Puolessa näistä maista on tämän 
lisäksi myös korruptiosta vastaava syyttäjänvirasto.
Näiden toimijoiden lisäksi, joka kolmannessa maassa on poliisin erityisyksikköjä, jotka on perustettu 
vakavien, järjestäytyneeseen rikollisuuteen liittyvien rikosten ja/tai talousrikosten tutkintaa varten. 
Näin on etenkin Sloveniassa, jossa julkisiin hankintoihin ja käyttöoikeussopimuksiin liittyvän vakavan 
rikollisuuden tutkinnasta vastaa oma erikoissyyttäjänvirasto.
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Résumé Analytique
 « Warning on crime » (WOC) (www.warningoncrime.eu) est un projet financé par la Direction 
générale de la migration et des affaires intérieures (DG home) de la Commission européenne, dans le 
cadre du Programme « Prévenir et combattre la criminalité » (ISEC).
Ce projet de recherche se fonde sur une analyse comparative de la corruption et de l’infiltration 
criminelle dans les procédures de marchés publics, dans l’ensemble des Etats membres (EM) de 
l’Union européenne, à l’exception de la Belgique, de Chypre et de la Grèce.
Tant le cadre légal que les mesures de prévention adoptées seront présentés afin de comparer la 
vulnérabilité des procédures de marchés publics dans ces 25 Etats membres. Le but sera d’évaluer 
en quoi ces procédures constituent le cadre privilégié d’une coopération entre criminels en col blanc, 
fonctionnaires malhonnêtes et membres d’organisations criminelles. Les travaux d’envergure et 
transfrontières ont ainsi fait l’objet d’une attention particulière. 
Le rapport est divisé en quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre porte sur le cadre législatif relatif à la 
lutte contre les infractions affectant les marchés publics. Le second chapitre analyse la vulnérabilité 
des marchés publics. Le chapitre 3 décrit les mesures préventives mises en place dans les Etats 
membres et le chapitre 4 présente les mesures de contrôle envisagées dans la phase postérieure à 
l’appel d’offre. 
Le cadre légal
La lutte contre les infractions affectant les marchés publics s’appuie non seulement sur des règles 
légales mais aussi sur des instruments de soft law. Le cadre légal se concentre sur quatre questions : 
les organisations criminelles, la corruption, le droit des marchés publics et les pactes d’intégrité. 
Tous les Etats concernés par le projet incriminent les organisations criminelles en tant que telles, 
conformément à la décision-cadre du Conseil 2008/841/JAI du 24 octobre 2008 sur la lutte contre le 
crime organisé. Dans la plupart d’entre eux, cette infraction permet de punir les groupes poursuivant 
des activités criminelles, y compris la corruption dans le cadre de marchés publics. Le droit italien 
prévoit spécifiquement l’infraction d’association de malfaiteur de type mafia et renvoie explicitement 
aux marchés publics. De même, l’infraction d’association criminelle en droit autrichien inclut 
expressément la corruption. Néanmoins, il est à noter que la jurisprudence en la matière est très 
limitée et ce dans tous les Etats membres étudiés. 
L’encadrement légal des infractions de corruption et de trafic d’influence a évolué ces dernières 
années, marqué par le rapprochement des législations nationales. Si des lacunes et contradictions 
persistent, les résultats généraux obtenus sont bien plus complets qu’il y a quelques années. 
Afin de réduire les infractions pouvant affecter les procédures de marchés publics, les nouvelles 
directives relatives aux marchés publics ont mis l’accent sur la prévention, la transparence et la 
responsabilité. La présente étude montre que la transposition de règles relatives à l’exclusion des 
participants et à la sous-traitance varie considérablement d’un Etat membre à un autre. Cette 
hétérogénéité est en partie liée au fait que les marchés publics sont perçus comme une activité 
nationale et que les infracrions pouvant affecter ces procédures sont essentiellement d’origine 
interne. Par ailleurs, les différences rencontrées découlent également de la marge de discrétion que 
la législation envisage de laisser aux autorités contractantes ou pouvoirs adjudicateurs. 
Les instruments de soft-law jouent un rôle de plus en plus important dans la neutralisation du 
phénomène. Des pactes d’intégrité - instruments développés par Transparency International, 
consistant en un accord entre les autorités contractantes, les soumissionnaires et une autorité 
de surveillance indépendante, par lequel ils s’engagent à refuser toute forme de corruption ou de 
collusion – vont prochainement être expérimentés par 11 États lors de 17 projets cofinancés par 
l’Union européenne. L’Italie a une longue expérience en ce qui concerne les « pactes de légalité », aux 
termes desquels les parties s’engagent à mettre en œuvre les règles légales visant non seulement 
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à lutter contre la corruption et le crime organisé mais aussi à renforcer la transparence et l’intégrité 
dans le processus de marché public. Par exemple, dans le cadre du chantier de la ligne haute vitesse 
Turin-Lyon, les règles communes étaient fixées, pour tous les soumissionnaires, quelle que soit leur 
nationalité, par un instrument de soft law (règlement des contrats). Plus précisément, cet instrument 
étend le contrôle anti-mafia italien à tous les soumissionnaires. La valeur contraignante de ce 
règlement est cependant contestable et pourrait être discutée devant les juridictions administratives.
Vulnérabilité des marchés publics dans différentes étapes du cycle
Le contexte des marchés publics est généralement caractérisé par une vulnérabilité face à la 
criminalité. Certains secteurs d’activité peuvent  s’avérer plus exposés que d’autres. Citons la 
construction et la santé qui apparaissent extrêmement vulnérables. Les transports, l’énergie, 
l’élimination des déchets, l’informatique et les télécommunications sont également des secteurs 
exposés à un niveau moyen/élevé, avec, toutefois, des différences entre les pays. S’agissant des 
Etats qui disposent encore d’une industrie minière, ce secteur est considéré comme très vulnérable. 
De même, les marchés publics dans le secteur de la défense manquent de transparence. Les services 
liés à l’éducation et dans le domaine social deviennent un nouveau secteur où les marchés publics 
sont de plus en plus soumis à de tels risques. La vulnérabilité dans plusieurs des pays étudiés 
est étroitement liée à l’exposition à la corruption et à l’illégalité des collectivités locales et des 
entreprises publiques. 
L’ensemble des procédures liées aux marchés publics (avant, durant et après l’adjudication) sont 
vulnérables. La phase amont de l’adjudication est considérée comme très exposée dans près de la 
moitié des pays, et illustre certains des problèmes portant sur l’adoption de mesures de lutte. Tout 
cela est dû à la manipulation des besoins et des allocations de financement ainsi qu’aux risques de 
divulgation d’informations. 
Le manque de clarté du cahier des charges ainsi que la faiblesse du prix de soumission, accompagnés 
de vastes possibilités d’élargir la phase postérieure à l’octroi du contrat sont souvent observés dans 
la plupart des pays. 
Si la phase d’appel d’offres est très réglementée, la procédure de sélection qui la particularise permet 
néanmoins d’observer un risque élevée/moyen dans 60 % des pays. Ceci est dû à une évaluation 
non-objective ou inadéquate des critères de sélection et à la possible manipulation de la Commission 
d’évaluation. Les hypothèses d’actions judiciaires non fondées engagées par les soumissionnaires 
apparaissent comme un risque concret dans la plupart des pays.
 
Globalement, la phase qui suit l’appel d’offres apparaît comme étant la plus risquée. L’autorité 
contractante semble oublier le contrat après sa conclusion et dans la plupart des pays, il n’existe 
aucune autorité chargée de surveiller la bonne exécution du contrat. On relève ainsi, à titre d’exemple, 
certains vices comme un matériel de mauvaise qualité, le volume du travail et son coût exagérés, les 
retards dans la bonne exécution des travaux publics en général. 
Mesures préventives  
En raison des risques divers affectant les marchés publics dans leur ensemble, le système de 
prévention est désormais relativement complexe et en constante évolution. Ce système de 
prévention comprend à la fois des organes dédiés et des outils.  
Parallèlement au rôle joué par les cours des comptes dans le contrôle de l’emploi des fonds publics, 
il existe un large éventail d’organismes dans les différents Etats de l’UE qui se focalisent sur la 
prévention de la corruption et sur le crime organisé, et dont l’action concerne les marchés publics. 
Certains Etats membres ont des organes spécifiques dédiés dont la tâche consiste à combattre le 
crime et l’illégalité dans les marchés publics, ce bien que des différences puissent être observées 
entre les pays. S’agissant des instruments de prévention, les Pays-Bas et l’Italie disposent 
de mesures spécifiques visant à contrôler les entreprises, leurs propriétaires ainsi que leurs 
représentants légaux. En Italie, ces contrôles sont effectués dans le cadre de la législation anti-mafia. 
99Annex 3.  Translated execut ive Summary
Les « drapeaux rouges » ressortent parmi une variété d’outils utilisés afin de surveiller des 
manquements dans les marchés publics. Ils sont des alerteurs permettant de mettre en garde 
contre l’existence d’éventuels comportements répréhensibles comme la corruption, différents 
manquements ou encore la fraude. Bien que ces indicateurs puissent apparaître utiles en présence 
d’un risque de corruption, seulement huit pays utilisent ce type d’outils, avec toutefois des 
spécificités  nationales souvent relevées. 
Des mesures de radiation sont utilisées dans 14 Etats membres. Les listes blanches sont utilisées 
comme instruments de présélection pour choisir des entreprises qui seront autorisées à prendre part 
à la procédure de soumission, alors que les listes noires interdisent aux entreprises et aux particuliers 
de participer à ces mêmes procédures. Dans tous les pays européens – à l’exception de la Roumanie 
– ces outils sont gérés par les pouvoirs publics. En dépit de la reconnaissance de leur utilité comme 
moyens de renforcer la conformité aux dispositions législatives dans le domaine considéré mais 
également comme instrument permettant de sanctionner au travers de la réputation, leur emploi 
n’est pas encore systématiquement répandu en raison de difficultés pratiques liées à leur gestion 
(risque de manipulation et difficultés à définir des critères clairs ainsi que les modalités d’un appel).
Les bases de données sont des outils essentiels afin de partager des informations sur l’application 
des règles. À l’exception de l’Italie et des Pays-Bas, l’utilisation de bases de données pour surveiller 
les entreprises n’est pas encore systématique. En raison du manque de règles communes au niveau 
européen et en raison de l’absence d’ouverture des marchés nationaux aux soumissionnaires 
étrangers, la mise en place d’un mécanisme commun de partage d’information sur les entreprises 
n’est pas vraiment à l’ordre du jour.  
Mesures de contrôle dans la phase postérieure à l’appel d’offres
Certaines mesures de contrôle dans cette phase sont communes dans les Etats membres de l’UE. 
Elles peuvent se répartir en deux grands ensembles : 
OO la surveillance interne souvent assurée par le maître d’ouvrage ; 
OO la surveillance externe, réalisée par des institutions indépendantes et extérieures (telles que des 
cours des comptes, des organismes fiscaux, des inspections du travail, etc.), qui généralement 
concentrent leur attention sur les aspects économiques et financiers, la transparence des 
comptes, le respect de la législation du travail, etc.
Au-delà, seule l’Italie présente des systèmes de contrôle axés sur des pratiques abusives qui peuvent 
être observées durant l’exécution des contrats de marché public. En outre, l’Italie est le seul Etat 
membre doté d’institutions spécialement chargées  de mener à bien des contrôles et des enquêtes 
dans le champ des grands travaux publics. L’ensemble des autres Etats membres ne font pas de 
distinctions fondées sur le type de travaux publics et donc sur le montant du marché public. Les deux 
tiers des Etats membres disposent d’organismes spécialisés dans la détection de la corruption dans 
divers secteurs économiques dont les marchés publics. La moitié de ces Etats dispose également 
d’un parquet spécialisé dans les affaires de corruption.
En plus de ces organismes, un tiers des pays disposent d’unités de police spéciales, qui ont été 
spécialement créées pour enquêter dans des grandes affaires de criminalité organisée ou de crimes 
économiques et financiers. La Slovénie dispose d’un parquet spécial chargé d’enquêter sur des 
formes graves de criminalité dans les marchés publics ou de concession.
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Sažetak
Projekt „Upozorenje na kriminal“ (WOC) (www.warningoncrime.eu) izveden je uz financijsku 
potporu Odjela za migracije i unutarnje poslove Europske komisije (DG HOME) u okviru Programa za 
prevenciju i borbu protiv kriminala (ISEC).
Istraživanje je obuhvatilo komparativnu analizu korupcije i kriminalnog prodiranja u javnu nabavu na 
teritoriju svih Država članica (DČ) osim Belgije, Cipra i Grčke.
Cilj je projekta usporedba ranjivost u području javne nabave u 25 DČ, uključujući mjere uređene 
zakonodavstvom i mjere usvojene za sprečavanje i suzbijanje kažnjivih ponašanja, uz osvrt na 
osvjetljavanje uzroka koji javnu nabavu čine plodnim tlom za suradnju kriminalaca bijelih ovratnika 
(„white-collar criminals“), nelojalnih javnih dužnosnika i članova kriminalnih organizacija. Posebna 
pažnja je posvećena važnim prekograničnim javnim radovima.
Izvješće je podijeljeno u četiri poglavlja. Prvo poglavlje odražava dostupni zakonodavni okvir za 
suzbijanje protuzakonitosti u javnoj nabavi; drugo poglavlje predstavlja procjenu ranjivosti javne 
nabave; treće poglavlje opisuje preventivne mjere koje su usvojene u DČ; četvrto poglavlje analizira 
kontrolne mjere predviđene u fazi nakon ponuda na javnom nadmetanju.
Pravni okvir
Suprotstavljanje protuzakonitostima u javnoj nabavi kroz zakonske mjere uključuje različita pravna 
pravila i soft-law mjere. Pravni okvir usmjerava se na četiri područja: kriminalne organizacije, mito, 
javnu nabavu i sporazume o integritetu.
Sve države su proučavale kriminalne organizacije sukladno Okvirnoj odluci Vijeća 2008/841/PUP 
od 24. listopada 2008 o borbi protiv organiziranog kriminala i u većini slučajeva kazneno djelo, uz 
ispunjenje zakonom propisanih pretpostavki, predstavlja sredstvo za kažnjavanje grupa koje se bave 
kriminalnim aktivnostima vezanim uz javnu nabavu, uključujući korupciju. Dodatno, talijanski pravni 
sustav posebno predviđa kao kazneno djelo udruženja mafijaškog tipa koji izričito spominje javnu 
nabavu. Austrijsko zakonodavstvo uključuje kazneno djelo kriminalnog udruženja koji može obuhvatiti 
i korupciju. Međutim, praksa je veoma ograničena diljem DČ.
Pravni okvir za mito i trgovanje utjecajem bio je podvrgnut procesu razvoja i procjene diljem DČ te, 
unatoč i dalje prisutnim pravnim prazninama i proturječnostima, ukupni rezultati odaziva mnogo su 
opsežniji nego prije nekoliko godina.
Nove smjernice za javnu nabavu, kao sredstva za smanjenje nezakonitosti u javnoj nabavi, 
usredotočene su na sprečavanje, transparentnost i odgovornost. Istraživanje pokazuje da se 
prenošenje pravila na temelju isključenja i podugovaranja značajno razlikuje u državama. Ovo je 
djelomično povezano s idejom da je javna nabava dio globalnog tržišta koje se mora suočiti s lokalnim 
prijetnjama u smislu nezakonitosti, te također uzeti u obzir razinu diskrecije koji zakonodavci žele 
ostaviti naručiteljima.
Soft-law instrumenti dobivaju sve veći značaj u borbi protiv nezakonitosti u javnoj nabavi. Sporazumi 
o integritetu – sredstvo razvijeno od strane Transparency Internationala (TI), sastoji se od sporazuma 
potpisanog od strane vladinih agencija, društava koja se nadmeću i nezavisnog kontrolora koji se 
obvezuje na suzdržavanje od bilo kakvog oblika korupcije i koluzije - uskoro će biti testirani u 11 
zemalja na 17 projekata sufinanciranih od strane Strukturalnih i Kohezijskih fondova EU. Italija ima 
dugogodišnje iskustvo u sporazumima koji obvezuju stranke na usvajanje posebnih radnji usmjerenih 
na provođenje pravnih pravila protiv korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta i na povećanje integriteta 
i transparentnosti u sustavu javne nabave. U većini proučavanih javnih radova, soft-law instrument 
(„reglement des contracts“) koristio se kako bi pružio zajednička pravila za ovaj javni rad, ne uzimajući 
u obzir državljanstvo ponuditelja. Posebice proširuje talijanske antimafijaške mjere kontrole na sve 
ponuditelje uključene u izvršenje radova. Ipak za većinu soft law instrumenata dvojbeno je mogu li 
imati obvezujuću snagu pred upravnim sudom u slučaju spora. 
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Ranjivost ciklusa javne nabave
Ciklus javne nabave podložan je kriminalu. Neki poslovni sektori su ipak izloženiji od drugih: 
građevinarstvo i zdravstveni sustav su visoko ranjivi. Prijevoz, energija, odlaganje smeća te IT 
i telekomunikacije su sve srednje do visokorizični sektori, ovisno o pojedinim državma. Za one 
države koje još uvijek imaju industriju rudarstva, taj sektor se smatra visoko ranjivim. Javnoj nabavi 
povezanoj sa sektorom obrane nedostaje transparentnosti. Socijalne službe i obrazovanje se javljaju 
kao novi sektor u kojem javna nabava postaje sve više ranjiva. Ranjivost nekolicine zemalja pod 
istragom je usko povezana s izloženošću korupciji i protuzakonitostima lokalnih vlasti i poduzeća u 
državnom vlasništvu.
Cijeli ciklus javne nabave (faza prije nadmetanja, nadmetanje i faza poslije nadmetanja) je ranjiv. 
Međutim, u fazi prije nadmetanja, faza planiranja – ona na samom početku postupka – smatra se 
najranjivijom u gotovo polovini država i obuhvaća neke probleme vezane uz usvajanje protumjera. 
Sve ovo je uzrokovano manipulacijom dobrima i raspodjelom sredstava kao i rizikom od odavanja 
informacija.
Nedostatak jasne specifikacije ponuda na javnom nadmetanju i podnošenje niskih cijena nadmetanja 
popraćenih opsežnim mogućnostima širenja ugovora u fazi nakon nagrade predmet su promatranja u 
mnogim državama.
Faza ponuda na javnom nadmetanju široko je regulirana. Postupak selekcije, s druge strane, 
podrazumijeva visok/srednji rizik u 60% država zbog neobjektivnih ili neprikladnih kriterija za odabir 
i raznih manipulacija odbora za procjene. Također zloupotrebe sudskih radnji ponuditelja predstavlja 
konkretan rizik u većini zemalja.
Sve u svemu, faza poslije nadmetanja pokazuje se najrizičnijom. Čini se da vladine agencije 
zaboravljaju na ugovor nakon što je potpisan i u većini zemalja ne postoji autoritet koji bi nadzirao 
izvršenje ugovora.
Materijali niske kvalitete, precijenjen opseg posla i troškova i kašnjenje s izvršenjem radova 
rasprostranjeni su problemi, posebice – ali ne isključivo – povezani s javnim radovima.
Preventivne mjere
Zbog raznovrsnih rizika koji utječu na životni ciklus javne nabave, sustav prevencije je veoma složen i 
stalno se razvija. Uključuje preventivna tijela i preventivne instrumente.
Osim uloge revizijskog suda u nadziranju korištenja javnih sredstava, tu je i širok spektar tijela DČ koja 
su usmjerena na prevenciju korupcije i organiziranog kriminala i čija se djelatnost tiče javne nabave. 
Neke DČ imaju posebna tijela čija je zadaća suprotstavljanje kriminalu i nezakonitostima u javnoj 
nabavi, iako se ona u državama razlikuju.
Što se tiče preventivnih instrumenata, Nizozemska i Italija ističu posebne mjere usmjerene na 
nadziranje trgovačkih društava i njihovih vlasnika i pravnih zastupnika. U Italiji, ovaj nadzor se provodi 
u okviru anti-mafijskog zakonodavstva.
Crvene zastave javljaju se među raznim instrumentima za nadziranje protupravnog ponašanja u 
javnoj nabavi. Crvene zastave su znakovi upozorenja na potencijalne probleme koji se trebaju riješiti 
poput korupcije, protupravnog ponašanja i prijevara. Iako se ovi pokazatelji smatraju korisnim 
instrumentima za predviđanje rizika od korupcije, samo se osam država služi nekim oblikom crvenih 
zastava s nacionalnim posebitostima.
Mjere isključenja koriste se u 14 DČ. Bijele liste funkcioniraju kao uvjet prije odabira za sudjelovanje 
u postupku nadmetanja, dok crne liste podrazumijevaju postupak koji isključuje trgovačka društva i 
pojedince. U svim državama osim Rumunjske ovim instrumentima upravljaju državne vlasti. Unatoč 
općoj svijesti o korisnosti ovih mjera kao poticaja za zakonito postupanje i kao sankcije koje štete 
poslovnom ugledu, njihova primjena još uvijek nije široko raširena zbog praktičnih problema u 
upravljanju tim mjerama (rizik manipulacije i teškoće u definiranju jasnih kriterija i pravila za žalbe).
Baze podataka su ključan alat za raspodjelu informacija o provedbi zakona. S izuzetkom Italije i 
Nizozemske, korištenje baza podataka nije učestalo. Zahvaljujući nedostatku zajedničkih pravila 
na razini EU i nacionalnim tržištima javne nabave s ograničenim pristupom za strane ponuditelje, 
uređenje zajedničkog mehanizma za dijeljenje informacija o trgovačkim društvima nije tako visoko na 
dnevnom redu.
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Kontrolne mjere u fazi poslije nadmetanja
Kontrolne mjere koje su zajedničke u svim DČ u fazi poslije nadmetanja mogu se podijeliti u dvije grupe:
OO unutrašnje nadziranje, obično provođeno od stane vladinih agencija;
OO vanjsko nadziranje, izvođeno od strane nezavisnih i vanjskih institucija (poput revizijskih sudova, 
financijskih ili poreznih agencija, inspekcija rada itd.), koje su općenito usredotočene na ekonomske 
i financijske aspekte, transparentnost računa, usklađenost sa zakonima o radu itd.
Osim toga, jedino Italija ističe kontrolne sisteme usredotočene na protuzakonito postupanje tijekom 
izvršenja ugovora o javnoj nabavi. Štoviše, Italija je jedina DČ s posebnim jedinicama za provedbu 
zakona koje su zadužene za provođenje nadzora i istražne radnje vezane uz bitne javne radove. Sve 
ostale DČ ne čine tu razliku između kontrolnih i nadzornih tijela na temelju vrste javnih radova.
Dvije trećine DČ imaju tijela specijalizirana za otkrivanje korupcije u raznim ekonomskim sektorima, 
uključujući javnu nabavu. Polovica ovih zemalja također ima i specijalni ured državnog odvjetnika 
zaduženog za progon korupcije.
Među ovim tijelima, jedna trećina zemalja ima posebne policijske jedinice koje su posebno osnovane 
kako bi istraživale ozbiljan organizirani kriminal i/ili ekonomska i financijska kaznena djela. Slovenija 
se ističe s Posebnim Uredom Tužitelja zaduženog za istragu ozbiljnih oblika kriminala u javnoj nabavi/
koncesijama.
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Sommario
Il progetto ‘Warning on Crime’ (WOC) (www.warningoncrime.eu) è stato condotto con il supporto 
finanziario della Commissione Europea, Direzione generale Migrazione e Affari Interni (DG HOME), 
nell’ambito del programma Prevenzione e contrasto al crimine (ISEC). 
La ricerca condotta è uno studio comparativo sulla infiltrazione criminale e la corruzione negli appalti 
pubblici che coinvolge tutti gli Stati Membri con l’eccezione di Belgio, Cipro e Grecia.
Lo scopo del lavoro è la comparazione del livello di vulnerabilità degli appalti pubblici nei 25 Paesi 
Membri, la legislazione e le misure adottate per prevenire e ridurre tale vulnerabilità, con l’obiettivo di 
chiarire cosa rende gli appalti pubblici un terreno di fruttuosa collaborazione tra criminali del colletto 
bianco, dipendenti pubblici infedeli e membri di organizzazioni criminali. Una attenzione particolare 
sarà data ai grandi appalti pubblici di opere transfrontaliere. 
Il report è diviso in quattro capitoli. Il primo capitolo riflette sul quadro legislativo sul contrasto della 
illegalità negli appalti; il secondo capitolo presenta un quadro della vulnerabilità degli appalti; il terzo 
capitolo descrive le misure preventive messe in campo nei diversi Stati e infine il quarto capitolo si 
concentra sulle misure di controllo della fase successiva alla conclusione della procedura di appalto.
Quadro legislativo
Il contrasto della illegalità negli appalti attraverso misure legislative coinvolge sia norme di legge 
che strumenti di soft-law. Il quadro legislativo ha riguardato quattro aree: organizzazioni criminali, 
corruzione, appalti e patti di integrità.
Tutti i Paesi oggetto di studio prevedono almeno una fattispecie penale sulla organizzazione criminale 
in conformità con La Decisione Quadro del Consiglio 2008/841/JHA del 24 ottobre 2008 sulla lotta 
al crimine organizzato e nella maggior parte di essi il reato può rappresentare uno strumento per 
incriminare i gruppi, aventi le caratteristiche richieste dalla legge, che conducono attività criminali, 
compresa quelle corruttive, collegate agli appalti pubblici. Inoltre, il sistema legislativo italiano 
prevede la fattispecie dell’associazione di stampo mafioso, che menziona in modo esplicito gli appalti 
pubblici. La legislazione austriaca include una fattispecie di associazione criminale che esplicitamente 
indica il caso in cui l’associazione criminale corrompe altre persone.
La giurisprudenza sul tema si presenta comunque piuttosto limitata.
La legislazione in materia di corruzione e traffico di influenze illecite è stata soggetta a un processo 
di riforma in tutti i paesi e a un progressivo avvicinamento tra gli Stati Membri e sebbene rimangano 
contraddizioni e inadeguatezze la risposta complessiva è molto più esaustiva rispetto ad alcuni anni fa.
Le nuove direttive in materia di appalti pubblici focalizzano l’attenzione sulla prevenzione, la 
trasparenza e la accountability come mezzi per ridurre l’illegalità negli appalti pubblici. La ricerca 
mostra che la trasposizione delle norme sui motivi di esclusione e il subcontratto varia in modo 
significativo tra i Paesi. Ciò è in parte dovuto all’idea che gli appalti pubblici sono un mercato 
nazionale che deve affrontare i rischi in termini di illegalità che si producono a livello locale. 
Secondariamente è dovuto al livello di discrezionalità che il legislatore sceglie di dare alla stazione 
appaltante. 
Gli strumenti di soft-law stanno assumendo sempre maggiore rilevanza nel contrasto alla illegalità 
negli appalti pubblici. I patti di integrità – uno strumento sviluppato da Transparency International (TI) 
che consiste in un accordo firmato dalla stazione appaltante, dalle imprese partecipanti alla gara e da 
un organismo di monitoraggio in cui le parti si impegnano ad astenersi da ogni forma di corruzione 
o collusione – saranno testati da 11 Paesi in 17 progetti co-finanziati dai fondi strutturali. L’Italia 
ha una lunga esperienza in Patti di legalità firmati nel corso degli anni che impegnano le parti ad 
adottare specifiche azioni per implementare norme contro la corruzione e la criminalità organizzata 
e aumentare l’integrità e la trasparenza nelle procedure di appalto. Nel caso della ferrovia ad alta 
velocità tra Torino e Lione è stato siglato uno strumento di soft-law (reglement des contracts) volto 
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a prevedere regole comuni per la realizzazione di questa opera, a prescindere dalla nazionalità delle 
imprese che vorranno partecipare agli appalti pubblici. In particolare, i controlli anti-mafia italiani 
saranno estesi a tutte le imprese coinvolte nell’esecuzione dei lavori. Comunque, come altri strumenti 
di soft-law è da verificare quale valore legale questo strumento potrà avere di fronte a una Corte in 
caso di ricorso.
La vulnerabilità degli appalti pubblici 
Gli appalti pubblici sono vulnerabili alla criminalità. Alcuni settori economici si rivelano maggiormente 
esposti alle infiltrazioni criminali: sono altamente vulnerabili il settore delle costruzioni e la sanità. 
I trasporti, l’energia, lo smaltimento di rifiuti, IT e telecomunicazioni sono tutti settori con un rischio 
di infiltrazione criminale medio/alto, sebbene con alcune differenze tra i paesi. L’industria mineraria 
è un settore altamente vulnerabile nei paesi in cui l’attività estrattiva è ancora presente. Gli appalti 
pubblici relativi al settore della difesa risultano essere poco trasparenti. I servizi in ambito sociale ed 
educativo emergono come un nuovo settore in cui gli appalti pubblici stanno diventando sempre più 
sensibili alle infiltrazioni criminali. La vulnerabilità di diversi paesi è strettamente legata al livello di 
corruzione e di illegalità dei governi locali e delle aziende statali.
Ogni fase dell’intera procedura d’appalto (fase precedente alla pubblicazione del bando di gara, 
procedura, e fase successiva alla aggiudicazione) è soggetta al rischio di infiltrazione criminale. 
Tuttavia, nella fase precedente l’inizio della procedura di appalto, il momento di stesura del bando 
è considerato altamente vulnerabile in quasi la metà dei paesi e non risulta semplice adottare delle 
contro-misure. Questo è dovuto alla allocazione di fondi per rispondere a bisogni non esistenti 
appositamente ‘fabbricati’, nonché alla diffusione di informazioni riservate relative al bando di gara 
allo scopo di favorire alcuni partecipanti. 
La mancanza di chiarezza del capitolato d’appalto e la possibilità di favorire offerte economiche basse 
grazie ad una ampia possibilità di aumentare l’ammontare del contratto in un momento successivo 
all’aggiudicazione sono spesso osservate nella maggioranza dei paesi.  
La fase dello svolgimento dell’appalto è altamente regolamentata. La procedura di selezione, 
tuttavia, presenta un rischio medio/alto nel 60% dei paesi dovuto a una scelta non-obiettiva e 
inadeguata dei criteri di selezione e alla manipolazione della commissione di valutazione. Inoltre, 
l’abuso di azioni legali da parte dei partecipanti a un appalto appare essere un concreto rischio nella 
maggioranza dei paesi. 
La fase di post-appalto si è rivelata essere al più alto livello di rischio. La stazione appaltante sembra 
dimenticare il contratto una volta che esso è stato assegnato, e nella maggior parte dei paesi non 
sono previste autorità incaricate di monitorare l’esecuzione del contratto.
La bassa qualità dei materiali usati, l’aumento fittizio del volume dei costi e del lavoro, e i ritardi 
nell’esecuzione dei lavori sono tutti problemi diffusi, particolarmente - ma non esclusivamente - in 
relazione ai lavori pubblici.
Misure preventive
In conseguenza ai vari rischi che interessano l’intera procedura degli appalti pubblici, il sistema di 
prevenzione è piuttosto complesso e in costante evoluzione. Esso include istituzioni e strumenti 
preventivi.
Oltre al ruolo proprio delle corti dei conti nel monitorare l’uso dei fondi pubblici, esiste un’ampia 
gamma di istituzioni negli Stati Membri, focalizzate sulla prevenzione della corruzione e del crimine 
organizzato, le cui azioni riguardano gli appalti pubblici.
Alcuni Stati Membri hanno enti specifici incaricati di contrastare il crimine e l’illegalità negli appalti, 
sebbene vi siano delle differenze tra i paesi.
Per quanto riguarda gli strumenti preventivi, i Paesi Bassi e l’Italia vantano misure specifiche 
finalizzate a monitorare le imprese, il loro proprietari e i legali rappresentanti. In Italia, questo genere 
di controlli sono svolti nell’ambito della legislazione anti-mafia.
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I Red flag sono strumenti emergenti tra i vari utilizzati al fine di monitorare le condotte illegali negli 
appalti pubblici. Consistono in segnali d’allerta su questioni che potenzialmente indicano la presenza 
di corruzione, condotte illegali, e frodi. Benché questi indicatori siano considerati utili segnali del 
rischio di corruzione, solo otto paesi usano qualche tipologia di red flag con specificità nazionali.
White lists e black lists sono usate in 14 Stati Membri. Le prime funzionano come una condizione 
di pre-selezione delle imprese che intendono partecipare a un appalto, le seconde comportano 
l’esclusione di imprese e persone fisiche dalle procedure di gara. In tutti i paesi, ad eccezione della 
Romania, questi strumenti sono utilizzati e gestiti da autorità pubbliche. 
Nonostante vi sia un generale accordo sull’utilità di questi strumenti come incentivi per le imprese a 
conformarsi ai dettami normativi e come sanzione reputazionale, il loro utilizzo non è ancora molto 
diffuso a causa delle difficoltà di gestione (rischi di uso distorto e difficoltà nella definizione di chiari 
criteri e regole per l’esercizio del diritto d’appello).
I database sono uno strumento decisivo per la condivisione di informazioni tra le varie unità delle 
forze dell’ordine. Con eccezione dell’Italia e dei Paesi Bassi, l’uso dei database come strumento 
investigativo sulle imprese non è al momento molto comune. La messa a punto di un meccanismo 
di condivisione delle informazioni comune tra gli Stati Membri non è tra le priorità, a causa della 
mancanza di regole comuni a livello europeo e di un limitato accesso dei competitors stranieri alle 
gare d’appalto. Il mercato degli appalti pubblici rimane un mercato nazionale.
 
Misure di controllo nella fase di post-appalto
Le misure di controllo usate nella fase di post-appalto comuni tra gli Stati Membri possono essere 
divise in due gruppi:
OO misure di monitoraggio interno, generalmente effettuato dalla stazione appaltante;
OO misure di monitoraggio esterno, eseguito da istituzioni indipendenti ed esterne (come le corti 
dei conti, le agenzie delle entrate, gli ispettorati del lavoro, etc.), che generalmente focalizzano la 
propria attenzione sugli aspetti economici e finanziari, sulla trasparenza dei conti, sulla conformità 
con le leggi sul lavoro, etc. 
Inoltre, solo l’Italia vanta sistemi di controllo focalizzati sulle pratiche illecite che possono essere 
riscontrate durante l’esecuzione dei contratti pubblici. Oltre a questo, l’Italia è l’unico Stato Membro 
con unità speciali delle forze dell’ordine incaricate di svolgere i controlli e le attività investigative in 
relazione alle grandi opere pubbliche. Tutti gli altri Stati Membri non fanno distinzione tra istituzioni di 
controllo e/o monitoraggio in relazione al tipo di lavoro pubblico.  
Due terzi degli Stati Membri hanno forze dell’ordine specializzati nell’investigare e individuare atti di 
corruzione in vari settori economici, tra cui gli appalti pubblici. Metà di questi paesi hanno anche uffici 
del pubblico ministero specializzati e incaricati di perseguire la corruzione. 
Accanto a queste istituzioni, un terzo dei paesi ha forze dell’ordine istituite specificamente per 
investigare gravi reati legati alla criminalità organizzata e/o crimini economici e finanziari. La Slovenia, 
inoltre, vanta un ufficio speciale del pubblico ministero responsabile delle investigazioni di gravi reati 
commessi nell’ambito degli appalti pubblici/concessioni.
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Kopsavilkums
Projekts „Brīdinājums par noziedzību” („Warning on Crime”) (WOC) (www.warningoncrime.eu) 
īstenots ar Eiropas Komisijas Migrācijas un iekšlietu ģenerāldirektorāta (DG HOME) atbalstu 
programmas „Noziedzības profilakse un apkarošana” (ISEC) ietvaros.
Tas ir salīdzinošs pētījums par noziedzības iefiltrēšanos un korupciju publiskajos iepirkumos un 
aptver visas dalībvalstis, izņemot Beļģiju, Kipru un Grieķiju.
Projekta mērķis ir salīdzināt publisko iepirkumu neaizsargātību 25 dalībvalstīs, kā arī pieņemtos 
tiesību aktus un pasākumus tās novēršanai un apkarošanai, lai noskaidrotu, kas padara publiskos 
iepirkumus par auglīgas sadarbības starp balto apkaklīšu noziedzniekiem, neuzticamām valsts 
amatpersonām un noziedzīgu organizāciju locekļiem pamatu. Īpaša uzmanība veltīta lielajiem un 
pārrobežu publiskās lietošanas projektiem.
Ziņojums ir sadalīts četrās nodaļās. Pirmajā nodaļā atspoguļots pieejamais tiesiskais regulējums 
nelikumību apkarošanai publiskajos iepirkumos; otrajā nodaļā sniegts publisko iepirkumu 
neaizsargātības novērtējums; trešajā nodaļā aprakstīti dalībvalstīs ieviestie profilaktiskie pasākumi 
un ceturtajā nodaļā analizēti paredzētie kontroles pasākumi pēciepirkuma posmā.
Tiesiskais regulējums0
Nelikumību apkarošana publiskajos iepirkumos, izmantojot tiesību aktus, ietver dažādas tiesību 
normas un ieteikuma tiesību instrumentus. Projekta uzmanības centrā ir četras jomas – noziedzīgās 
organizācijas, kukuļošana, publisko iepirkumu tiesību akti un godīguma pakti.
Visās valstīs tika pētīta noziedzīgo organizāciju kriminalizācija saskaņā ar 2008. gada 24. oktobra 
Padomes Pamatlēmumu 2008/841/TI par cīņu pret organizēto noziedzību, un lielākajā daļā valstu 
šis noziedzīgais nodarījums varētu būt līdzeklis, lai sodītu grupas, ar noteikumu, ka tās atbilst likumā 
noteiktajām prasībām, proti, grupa, kas veic noziedzīgas darbības, korupciju ieskaitot, saistībā ar 
publiskajiem iepirkumiem. Turklāt Itālijas tiesību sistēmā paredzēts tāds noziedzīgs nodarījums kā 
mafioza apvienība, kurā skaidri norādīti publiskie iepirkumi. Austrijas likumdošanā ir ietverts tāds 
noziedzīgs nodarījums kā noziedzīga apvienība, kas var ietvert arī korupciju. Tomēr dalībvalstu tiesu 
prakse ir ļoti ierobežota.
Tiesiskais regulējums attiecībā uz kukuļošanu un tirgošanos ar ietekmi dalībvalstīs ir bijis pakļauts 
evolūcijas un tuvināšanās procesam, un, neskatoties uz to, ka nepilnības un pretrunas joprojām 
pastāv, vispārējā reakcija ir daudz plašāka nekā pirms dažiem gadiem. 
Jaunajās direktīvās attiecībā uz publiskajiem iepirkumiem uzmanība koncentrēta uz profilaksi, 
caurredzamību un pārskatatbildību kā līdzekļiem nelikumību samazināšanai publiskajos 
iepirkumos. Pētījums liecina, ka noteikumu pārņemšana par izslēgšanas un apakšuzņēmumu 
līgumu slēgšanas iemesliem dažādās valstīs būtiski atšķiras. Daļēji tas ir saistīts ar to, ka publiskais 
iepirkums ir valsts mēroga tirgus, kam nākas saskarties ar vietējiem draudiem nelikumību veidā, kā 
arī jāņem vērā tehniskāki apsvērumi attiecībā uz to, cik lielu rīcības brīvību likumdevējs plāno atstāt 
līgumslēdzējai iestādei.
Lielāku nozīmi cīņā ar pretlikumībām publiskajos iepirkumos gūst  ieteikuma tiesību instrumenti. 
Godīguma paktu, kas ir  Transparency International (TI) izstrādāts instruments un sastāv no 
vienošanās, ko paraksta līgumslēdzēja iestāde, pretendenti un neatkarīgs uzraugs, kuri apņemas 
atturēties no jebkāda veida korupcijas un slepenas vienošanās, drīzumā tiks testēts 11 valstīs 17 ES 
finansētu projektu ietvaros. Itālijai ir sena pieredze ar likumības paktiem, kas tiek parakstīti daudzu 
gadu garumā un uzliek pusēm par pienākumu ieviest tiesību normas korupcijas un organizētās 
noziedzības apkarošanai un godīguma un caurredzamības veicināšanai publisko iepirkumu ciklā. 
Lielajā publiskās lietošanas projektā – Turīnas-Lionas ātrgaitas dzelzceļa līnija, kura izpēte tikusi 
veikta, izmantots ieteikuma tiesību instruments (reglement des contracts), lai nodrošinātu 
kopīgus noteikumus šim publiskās būvniecības projektam, neatkarīgi no iesaistīto pretendentu 
valstspiederības. It īpaši tas attiecas uz cīņas ar Itālijas mafiju kontroli attiecībā uz visiem darbu 
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izpildē iesaistītajiem pretendentiem. Tomēr, kā ar lielāko daļu ieteikuma tiesību instrumentiem, tas ir 
strīdīgs jautājums, vai sūdzību gadījumā tam būs saistoša nozīme administratīvajā tiesā.
Publiska iepirkuma cikla neaizsargātība
Noziedzība apdraud publisko iepirkumu ciklu. Dažas saimnieciskās darbības nozares ir tai vairāk 
pakļautas – ļoti neaizsargāta ir būvniecība un veselības aprūpe. Transports, enerģētika, atkritumu 
apsaimniekošana, IT un telekomunikācijas – tās visas ir vidēja/augsta riska nozares, ar atšķirībām 
dažādās valstīs. Valstīs, kurās joprojām eksistē iežguves rūpniecība, šī nozare tiek uzskatīta par 
ļoti neaizsargātu. Publiskajiem iepirkumiem saistībā ar aizsardzības nozari trūkst caurredzamības. 
Sociālie pakalpojumi un izglītība parādījusies kā jauna nozare, kurā publiskie iepirkumi kļūst aizvien 
neaizsargātāki. Vairāku izpētāmo valstu neaizsargātība ir cieši saistīta ar korupcijas un nelikumību 
ietekmi uz pašvaldībām un valsts uzņēmumiem.
Neaizsargāts ir viss iepirkumu cikls (pirmsiepirkuma, iepirkuma un pēciepirkuma posmi). Vienlaikus, 
pirmsiepirkuma posmā plānošanas stadija pirms procedūras uzsākšanas tiek uzskatīta par ļoti 
neaizsargātu gandrīz pusē valstu un atspoguļo dažas problēmas attiecībā uz pretpasākumu 
pieņemšanu. Tas viss ir saistīts ar vajadzību un finanšu līdzekļu piešķiršanas manipulācijām, kā arī 
informācijas izpaušanas risku.
Lielākajā daļā valstu vērojams skaidru iepirkuma specifikāciju trūkums un zemu piedāvājuma cenu 
iesniegšana, kam seko plašas iespējas paplašināt līgumu pēc uzvaras iepirkumā.
Iepirkuma konkursa posms ir stingri reglamentēts. Neskatoties uz to, atlases procedūra atspoguļo 
augstu/vidēju risku 60% valstu, jo nav objektīva vai atbilstīga atlases kritēriju novērtējuma un 
iespējam manipulācija ar novērtēšanas padomi. Tiesu darbību ļaunprātīga izmantošana, ko īsteno 
pretendenti, arī ir konkrēts risks vairumā valstu.
Kopumā posms pēc iepirkuma konkursa ir izrādījies visriskantākais. Izskatās, ka līgumslēdzēja iestāde 
ir aizmirsusi par līgumu pēc tā parakstīšanas, un vairumā valstu nav iestādes, kas uzraudzītu līguma 
izpildi. Plaši izplatītas ir tādas problēmas kā zemas kvalitātes materiāli, uzpūsts darbu apjoms un 
izmaksas un kavēšanās darbu izpildē, jo īpaši, bet ne tikai saistībā ar publiskās lietošanas projektiem. 
Profilakses pasākumi
Sakarā ar dažādiem riskiem, kas ietekmē publiskā iepirkuma ciklu, profilakses sistēma ir samērā 
sarežģīta un nepārtraukti attīstās. Tajā ietilpst profilakses institūcijas un līdzekļi.
Līdztekus revīzijas palātas lomai valsts līdzekļu izmantošanas uzraudzībā, dalībvalstīs eksistē daudz 
dažādu institūciju, kas vērstas uz korupcijas un organizētās noziedzības novēršanu un kuru darbība 
skar publiskos iepirkumus. Dažās dalībvalstīs ir īpašas institūcijas, kuru uzdevums ir cīnīties ar 
noziedzību un nelikumībām publiskajos iepirkumos, lai gan ar atšķirībām dažādās valstīs.
Ciktāl tas attiecas uz profilakses līdzekļiem, Nīderlande un Itālija var lepoties ar konkrētiem 
pasākumiem uzņēmumu, to īpašnieku un likumīgo pārstāvju uzraudzīšanai. Itālijā šādas pārbaudes 
tiek veiktas saskaņā ar mafijas apkarošanas likumdošanu.
Sarkani karogi parādās starp dažādiem līdzekļiem, ko izmanto amatpārkāpumu uzraudzībai 
publiskajos iepirkumos. Sarkanie karogi ir brīdinājuma signāli par iespējamām problēmām, kas gaida 
risinājumu, piemēram, korupcija, amatpārkāpumi un krāpšana. Lai gan šie rādītāji tiek uzskatīti par 
noderīgiem korupcijas riska pareģotājiem, tikai astoņas valstis izmanto dažus sarkano karogu veidus 
ar valstij raksturīgajām iezīmēm.  
Aizlieguma pasākumi tiek izmantoti 14 dalībvalstīs. Baltie saraksti darbojas kā priekšatlases 
nosacījumi, lai izvēlētos uzņēmumus, kas piedalīsies iepirkuma konkursa procesā, savukārt melnie 
saraksti kalpo par iemeslu kārtībai, kas liedz piedalīties konkursā uzņēmumiem un fiziskām 
personām. Visās valstīs, izņemot Rumāniju, šo līdzekļus pārvalda valsts institūcijas. Neskatoties 
uz to, ka šo līdzekļu lietderība, lai stimulētu likuma normu ievērošanu un kā reputācijas sankcija ir 
vispāratzīta, to izmantošanas vēl nav plaši izplatīta sakarā ar praktiskajām grūtībām to pārvaldīšanā 
(manipulācijas risks un grūtības skaidri definēt pārsūdzības kritērijus un noteikumus).
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Būtisks informācijas apmaiņas instruments likuma piemērošanas jomā ir datubāzes. Izņemot Itāliju 
un Nīderlandi, datubāzes uzņēmumu uzraudzīšanai vēl netiek bieži izmantotas. Sakarā ar to, ka 
nav vienotu noteikumu ES līmenī un valstu publisko iepirkumu tirgos ar ierobežotu piekļuvi ārvalstu 
pretendentiem, vienota informācijas apmaiņas mehānisma par uzņēmumiem izveide nav tuvākajā 
dienas kārtībā.
Kontroles pasākumi pēciepirkuma posmā 
Kontroles pasākumi, kas ir kopēji visas dalībvalstīs pēciepirkuma posmā, var tikt iedalīti divās grupās:  
OO iekšējā uzraudzība, ko parasti īsteno līgumslēdzēja iestāde; 
OO ārējā uzraudzība, ko veic neatkarīgas un ārējās institūcijas (piemēram, revīzijas palātas, finanšu vai 
nodokļu iestādes, darba inspekcijas u.c.), kas parasti koncentrē savu uzmanību uz ekonomiskajiem 
un finanšu aspektiem, kontu pārredzamību, darba likumdošanas ievērošanu u.tml.  
Bez tam, Itālija var lepoties ar kontroles sistēmām, kas vērstas uz ļaunprātīgām darbībām, ko 
iespējams novērot publiskā līguma izpildes laikā. Turklāt Itālija ir vienīgā dalībvalsts, kurā īpašas 
tiesībsargājošās struktūrvienības, kas ir atbildīgas par uzraudzības un izmeklēšanas darbībām 
saistībā ar lielajiem publiskās lietošanas projektiem. Visās pārējās dalībvalstīs netiek šķirots starp 
kontroles un/vai uzraudzības institūcijām – pamatojoties uz publiskās lietošanas projektu veida un 
līdz ar to arī publiskā līguma apjoma.
Divās trešdaļās dalībvalstu tiesībsargājošās iestādes ir specializējušās korupcijas atklāšanā dažādās 
tautsaimniecības nozarēs, publiskos iepirkumus ieskaitot. Pusē šo valstu ir arī specializētās 
prokuratūras, kas īsteno ar kriminālvajāšanu saistībā ar korupciju.
Līdztekus šīm iestādēm, vienā trešdaļā valstu ir īpašas policijas vienības, kas ir īpaši izveidotas, 
lai izmeklētu nopietnus organizētās noziedzības nodarījumus un/vai ekonomiskos un finanšu 
noziegumus. Piemēram, Slovēnija lepojas ar īpašu prokuratūru, kas ir atbildīga par nopietnu 
noziegumu veidu izmeklēšanu publiskajos iepirkumos/koncesijās. 
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Streszczenie
W „Ostrzeżenie o przestępczości” (WOC) projekt (www.warningoncrime.eu) został zrealizowany przy 
wsparciu finansowym Komisji Europejskiej, Dyrekcji Generalnej ds Migracji i Spraw Wewnętrznych 
(DG HOME), w ramach Programu Profilaktyki i zwalczanie przestępczości (ISEC).
Badanie to studium porównawcze na infiltrację przestępczej i korupcji w zamówieniach publicznych, 
z udziałem wszystkich państw członkowskich (MSS), z wyjątkiem Belgii, Cypru i Grecji.
Celem jest porównanie podatności zamówień publicznych w 25 państwach członkowskich, a także 
ustawodawstwa i środków przyjętych w celu zapobiegania i zwalczania go, w celu wyjaśnienia, 
co sprawia, że  zamówienia publiczne na podstawę owocnej współpracy pomiędzy przestępców 
w białych kołnierzykach, niewiernych funkcjonariuszy publicznych oraz członkowie organizacji 
przestępczych. Szczególną uwagę przywiązuje się do dużych, jak i transgranicznych robót 
publicznych.
Raport podzielony jest na cztery rozdziały. Rozdział 1 odbija się na dostępnych ram prawnych 
dotyczących przeciwdziałania nielegalność w zamówieniach publicznych; Rozdział 2 przedstawia 
ocenę podatności zamówień publicznych; Rozdział 3 zawiera opis środków zapobiegawczych 
wdrożonych w państwach członkowskich; oraz rozdział 4 analizuje środki kontroli przewidziane w 
fazie po przetargu.
Ramy prawne
Przeciwdziałanie nielegalność w zamówieniach publicznych przez przepisy prawa obejmuje różne 
przepisy prawne i narzędzia prawa miękkiego. Projekt koncentruje się na czterech obszarach: 
organizacji przestępczych, przekupstwa, prawa zamówień publicznych, i paktów uczciwości.
Wszystkie kraje studiował kryminalizacji organizacji przestępczych, zgodnie z decyzją ramową 
Rady 2008/841 / WSiSW z dnia 24 października 2008 roku w sprawie zwalczania przestępczości 
zorganizowanej, a większość z nich przestępstwo może stanowić narzędzie do karania grupy 
- pod warunkiem, że spełniają one wymogi określone przez prawo - które działają działalności 
przestępczej, w tym korupcji, związanych z zamówieniami publicznymi. Ponadto włoski system 
prawny przewiduje konkretnie przestępstwa mafijnym stowarzyszenia, które wyraźnie wspomina o 
zamówienia publiczne. Ustawodawstwo austriackie obejmuje przestępstwo związku przestępczego, 
który może również obejmować korupcji. Jednak orzecznictwo jest bardzo ograniczona w całej 
państwach członkowskich.
Ramy prawne w sprawie korupcji i handlu wpływami została poddana procesowi ewolucji i zbliżenia 
w całej państwach członkowskich, i chociaż luk i sprzeczności pozostają ogólne wyniki odpowiedzi o 
wiele bardziej wszechstronny niż kilka lat temu.
Nowe dyrektywy dotyczące zamówień publicznych skupić uwagę na profilaktykę, przejrzystości i 
odpowiedzialności jako środek do zmniejszenia nielegalność w zamówieniach publicznych. Z badań 
wynika, że  transpozycja przepisów dotyczących podstaw wykluczenia i podwykonawstwa różni się 
znacznie w poszczególnych krajach. Jest to częściowo związane z ideą, że zamówienia publiczne to 
ogólnopolski rynek, który musi stawić czoła lokalnych zagrożeń w zakresie niezgodności, a także 
bierze pod uwagę rozważenie bardziej technicznych na stopień uznania ustawodawca zamierza 
wyjechać do zamawiającego.
Elastyczne instrumenty prawne są coraz większe znaczenie w zwalczaniu nielegalność w 
zamówieniach publicznych. Integrity pakty - narzędzie opracowane przez Transparency International 
(TI), składające się z umowy podpisanej przez instytucję zamawiającą, oferentów i niezależnego 
monitora, które zobowiązują się do powstrzymania się od wszelkich form korupcji i zmowy - to 
ma być testowane w 11 kraje na 17 projektów finansowanych ze środków UE. Włochy mają 
wieloletnie doświadczenie w zakresie legalności pakty podpisane w ciągu lat, które zobowiązują 
strony do przyjęcia konkretnych działań w celu wdrożenia przepisów prawnych, zwalczanie korupcji 
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i przestępczości zorganizowanej oraz wzmocnienie integralności i przejrzystości w cyklu zamówień 
publicznych. W głównych prac publicznych studiował, Lyon-w Turynie szybkich linii kolejowych, 
instrument miękkiego prawa (Reglement des umowy) zostały wykorzystane do zapewnienia 
wspólnych zasad dla tej pracy publicznej, niezależnie od obywatelstwa oferentów uczestniczących. 
W szczególności obejmuje włoskie kontroli anty-mafijne do wszystkich oferentów biorących udział w 
realizacji robót. Jednakże, jak w przypadku większości instrumentów prawa miękkiego, jest wątpliwe, 
czy to może mieć wartość wiążącą do sądu administracyjnego w przypadku reklamacji.
Podatność cyklu zamówień publicznych
Cykl życia zamówień publicznych jest narażone na przestępstwa. Niektóre sektory działalności 
okazują się być bardziej narażone do nich: budowa i opieka zdrowotna są bardzo wrażliwe. Transport, 
energia, utylizacji odpadów, telekomunikacji oraz IT i wszystkie sektory są średnie / wysokiego 
ryzyka, z różnicami w poszczególnych krajach. Dla tych krajów, które wciąż mają górnictwo, sektor 
ten jest uważany za bardzo wrażliwy. Zamówienia publiczne związane z sektorem obronnym brakuje 
przejrzystości. Opieki społecznej i edukacji staje się nowego sektora, gdzie zamówień publicznych 
staje się coraz bardziej zagrożone. Luka w kilku krajach objętych dochodzeniem jest ściśle spleciona z 
narażeniem na korupcję i nielegalności samorządów i przedsiębiorstw państwowych.
Cały cykl Zamówień (fazy pre-miękkie, delikatne, a po przetargu) jest zagrożony. W fazie wstępnej 
przetargu, jednak na etapie planowania - ten poprzedzający początek procedury - jest uważane 
za bardzo wrażliwe w niemal połowie krajów, a niektóre funkcje problemów dotyczących przyjęcia 
środków zaradczych. Wszystko to z powodu manipulacji potrzeb i finansowania alokacji, a także na 
ryzyko ujawnienia informacji.
Brak jasności w specyfikacji przetargowej oraz złożenie niskiej cenie ofertowej towarzyszą obszerne 
możliwości rozszerzenia umowy w fazie post-nagrody są często obserwowane w większości krajów.
Faza oferta jest ściśle regulowana. Procedura wyboru, jednak charakteryzuje się wysoką / średnim 
ryzykiem w 60% krajów z powodu braku obiektywnej lub nieodpowiedniej wagi kryteriów wyboru i 
manipulacji pokładzie oceny. Niewłaściwe, zbyt działań sądowych przez oferentów wydaje się być 
konkretnym ryzykiem w większości krajów.
Ogólnie faza po przetargu okaże się najbardziej ryzykowne. Zamawiający zdaje się zapominać umowy 
po jej podpisaniu, a w większości krajów nie ma władzy, aby monitorować wykonanie umowy.
Niskiej jakości materiał, napompowane głośności pracy i koszty, a opóźnienia w realizacji robót są 
powszechne problemy, zwłaszcza - ale nie tylko - w odniesieniu do robót publicznych.
Środki zapobiegawcze
Ze względu na różne ryzyka związanego z cyklem zamówień publicznych, system zapobiegania jest 
dość złożone i stale się rozwija. Zawiera ciała i narzędzi profilaktycznych.
Oprócz roli odgrywanej przez sąd kontroli w zakresie monitorowania wykorzystania środków 
publicznych, istnieje szeroka gama organów w państwach członkowskich, ukierunkowanych 
na zapobieganie korupcji i przestępczości zorganizowanej, a którego skarga dotyczy zamówień 
publicznych. Niektóre państwa członkowskie mają szczególne ciała w miejscu, którego zadaniem 
jest przeciwdziałanie przestępczości i nielegalność w zamówieniach publicznych, choć z różnic w 
poszczególnych krajach.
Jeśli chodzi o narzędzia prewencyjne są zainteresowane, Holandia i Włochy pochwalić szczególne 
środki zmierzające do firm i ich właścicieli i przedstawicieli prawnych monitorowanie. We Włoszech, 
kontrole te przeprowadzane są w ramach przepisów dotyczących zwalczania mafii.
Pojawiają się czerwone flagi spośród różnych narzędzi służących do monitorowania wykroczeń 
w zamówieniach publicznych. Czerwone flagi są sygnały ostrzegawcze dotyczące potencjalnych 
problemów do rozwiązania, takie jak korupcja, przestępstwa i oszustwa. Mimo że wskaźniki te są 
uważane za użyteczne predyktory na ryzyko korupcji, tylko osiem krajów stosuje niektóre rodzaje 
czerwone flagi z uwarunkowań krajowych.
Środki wykluczeniach są wykorzystywane w 14 państwach członkowskich. Białe listy pracować 
jako warunek preselekcji do wyboru firm, które wezmą udział w procesie przetargowym, natomiast 
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czarne listy pociąga za sobą procedurę, która wyklucza firm i osób. We wszystkich krajach, ale w 
Rumunii, narzędzia te są zarządzane przez władze publiczne. Mimo ogólnego uznania przydatności 
tych narzędzi jako zachęta do przestrzegania przepisów prawa, jak i reputacji sankcji, ich stosowanie 
nie jest jeszcze powszechne ze względu na praktyczne trudności w zarządzaniu nimi (ryzyko 
manipulacji i trudności w określeniu jasnych kryteriów i Zasady odwołania).
Bazy danych są istotnym narzędziem w celu wymiany informacji na temat egzekwowania prawa. 
Z wyjątkiem Włoch i Holandii, korzystanie z baz danych do monitorowania firm nie jest jeszcze 
tak powszechne. Ze względu na brak wspólnych zasad na szczeblu UE oraz do krajowych rynków 
zamówień publicznych z ograniczonym dostępem dla zagranicznych oferentów, set-up wspólnego 
mechanizmu wymiany informacji o spółkach nie jest na porządku dziennym.
Środki kontroli w fazie po przetargu
Środki kontroli, które są powszechne w wszystkich państwach członkowskich, w fazie po przetargu 
można podzielić na dwie grupy:
OO Monitoring wewnętrzny, zwykle wykonywane przez instytucję zamawiającą;
OO Monitorowanie zewnętrznych, prowadzonych przez niezależnych i zewnętrznych instytucji (takich 
jak trybunały obrachunkowe, agencji finansowych lub podatkowych, inspekcji pracy, etc.), które na 
ogół skupiają swoją uwagę na aspektach ekonomicznych i finansowych, przejrzystości rachunków, 
zgodnie z przepisami prawa pracy, itp.
Poza tym, tylko Włochy pochwalić systemów kontroli ukierunkowanych na nieuczciwych praktyk, 
które można zaobserwować w trakcie realizacji zamówienia. Ponadto, Włochy są jedynym MS z 
jednostek specjalnych ścigania odpowiedzialnych za przeprowadzanie kontroli i działań śledczych 
w stosunku do głównych robót publicznych. Wszystkie pozostałe państwa członkowskie nie 
wprowadza rozróżnienia - między kontrolą i / lub organów monitorujących - w zależności od typu 
robót publicznych, a tym samym od kwoty zamówienia publicznego.
Dwie trzecie państwach członkowskich dysponują organy ścigania wyspecjalizowane w wykrywaniu 
korupcji w różnych sektorach gospodarki, w tym zamówień publicznych. Połowa z tych krajów są 
również wyposażone biuro prokuratora wyspecjalizowanego za ściganie korupcji.
Wraz z tych organów, jedna trzecia krajów ma specjalnych jednostek policji w miejscu, które zostały 
wyraźnie określone w celu zbadania poważną przestępczością zorganizowaną i / lub przestępstw 
gospodarczych i finansowych. Słowenia, w szczególności, oferuje do spraw dochodzenia poważnych 
form przestępczości w publicznych zamówień / koncesji Prokuratury Specjalnego.
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Sumário Executivo 
O projeto “War on Crime” (WOC) (www.warningoncrime.eu) foi realizado com o apoio financeiro da 
Direcção-Geral da Migração e dos Assuntos Internos (DG HOME) da Comissão Europeia, no âmbito 
do Programa de Prevenção e Luta contra a Criminalidade (ISEC).
A presente investigação é um estudo comparativo sobre a permeabilidade à criminalidade e à 
corrupção na contratação pública, envolvendo todos os Estados-Membros (EM) com excepção da 
Bélgica, Chipre e Grécia.
O objetivo foi comparar da vulnerabilidade dos contratos públicos em 25 Estados-Membros, bem 
como a legislação e as medidas de prevenção e de combate, com vista à compreensão sobre o que 
torna a contratação pública um terreno fértil para uma cooperação bem-sucedida entre criminosos 
de colarinho branco, funcionários públicos desonestos e membros de organizações criminosas. Foi 
dada especial atenção a obras públicas transfronteiriças e de grande envergadura.
O relatório divide-se em quatro capítulos. O Capítulo 1 debruça-se sobre o quadro jurídico existente 
no que se refere ao combate contra ilegalidades nos contratos públicos. O Capítulo 2 apresenta uma 
avaliação da vulnerabilidade dos contratos públicos. O Capítulo 3 descreve as medidas preventivas 
aplicadas nos Estados-Membros e o Capítulo 4 analisa as medidas de controlo previstas durante a 
fase de pós-contratação.
Enquadramento jurídico
A prevenção de ilegalidades nos contratos públicos envolve diferentes normas legais e ferramentas 
de soft law. O projecto centrou-se em quatro áreas: criminalidade organizada, corrupção na 
contratação pública e pactos de integridade.
Todos os países estudados criminalizam a associação criminosa em conformidade com a Decisão-
Quadro 2008/841/JAI do Conselho, de 24 de Outubro de 2008 sobre o combate à criminalidade 
organizada. Na maioria dos referidos Estados, a criminalização pode representar uma ferramenta 
que permite punir grupos que, preenchendo os requisitos estabelecidos por lei, levem a cabo 
atividades criminosas, incluindo corrupção, relacionadas com contratos públicos. O ordenamento 
jurídico italiano prevê especificamente o delito de associação mafiosa, que menciona explicitamente 
os contratos públicos. A legislação austríaca inclui um crime de associação criminosa que também 
pode abranger a corrupção. No entanto, a jurisprudência é ainda muito limitada entre os Estados-
Membros.
O quadro jurídico relativo a corrupção e tráfico de influências tem vindo a passar por um processo 
de evolução e aproximação entre os vários Estados-Membros e, apesar de se verificarem lacunas 
e contradições, os resultados globais têm se revelado muito mais abrangentes do que alguns anos 
atrás.
Novas directivas relativas à contratação pública têm vindo a concentrar a atenção sobre a prevenção, 
a transparência e a responsabilização como meios para a redução da ilegalidade nos contratos 
públicos. A investigação demostra que a transposição das normas relativas aos motivos de exclusão 
e subcontratação varia significativamente entre os países. Isto deve-se, em parte, à concepção de 
que a contratação pública é um mercado nacional, que necessita de fazer face a riscos locais, no que 
se refere a irregularidades legais. Porém, é importante também levar em conta uma consideração 
mais técnica sobre o grau de discricionariedade que o legislador pretende deixar à entidade 
adjudicante.
Os instrumentos de soft law têm vindo a ganhar mais relevância na luta contra irregularidades nos 
contratos públicos. Os pactos de Integridade - uma ferramenta desenvolvida pela Transparência 
Internacional (TI) que consiste num acordo assinado entre entidade adjudicante, os licitantes e um 
monitor independente, no qual se comprometem a evitar qualquer forma de corrupção e conluio - 
estão prestes a ser testados em 11 países através de 17 projectos financiados pela UE. Itália tem 
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uma longa experiência em pactos de legalidade assinados ao longo de anos, nos quais as partes 
se comprometem a ações específicas, de forma a implementar regras legais para o combate ao 
crime organizado e à corrupção, bem como o reforço da integridade e da transparência no ciclo de 
contratos públicos. Numa das obras públicas estudadas, a linha de alta velocidade ferroviária Turim-
Lyon, tem sido utilizado um instrumento de soft law (reglement des contract) que fornece regras 
comuns a esta obra pública, independentemente da nacionalidade dos concorrentes envolvidos. 
Mais especificamente, estende o controlo italiano anti máfia a todos os concorrentes envolvidos na 
execução dos trabalhos. No entanto, como a maioria de instrumentos de soft law, é discutível se 
deve ou não ter um valor vinculativo perante um tribunal administrativo no caso de reclamações.
A vulnerabilidade do ciclo de vida dos contratos públicos
O ciclo de vida dos contratos públicos é vulnerável ao crime. Alguns sectores de actividade revelam-
se mais expostos: construção e saúde, por exemplo, são altamente vulneráveis. Transporte, energia, 
tratamento de resíduos, bem como as TICs e telecomunicações são todos setores de médio/
alto risco, com variações entre os países. Para os Estados que ainda têm indústria minéria, esta é 
considerada altamente vulnerável. OS contratos públicos relacionados com a indústria de defesa 
carecem de transparência. Os sectores doscserviços sociais e da educação estão a revelar-se como 
uma nova indústria onde os contratos públicos se tornam cada vez mais vulneráveis. 
A vulnerabilidade de vários dos Estados estudados está intimamente ligada à exposição à corrupção 
e à ilegalidade dos executivos municipais e empresas estatais.
Todo o ciclo de contratação pública (pré-concurso, concurso, fases pós-concurso) é vulnerável. Na 
fase de pré-concurso, a etapa de planeamento – a que precede ao início do processo de contratação 
- é considerada altamente vulnerável em quase metade dos países e apresenta alguns problemas 
referentes à adopção de medidas preventivas. Tal deve-se à manipulação das necessidades e 
atribuição de financiamento, bem como ao risco de divulgação de informações.
A falta de clareza do caderno de encargos e apresentação de um preço de partida baixo, 
acompanhadas pelas fortes possibilidades de expandir o contrato em fase de pós-concurso são 
frequentemente observadas na maioria dos países.
A fase de contratação é altamente regulada. Contudo, o processo de seleção apresenta riscos 
médios/altos em 60% dos países, devido a critérios de selecção não adequados ou subjectivos e à 
manipulação da grelha de avaliação. A má utilização de acções judiciais por parte dos concorrentes 
também parece ser um risco concreto na maioria dos países.
De modo geral, a fase pós-contratação é a que apresenta mais riscos. As autoridades de supervisão 
tendem a esquecer os contratos depois destes serem assinados e, na maioria dos países, não 
existem autoridades de acompanhamento da execução dos contratos.
Material de má qualidade, volume de trabalho e custos inflacionados, assim como atrasos na 
execução das obras são problemas generalizados, em especial – mas não exclusivamente – no que 
toca a obras públicas.
Medidas Preventivas
Devido aos vários riscos que afectam o ciclo de contratação pública, os sistemas de prevenção são 
bastante complexos e em constante evolução, incluindo órgãos e instrumentos preventivos.
Para além do papel do Tribunal de Contas, existe um leque alargado de entidades nos Estados-
Membros que se concentram na prevenção da corrupção e da criminalidade organizada, cuja esfera 
de acção se aplica à contratação pública. Alguns Estados-Membros têm entidades específicas cujo 
papel é combater o crime e o desrespeito da legalidade na contratação pública, apesar das diferenças 
significativas entre países.
No que se refere a instrumentos de prevenção, os Países Baixos e Itália apresentam medidas 
específicas destinadas a monitorizar empresas, assim como os seus proprietários e representantes 
legais. Em Itália, este controlo é levado a cabo no quadro legal da legislação anti-máfia.
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A sinalização está a emergir no seio das várias ferramentas usadas de monitorização de má conduta 
nos contratos públicos. Consiste em sinais de aviso sobre eventuais questões a ser resolvidas, como 
corrupção, má conduta ou fraude. Apesar destes indicadores serem considerados uma boa forma 
de prever riscos de corrupção, apenas oito países utilizam algum tipo de sinalização, com variações 
nacionais.
Medidas de exclusão são utilizadas em 14 Estados-Membros. Listas brancas funcionam como 
condição de pré-selecção das empresas que podem apresentar propostas, ao passo que listas negras 
espoletam um processo de exclusão de empresas e indivíduos. Em todos os países, com excepção da 
Roménia, estes instrumentos são geridos por autoridades públicas. Apesar do reconhecimento dos 
benefícios destas ferramentas como incentivos para o cumprimento das obrigações legais e como 
uma forma de sanção reputacional, a sua utilização ainda não está generalizada devido a dificuldades 
práticas na sua gestão (risco de manipulação e problemas na definição de critérios claros e regras de 
recurso). Por sua vez, bases de dados são uma ferramenta crucial na partilha de informação sobre 
a aplicação da lei. Com a excepção de Itália e dos Países Baixos, o recurso a bases de dados para 
a monitorização de empresas não são ainda muito utilizadas. Devido à falta de regras comuns ao 
nível comunitário e à existência de mercados nacionais de contratação pública com acesso limitado 
a proponentes estrangeiros, a criação de um mecanismo comum de partilha de informação sobre 
empresas ainda não é vista como uma questão prioritária. 
Medidas de controlo na fase pós-contratação
As medidas de controlo comuns a todos os Estados-Membros na fase pós-contratação podem ser 
divididas em dois grupos:
OO Monitorização interna, geralmente levada a cado pela autoridade contratante;
OO Monitorização externa, conduzida por entidades externas e independentes (como tribunais de 
contas, agências tributárias, inspecção do trabalho, etc.), que em geral concentram a sua atenção 
em aspectos económicos e financeiros, transparência de contas, respeito pelas leis laborais, etc.
Itália promove sistemas de controlo focados em práticas abusivas que só conseguem ser 
identificadas durante a fase de execução do contrato público. Mais, Itália é o único Estado-Membro 
com unidades especiais de cumprimento da legalidade relativamente a obras públicas de grande 
envergadura. Os restantes Estados-Membros não fazem qualquer tipo de distinção entre entidades 
de controlo e de monitorização, com base no tipo de contratação pública e, consequentemente, no 
valor do contrato público.
Dois terços dos Estados-Membros têm órgãos de execução da lei especializados na deteção de 
corrupção em diferentes sectores económicos, incluindo contratação pública. Metade estes países 
têm também um gabinete especializado junto do Ministério Público, encarregado da investigação 
relativa à corrupção.
Para além destas entidades, um terço dos países apresentam unidades especiais de polícia, 
criadas especificamente com o objetivo de investigar criminalidade organizada grave e/ou crimes 
económicos e financeiros. A Eslovénia, em particular, estabeleceu um Gabinete Especial do 
Procurador para a investigação de criminalidade agravada na contratação e concessão públicas. 
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Rezumat
Proiectul “Avertisment privind criminalitatea - corupția și infiltrarea grupărilor infracționale organizate 
în contractele publice” (WOC) (www.warningoncrime.eu) a fost realizat cu sprijinul Comisiei Europene, 
Directoratul General pentru Migrație și Afaceri Interne (DG HOME), în cadrul Programului de Prevenire 
și Combatere a Criminalității și constă într-un studiu comparativ privind corupția în sistemele de 
achiziții publice din toate statele membre UE, exceptând Belgia, Cipru și Grecia.
Obiectivul principal al proiectului îl reprezintă compararea vulnerabilităților diverselor sisteme de 
achiziții publice ale statele membre analizate, dar și a măsurilor legislative adoptate pentru a le 
combate. Scopul final este de a clarifica ce anume face ca acest domeniu al achizițiilor publice să 
devină teren propice pentru colaborarea dintre funcționari corupți și membri ai diferitelor grupuri și 
structuri infracționale. O atenție deosebită a fost acordată lucrărilor publice de anvergură și celor care 
implică cooperare transfrontalieră.  
Raportul cuprinde patru capitole: primul prezintă cadrul legal de combatere a ilegalităților în achizițiile 
publice; capitolul al doilea evaluează gradul de vulnerabilitate al sistemelor de achiziții publice; cel 
de-al treilea descrie măsurile preventive aplicate în statele membre analizate, iar ultimul capitol 
analizează măsurile de control prevăzute pentru etapa post-licitație.
Cadrul legal
Combaterea infracționalității în achizițiile publice prin intermediul prevederilor legale presupune 
existența unor norme juridice și a unor instrumente juridice fără caracter obligatoriu (soft law). 
Proiectul este dezvoltat în patru direcții: structuri infracționale, fapte de corupție, legea achizițiilor 
publice și pacturi de integritate. 
În toate statele analizate în studiu sunt considerate ilegale structurile infracționale, în conformitate 
cu Decizia – cadru a Consiliului 2008/841/JHA din 24 Octombrie 2008 cu privire la combaterea 
criminalității organizate, iar în majoritatea dintre acestea există instrumentele legale pentru 
condamnarea grupurilor care desfășoară activități ilegale, inclusiv fapte de corupție, în achizițiile 
publice. 
În plus, sistemul juridic italian vizează în mod special infracțiunile asociațiilor de tip mafiot, printre 
care și cele din domeniul achizițiilor publice. Legislația din Austria include la categoria infracțiuni și 
asocierea ilegală, aceasta cuprinzând și fapte de corupție. Cu toate acestea, jurisprudența în acest 
domeniu este foarte limitată în statele membre.  
În ce privește darea de mită și traficul de influență, cadrul legal a fost supus unui proces de evoluție 
și armonizare între statele membre și, cu toate că mai există încă lacune și incosecvențe, în general 
reacția la astfel de infracțiuni a devenit mult mai promptă în ultimii ani.
Noile directive privind achizițiile publice atrag atenția asupra prevenției, transparentizării și 
responsabilizării, ca mijloace pentru combaterea ilegalităților în achizițiile publice.
Din cercetare reiese faptul că transpunerea la nivel național a regulamentului privind motivele de 
excludere de la licitație și subcontractare variază de la caz la caz. Aceasta se datorează în parte și 
faptului că achizițiie publice reprezintă o piață națională care trebuie să preîntâmpine potențialele 
probleme de corupție de la nivel local și în același timp să ia în calcul o abordare mai tehnică a 
gradului de autonomie pe care legiuitorul intenționează să o lase autorității contractante.
Instrumentele juridice fără caracter obligatoriu capătă, astfel, o importanță din ce în ce mai mare 
în combaterea infracționalității în achizițiile publice. Pactele de integritate –  instrument creat de 
Transparency International (TI) -  constau într-un acord semnat între autoritatea contractantă, 
furnizor și un terț independent cu rol de supraveghere, prin care semnatarii se angajează să se abțină 
de la orice formă de corupție sau de la orice înțelegere secretă. Acestea sunt pe punctul de a fi testate 
în uns prezece dintre statele membre, prin șaptes prezece proiecte finanțate de UE.  
Italia, de exemplu, are o experiență îndelungată în privința pactelor de legalitate. Acestea obligă 
părțile la acțiuni specifice pentru implementarea normelor de drept, cu scopul de a combate corupția 
RO
116Annex 3.  Translated execut ive Summary
și criminalitatea organizată și de a spori integritatea și transparența pe parcursul realizării achizițiilor 
publice. Studiul de caz abordat în proiect – construcția căii ferate de mare viteză de la Torino la 
Lyon -  a inclus utilizarea unui instrument juridic fără caracter obligatoriu (reglement des contracts), 
în vederea stabilirii unor norme comune pentru acea lucrare publică, indiferent de naționalitatea 
furnizorilor implicați în executarea lucrării. În speță, acest instrument a extins controalele anti-mafia 
asupra tuturor furnizorilor implicați în executarea lucrării.
Cu toate acestea, la fel ca în cazul majoritatății instrumentelor juridice fără caracter obligatoriu, este 
puțin probabil ca acesta să dispună de forță legală în fața unei curți administrative în cazul unor 
plângeri. 
Vulnerabilitatea ciclului de viață a achizițiilor publice
Ciclul de viață al achizițiilor publice este vulnerabil la criminalitate. Anumite sectoare se dovedesc 
mai expuse: construcțiile și sănătatea sunt deosebit de vulnerabile. Transporturile, domeniul 
energetic, eliminarea deșeurilor, IT-ul și telecomunicațiile sunt sectoare cu risc mediu, variind de la 
țară la țară. De asemenea, în statele în care există încă o industrie minieră puternică, aceasta este 
considerată ca fiind printre sectoarele foarte vulnerabile. Achizițiile publice din sectorul apărării sunt 
caracterizate adesea prin lipsa transparenței. Serviciile sociale și educația, de asemenea, se dovedesc 
în mod special vulnerabile în privința achizițiilor publice. Se observă existența unei relații strânse 
între vulnerabilitatea anumitor state în materie de achizițiilor publice și expunerea la corupție și 
infracționalitate a guvernelor și a întreprinderilor de stat.
Întregul ciclu de desfășurare a achizițiilor publice (faza inițială, pre-licitație, licitația propriu zisă și faza 
finală, post-licitație) este vulnerabil. Faza inițială de planificare, care precedă începutul procedurii, 
este considerată extrem de vulnerabilă în aproape jumătate din țările cuprinse în studiu, și de obicei 
în această fază sunt întâlnite și probleme privitoare la adoptarea contra-măsurilor. Aceasta din cauza 
manipulării nevoilor și a alocării fondurilor, precum și a riscului de scurgere de informații.
Lipsa clarității caietelor de sarcini, favorizarea criteriului prețului cel mai scăzut, precum și 
posibilitățile de prelungire a contractului după semnarea contractului reprezintă probleme frecvente 
în majoritatea țărilor participante la studiu.
Etapa licitației este în general bine reglementată. Cu toate acestea, procedura de selecție prezintă 
un risc mediu spre mare în 60% dintre țări, datorită evaluării subiective a criteriilor de selecție și a 
manipulării consiliului de evaluare. De asemenea, recurgerea incorectă la instrumente judiciare de 
către competitori reprezintă un real pericol în majoritatea țărilor.
Etapa post-licitație, însă, se dovedește a fi cea mai riscantă. Autoritatea contractantă de obicei 
“uită” de contract după ce acesta a fost semnat, iar în multe state nu există o autoritate care să 
monitorizeze executarea lucrărilor/serviciilor.
Astfel, folosirea materialelor de proastă calitate, umflarea volumului de muncă și a costurilor, precum 
și întârzieri în executare sunt probleme foarte răspândite, în special – dar nu numai – în ceea ce 
privește lucrările publice.
Măsuri preventive
Din cauza riscurilor descrise mai sus, sistemul de prevenție trebuie aibă un grad ridicat de 
complexitate, să fie în continuă evoluție și să includă organisme și instrumente de prevenție.  
Dincolo de rolul curților de conturi în monitorizarea utilizării fondurilor publice, în statele membre 
există și alte organizații al căror scop este prevenția corupției și a criminalității organizate și ale căror 
acțiuni vizează achizițiile publice. În unele state membre există chiar organizații care se ocupă doar de 
combaterea ilegalității în achizițiile publice. Totuși, acestea diferă de la o țară la alta.
În privința instrumentelor de prevenție, Olanda și Italia dispun de măsuri specifice pentru 
monitorizarea companiilor, proprietarilor și a reprezentanților legali ai acestora. În Italia, aceste 
verificări sunt realizate cu instrumentele oferite de legislația anti-mafia.
Semnale de alarmă în legătură cu potențialele probleme în acest domeniu - corupție, neglijență sau 
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fraudă - au fost trase prin intermediul instrumentelor utilizate pentru monitorizarea neregulilor din 
achizițiile publice. Cu toate că acești indicatori sunt considerați folositori pentru detectarea din timp a 
potențialelor riscuri, doar opt țări folosesc acest tip de semnalizare adaptat la specificul național. 
Măsurile de excludere sunt folosite în paisprezece dintre statele membre. Listele albe (white list) 
reprezintă o condiție de preselecție a companiilor care vor lua parte la licitații, iar listele negre (black 
list) impun o procedură care exclude companiile  și persoanele. În toate țările, cu excepția României, 
aceste instrumente sunt administrate de către autoritățile publice. În ciuda faptului că sunt în general 
recunoscute ca instrumente utile pentru respectarea legilor sau ca potențiale sancțiuni pentru 
reputația participanților, acestea nu sunt folosite pe scară largă din cauza dificultăților practice care 
pot interveni în administrarea acestora (riscul de manipulare și dificultate în definirea clară a criteriilor 
și regulilor conform cărora funcționează).
Bazele de date sunt, de asemenea, instrumente foarte importante pentru informarea în privința aplicării 
legii. Cu excepția Italiei și Olandei, folosirea bazelor de date pentru monitorizarea companiilor nu este 
încă atât de răspândită. Din cauza lipsei unei legislații comune la nivelul Uniunii Europene și pentru că 
piețele naționale de achiziții publice limitează accesul furnizorilor străini, implementarea unui mecanism 
comun de informare în legătură cu companiile implicate nu va putea fi realizată prea curând.
Măsuri de control în etapa post-licitație
Măsurile de control din faza post-licitație comune în toate statele membre pot fi împărțite în două 
categorii : 
OO monitorizare internă, realizată de obicei de către autoritatea contractantă;
OO monitorizare externă, realizată de insituții externe independente (curți de conturi, agenții 
financiare, inspectorate de muncă etc); acestea se axează în general pe aspecte economice și 
financiare, pe transparența conturilor, respectarea legislației muncii etc
De asemenea, Italia dispune de sistem de control axat pe practici abuzive observate pe durata 
executării contractelor publice. Mai mult decât atât, Italia este singurul stat cu unități speciale 
responsabile cu monitorizarea și investigarea activităților desfășurate în cadrul lucrărilor publice de 
anvergură.
Niciunul dintre celelalte state membre nu face distincție – în ceea ce privește structurile de control și 
monitorizare – între diferite tipuri de lucrări publice, respectiv între diferite contracte publice.
Două treimi dintre statele membre au instutiții juridice specializate în detectarea corupției în diferite 
sectoare economice, inclusiv în achizițiile publice. Jumătate dintre aceste state au, de asemenea, o 
procuratură specializată pe intentarea proceselor de corupție.
Pe lângă aceste instituții, o treime din țările incluse în studiu au unități speciale de poliție înființate 
pentru investigarea ilegalităților financiare și economice și în general a criminalității organizate. 
În special statul sloven se poate lăuda cu o procuratură specială, responsabilă cu investigarea 
infracțiunilor grave în domeniul achizițiilor publice și a concesiunilor.
118Annex 3.  Translated execut ive Summary
Краткое описание
Проект „Предупреждение преступности” (WOC) (www.warningoncrime.eu) был осуществлен 
при поддержке Европейской комиссии, Генерального директоратам по вопросам миграции 
и внутренних дел (DG HOME), в рамках программы по предупреждению и пресечению 
преступности.
Исследование состоит из сравнительного исследования коррупции в системах публичных 
закупок всех государств-членов, за исключением Бельгии, Кипра и Греции.
Основная цель исследования заключается в сравнении уязвимости систем государственных 
закупок исследованных государств-членов, а также законодательные меры, принятые для 
борьбы с ними, с целю уничтожения что заставляет этих систем стать благодатной почвой для 
сотрудничества между коррумпированными чиновниками и членами различных структур. 
Особое внимание было уделено масштабу общественных работ или работ с участием 
приграничного сотрудничества.
Отчет состоит из 4х глав: первая представляет законодательную базу, доступную для борьбы 
с незаконностями существующие в государственных закупках, во второй главе оценивается 
уязвимость систем государственных закупок, третья описывает предупреждающие меры, 
применяемые в исследованных государств-членах, а последняя глава анализирует меры 
контроля, предусмотренные для стадии, котороя следует после государственных закупок.
Правовые рамки
Противодействие незаконной деятельности в государственных закупках на основании 
положений закона включает в себя различные правовые нормы и инструменты «мягкого права». 
Проект направлен на четыре области: криминальные организации, взяточничество, закон о 
государственных закупках, а также  пакты целостности.  
 
Во всех изученных странах криминализация преступных организаций осуществляется в 
соответствии с Рамочным Решением Совета Европейского Союза 2008/841 / JHA от 24 октября 
2008 года по борьбе с организованной преступностью, и в большинстве из них преступление 
может представлять собой инструмент, чтобы наказать группы - при условии, что они отвечают 
требованиям, установленным законом - которые занимаются преступной деятельностью, 
включая коррупцию, связанную с государственными закупками. Кроме того, итальянская 
правовая система предусматривает отдельную категорию преступлений совершаемых 
объединениями мафиозного типа, где четко упомянуты государственные закупки. Австрийское 
законодательство содержит такое преступление как создание группировок с целью совершения 
преступлений, в числе которых также может быть коррупция. Тем не менее, прецедентное 
право среди ГЧ  очень ограничено.
Правовая основа касающаяся взяточничества и злоупотребления влиянием была подвергнута 
процессу эволюции и приближении среди ГЧ, и хотя лазейки и противоречия остаются, в целом 
результаты реагирования являются гораздо более всеобъемлющими чем несколько лет назад. 
 
Новые директивы по государственным закупкам заостряют внимание на профилактике, 
прозрачности и подотчетности в качестве средства для снижения неправомерности в сфере 
государственных закупок. Исследование показывает, что перестановка правил об основаниях для 
исключения и субподряда значительно варьируется в разных странах. Отчасти это связано с тем, 
что государственные закупки являются общенациональным рынком, который будет сталкиваться 
с местными угрозами с точки зрения незаконности, а также учитывать более техническое 
рассмотрение степени усмотрения, которую законодатель намерен оставить заказчику.
Инструменты «мягкого права» приобретают все большее значение в борьбе с незаконной 
деятельностью в области государственных закупок. Пакты целостности - это инструмент, 
RUS
119Annex 3.  Translated execut ive Summary
разработанный Transparency International (TI), состоящий из соглашения, подписанного 
организацией-заказчиком, участниками торгов и независимым наблюдателем, которые 
обязуются воздерживаться от любой формы коррупции и сговора - скоро будут испытаны в 11 
странах на 17 проектах, финансируемых ЕС. У Италии большой опыт договоров законности, 
подписанных на протяжении многих лет, которые обязывают стороны к принятию конкретных 
мер по осуществлению правовых норм противодействия коррупции и организованной 
преступности, а также повышения целостности и прозрачности в цикле госзакупок. В большом 
общественном проекте, который был исследован - высокоскоростной железнодорожной 
линии Турин-Лион, инструмент «мягкого права»  (reglement des contrats) был использован 
для обеспечения общих правил в этой общественной работе, независимо от национальности 
участвующих в торгах. В частности, она распространяет итальянское управление по борьбе с 
мафией на всех участников торгов, участвующих в осуществлении работ. Тем не менее, как и 
для большинства нормативных документов рекомендательного характера, вопрос может ли он 
иметь обязательный характер в административном суде в случае жалоб, остаётся спорным.
Уязвимость цикла государственных заказов 
Цикл государственных заказов уязвим для преступности. Некоторые сектора бизнеса 
оказываются более подвержены ей – например, строительство и здравоохранение являются 
весьма уязвимыми. Транспорт, энергетика, утилизация отходов, информационные технологии 
и телекоммуникации – все это сектора со средним/ высоким уровнем риска, в зависимости 
от страны. В тех странах, где до сих пор существует горнодобывающая промышленность, 
этот сектор так же считается весьма уязвимым. Государственным заказам, связанным с 
оборонным сектором во многом не хватает прозрачности. Социальные службы и образование 
становятся новыми отраслями, в которых государственные поставки становятся все более и 
более подвержены риску. Подобная уязвимость, расследуемая в нескольких странах - тесно 
переплетена с разоблачением коррупции и незаконных действий местного самоуправления и 
предприятий, находящихся в государственной собственности.
Весь цикл заказов (во всех фазах: pre-tender, tender и post-tender) уязвим. Однако на 
предварительном этапе тендера, на этапе планирования – этапе, предшествующем началу 
процедуры, этапе, который считается весьма уязвимым почти в половине стран – возникают 
некоторые трудности с принятием контрмер. Все это происходит из-за манипуляций 
потребностями и распределеним финансирования, a такжe связано с риском раскрытия 
информации. В большинстве стран часто наблюдается отсутствие ясности в техничкских 
характеристиках тендера и изначально низкая предложенная цена, а вместе с тем широкие 
возможности для расширения контракта после получения гранта.
Фаза тендера строго регулируется. Процедура отбора, однако, имеет высокий / средний риск в 
60% стран из-за необъективной или неадекватной оценки критериев отбора, или же подтасовок 
оценочной комиссии.  Злоупотребление юридическими действиями участниками так же 
является серьезным риском во многих странах.
В целом, фаза post-tender оказывается наиболее опасной. Организация-исполнитель, кажется, 
забывает про контракт после его подписания, и в большинстве стран не существует никакого 
органа власти который контролировал бы выполнение контракта. Низкокачественные 
материалы, завышенный объем работы и затраты, а также задержки в исполнении работ – все это 
широко распространенные проблемы, особенно (но не исключительно) в отношении госзаказов.
Предупредительные меры
Из-за различных рисков, влияющих на жизненный цикл госзакупок, система предотвращения 
является довольно сложной и постоянно развивается. Она включает в себя органы и средства 
профилактики. 
Кроме счетной палаты, осуществляющей контроль за использованием государственных средств, 
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существует широкий круг организаций в ГЧ, ориентированных на предупреждение коррупции 
и организованной преступности, действия которых касаются государственных закупок. 
У некоторых ГЧ есть специфические органы, задачей которых является противодействие 
преступности и незаконной деятельности в области государственных закупок, хотя и 
существуют различия между странами. 
В том, что касается средства предотвращения, Нидерланды и Италия могут похвастаться 
конкретными мерами, направленными на мониторинг компаний, их владельцев и законных 
представителей. В Италии эти проверки осуществляются в рамках законодательства по борьбе с 
мафией.
Предупредительные сигналы появляются из числа различных инструментов, используемых для 
мониторинга неправомерных действий при государственных закупках. Эти предупредительные 
сигналы указывают на возможные проблемы, подлежащие рассмотрению, такие как коррупция, 
неправомерные действия и мошенничество. Хотя эти показатели считаются полезными 
предсказателями риска коррупции, лишь восемь стран используют некоторые виды 
предупредительных сигналов с национальными особенностями. 
Меры по недопущению используются в 14 ГЧ. Белые списки служат в качестве условия 
предварительного отбора в выборе компаний, которые примут участие в процессе торгов, в то 
время как черные списки влекут за собой процедуру, которая исключает компании и частные 
лица. Во всех странах, кроме Румынии, эти инструменты находятся в ведении государственных 
органов. Несмотря на общее признание полезности этих инструментов в качестве стимула 
для соблюдения положений закона и как репутационный санкции, их использование пока 
не распространено из-за практических трудностей в их управлении (риска манипуляции и 
трудностей в определении четких критериев и правил обжалования). 
Базы данных являются важным инструментом для обмена информацией по вопросам 
правоприменения. За исключением Италии и Нидерландов, использование баз данных для 
мониторинга компаний пока не является общепринятым. Из-за отсутствия общих правил на 
уровне ЕС и на внутренних рынках государственных закупок с ограниченным доступом для 
иностранных участников, настройка общего механизма обмена информацией о компаниях не 
находится на повестке дня.
Контрольные меры после стадии государственных закупок
Контрольные меры после стадии государственных закупок, общие для всех государств-членов, 
могут быть разделены на две категории:
O  внутренний мониторинг, как правило, осуществляется заказчиком
O  внешний мониторинг осуществляется независимыми внешними институтами (счётные 
палаты, финансовые учреждения, рабочие инспекции и т.д.), они, как правило, сосредоточены 
на экономических и финансовых вопросов, прозрачности счетов, соблюдение трудового 
законодательства и т.д.
Италия имеeт системы управления, сосредоточенные на практике злоупотреблений, 
наблюдаемые во время исполнения государственных соглащений.
Больше того, Италия является единственным государством с особыми подразделениями, 
ответственными за мероприятиями по мониторингу и расследованиями, проведенными в 
рамках общественных работ.
Ни одна из других государств-членов не делает различение – что касается структур контроля 
и управления – между различными типами общественных работ, или между различными 
государственными соглашениями. Две трети государств-членов имеют правовые институты, 
специализирующиеся на выявлении коррупции в различных экономических секторов, в том 
числе в государственных закупках. Половина из этих государств также имеют прокуратуру, 
специализированную на  привлечение исследований коррупции.
Кроме этих учреждений, треть опрошенных стран имеют специальные полицейские единицы, 
созданные для расследования финансовых и экономических нарушений и организованной 
преступности. В частности, Словения может похвастаться специальной прокуротурой, 
ответственной за расследование серьезнных преступлений в сфере государственных закупок и 
концессий.
121Annex 3.  Translated execut ive Summary
Povzetek
Projekt ‘Warning on Crime’ ('Opozorilo o kriminaliteti) (WOC) (www.warningoncrime.eu) je bil 
izveden s finančno podporo Evropske komisije, Generalnega direktorata za migracije in notranje 
zadeve (Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs – DG HOME) in v okviru Programa 
preprečevanja in boja zoper kriminaliteto (Programme Prevention of and Fight against Crime – ISEC).
Raziskava je primerjalna študija o infiltraciji kriminalitete in korupcije na področju javnih naročil. V 
raziskavo so bile vključuje vse države članice Evropske unije, razen Belgije, Cipra in Grčije.
Cilj študije je primerjati ranljivost področja javnih naročilih v 25 državah članicah, kot tudi zakonodajo 
in sprejete ukrepe za preprečevanje in boj zoper kriminaliteto in korupcijo na področju javnih naročil. 
Namen študije je pojasniti, kaj na tem področju predstavlja razlog za plodno sodelovanje med 
kriminalci belega ovratnika, nezvestimi državnimi uradniki in člani kriminalnih organizacij. Posebna 
pozornost je namenjena večjim in čezmejnim javnim naročilom.
Poročilo je razdeljeno na štiri poglavja. Prvo poglavje govori o razpoložljivih pravnih okvirjih za boj 
proti nezakonitostim pri javnih naročilih. Drugo poglavje predstavlja oceno ranljivosti javnih naročil. 
V tretjem poglavju so opisani preventivni ukrepi, vzpostavljeni v posameznih državah članicah, v 
četrtem poglavju pa so analizirani nadzorni ukrepi, predvideni v t. i. post-razpisni fazi.
Pravni okvir
Boj zoper nezakonitem ravnanju pri javnih naročilih na podlagi pravnih določb vključuje različne 
pravne predpise in t. i. 'orodja mehkega prava' (orig. soft-law tools). Projekt se osredotoča na štiri 
področja: kriminalne organizacije oziroma združbe, podkupovanje, zakon o javnih naročilih in pakte 
integritete.
Vse v raziskavo vključene države kriminalizirajo organizirane kriminalne združbe v skladu z Okvirnim 
sklepom Sveta 2008/841/JHA z dne 24. oktober 2008 o boju zoper organizirano kriminaliteto. 
Prav tako v večini držav prestopek lahko predstavlja orodje za kaznovanje skupin – pod pogojem, 
da izpolnjujejo z zakonom določene zahteve, in sicer, da izvajajo kriminalne dejavnosti, vključno s 
korupcijo, povezane z javnimi naročili. Poleg tega italijanski pravni sistem izrecno predvideva kaznivo 
dejanje mafijskega tipa združevanja, ki izrecno omenja javno naročanje. Avstrijska zakonodaja pa 
vključuje kaznivo dejanje hudodelskega združevanja, ki lahko obsega tudi korupcijo. Vendar pa je 
sodna praksa v državah članicah zelo omejena.
V procesu razvoja in približevanja je bil v državah članicah izpostavljen pravni okvir o podkupovanju in 
trgovanju z vplivom. Čeprav posamezne vrzeli in protislovja še vedno ostajajo, so rezultati celotnega 
odziva mnogo bolj obsežni kot pred nekaj leti.
Nove direktive o javnih naročilih pozornost osredotočajo na preprečevanje, transparentnost in 
odgovornost kot sredstva za zmanjšanje nezakonitost pri javnih naročilih. Raziskave kažejo, da 
se prenos pravil o razlogih za izključitev in podizvajalske pogodbe med državami pomembno 
razlikujejo. To je delno povezano z idejo, da je javno naročanje vsesplošen trg, ki se mora soočiti z 
lokalnimi grožnjami v smislu nezakonitosti, in tudi upoštevati bolj strokovno obravnavo glede stopnje 
diskrecije, ki jo zakonodajalec namerava dopustiti naročniku.
Instrumenti mehkega prava v boju proti nezakonitostim pri javnem naročanju pridobivajo večji 
pomen. Pakti integritete – orodje, ki jih je razvil Transparency International (TI), je sestavljeno iz 
sporazuma, ki so ga podpisali naročnik, ponudniki in neodvisni nadzornik, ki se zavežejo, da se bodo 
vzdržali kakršne koli oblike korupcije in dogovarjanja – bodo preizkušeni v 11 državah, ki so vključene 
v 17 projektov, ki jih financira EU. Italija ima dolgoletne izkušnje na področju zakonitosti paktov 
podpisanih v preteklih letih, ki zavežejo stranke, da sprejmejo posebne ukrepe za izvajanje zakonskih 
pravil zoper korupcijo in organizirano kriminaliteto ter za krepitev integritete in transparentnosti 
v postopku javnih naročil. V večjem delu javnih del železniške proge visoke hitrosti Torino-Lyon so 
bili za zagotavljanje skupnih pravil za javna dela, neglede na državljanstvo udeleženih ponudnikov, 
uporabljeni instrumenti mehkega prava (reglement des contracts). Slednji posebej razširi italijanski 
SI
122Annex 3.  Translated execut ive Summary
proti-mafijski nadzor nad vse ponudnike, ki sodelujejo pri izvedbi del. Vendar pa je, kot za večino 
instrumentov mehkega prava, vprašljivo, ali bi v primeru pritožb ta ukrep lahko imel zavezujoč pomen 
pred upravnim sodiščem.
Ranljivost postopka javnih naročil
Zaradi kriminalitete je ranljiv prav celoten postopek javnega naročanja. Nekateri poslovni sektorji se 
izkažejo za bolj izpostavljene: zelo ranljiva sta gradbeni sektor in zdravstveno varstvo. Prevozništvo, 
energetika, odlaganje odpadkov ter informacijske tehnologije in telekomunikacije so sektorji s 
srednjo/visoko stopnjo tveganja, s posameznimi razlikami med državami. V državah, ki še vedno 
imajo rudarsko industrijo, se ta sektor smatra za zelo ranljivega. Javna naročila na področju 
obrambnega sektorja so pogosto nepregledna. Sektorja socialnih storitev in izobraževanja pa se 
pojavljata kot nova sektorja, kjer javna naročila postajajo vse bolj ranljiva. Ranljivost več sektorjev v 
državah, kjer preiskave še potekajo, je tesno povezana z izpostavljenostjo korupcije in nezakonitim 
ravnanjem lokalnih oblasti in podjetij v državni lasti.
Celoten postopek javnega naročanja (pred-razpisna, razpisna in post-razpisna faza), je 'ranljiv'. V 
pred-razpisni fazi, ki je dejansko faza načrtovanja – tista, pred začetkom postopka – in se šteje za 
zelo ranljivo v skoraj polovici držav, se države soočajo s posameznimi težavami kar zadeva sprejetje 
protiukrepov. Vse to pa zaradi manipulacije potreb in dodelitve sredstev, kot tudi zaradi tveganja 
razkritja informacij.
V večini držav je pogosto opaziti, da pomanjkanje jasnosti razpisne dokumentacije in predložitev 
nizke cene ponudbe spremljajo znatne možnosti za razširitev pogodbe v fazi po dodelitvi naročila.
Razpisna faza, ko se zbirajo ponudbe, je močno regulirana. Postopek izbire ima visoko/srednjo 
stopnjo tveganja kar v 60% držav zaradi neobjektivnega ali neustreznega vrednotenja meril za izbor in 
manipulacij znotraj ocenjevalnega odbora. V večini držav obstaja tudi velika verjetnost, da ponudniki 
zlorabijo tudi posamezne sodne ukrepe.
Na splošno se je izkazalo, da je post-razpisna faza najbolj tvegana. Zdi se, da naročnik pozabi na 
pogodbo, potem ko je le-ta podpisana, in v večini držav ni nobenega organa za nadzor nad izvajanjem 
določil pogodbe.
Materiali slabe kvalitete, napihnjen obseg dela in stroškov ter zamude pri izvedbi del so vedno bolj 
pogoste in razširjene težave, zlasti – vendar ne izključno – na področju javnih del. 
Preventivni ukrepi
Zaradi različnih tveganj, ki vplivajo na postopek javnega naročanja in njegovo izvedbo, je sistem 
preprečevanja precej kompleksen in se nenehno razvija. Sistem vključuje tako institucije, kot tudi 
preventivne ukrepe.
Poleg vloge, ki jo pri spremljanju porabe javnih sredstev ima računsko sodišče, v državah članicah 
obstaja širok izbor organov, osredotočenih na preprečevanje korupcije in organizirane kriminalitete, 
katerih delovanje se nanaša na javna naročila. Nekatere države članice imajo tudi posebne organe, 
katerih naloga je boj proti kriminaliteti in nezakonitostim pri javnih naročilih, čeprav se le-ti med 
državami razlikujejo. 
Kar zadeva orodja za preprečevanje kriminalitete, se Nizozemska in Italija lahko pohvalita s posebnimi 
ukrepi, usmerjenimi v spremljanje podjetij in njihovih lastnikov ter zakonitih zastopnikov. V Italiji se ti 
pregledi izvajajo v okviru t. i. proti-mafijske zakonodaje.
Rdeče zastave so eden izmed različnih orodij, ki se uporabljajo za spremljanje slabega upravljanja pri 
javnih naročilih. Rdeče zastave so opozorilni signali o možnih vprašanjih, ki jih je treba obravnavati, 
kot so korupcija, kršitve in goljufije. Čeprav se ti kazalci smatrajo za koristne napovedovalce tveganja 
korupcije, zgolj osem držav uporablja posamezne vrste rdečih zastav z določenimi nacionalnimi 
posebnostmi.
Izločitvene ukrepe uporablja 14 držav članic. Beli seznami delujejo kot pred-izborni pogoj, da 
izberejo podjetja, ki bodo sodelovala v postopku zbiranja ponudb, medtem ko črni seznami pomenijo 
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postopek, ki izključuje podjetja in posameznike. V vseh državah, razen v Romuniji, ta orodja upravljajo 
javni organi. Kljub splošnemu priznavanju koristnosti teh orodij kot spodbude za delovanje v skladu 
z zakonskimi določbami in kot 'sankcije zoper ugled' (orig. reputational sanction), njihova uporaba 
zaradi praktičnih težav pri njihovem upravljanju (nevarnost manipulacije in težave pri opredelitvi 
jasnih kriterijev in pravil za pritožbe) še ni splošno razširjena.
Podatkovne zbirke so ključno orodje za izmenjavo informacij o izvrševanju zakonodaje. Z izjemo 
Italije in Nizozemske, uporaba baz podatkov za spremljanje družb še ni tako pogosta. Zaradi 
pomanjkanja skupnih pravil na ravni EU in na nacionalnih trgih javnih naročil z omejenim dostopom 
za tuje ponudnike, vzpostavitev skupnega mehanizma za izmenjavo informacij o družbah (še) ni med 
prioritetami dnevnega reda.
Nadzorni ukrepi v post-razpisni fazi
Nadzorne ukrepe, ki so v vseh državah članicah splošno uporabljani, lahko v post-razpisni fazi 
razdelimo v dve skupini:
OO notranji nadzor, ki ga običajno izvaja naročnik;
OO zunanji nadzor, ki ga izvajajo neodvisne in zunanje institucije (kot so računska sodišča, finančne 
ali davčne agencije, inšpektorati za delo itd.), ki na splošno svojo pozornost osredotočajo na 
gospodarske in finančne vidike, preglednost računov, ravnanje v skladu z delovno zakonodajo itd. 
Poleg tega se samo Italija lahko pohvali z nadzornimi sistemi, ki se osredotočajo na primere zlorab, ki 
so bile opažene med izvajanjem javnih naročil. Poleg tega je Italija edina država s posebnimi enotami 
pregona, pristojnimi za izvajanje nadzora in preiskave večjih javnih del. Vse ostale države članice ne 
delajo nobenih razlik – med nadzorom in/ali nadzornimi organi – glede na vrsto javnih del in s tem 
višino zneska javnega naročila.
Dve tretjini držav članic ima organe odkrivanja in pregona, specializirane za odkrivanje korupcije 
v različnih gospodarskih sektorjih, vključno z javnimi naročili. Polovica od teh držav ima tudi 
specializirano tožilstvo, pristojno za pregon korupcije.
Skupaj s temi organi, ima ena tretjina držav specializirane policijske enote, ki so bile ustanovljene 
posebej za preiskovanje resnejših oblik organizirane kriminalitete in/ali gospodarske in premoženjske 
kriminalitete. Slovenija se posebej ponaša s specializiranim tožilstvom, pristojnim za preiskovanje 
hudih oblik kriminalitete pri javnih naročilih oziroma koncesijah.
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